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ABSTRACT
RETHINKING DEATH AND DONATION: MEDIATING DEATH AT THE
END OF LIFE IN THE WAKE OF BRAIN DEATH’S FAILINGS

By
David Scott Henderson
August 2009

Dissertation Supervised by Aaron L. Mackler
Since its inception in 1968, death by whole-brain criteria, or simply brain
death, has enjoyed the status of one of the relatively “well settled” issues in
bioethics. Indeed, its almost universal acceptance in law and medical practice
seems to confirm this depiction. However, over the last fifteen years or so, a
growing number of experts in medicine, philosophy, and religion regard brain
death as an untenable criterion for human death. Given that the debate about
brain death has occupied a relatively small group of professionals, few are aware
that brain death fails to correspond to any coherent biological or philosophical
conception of death. This is significant, for if the brain-dead are not dead, then
the removal of their unpaired vital organs for transplantation is the direct cause of
their deaths. The aim of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the social,
legal, medical, and philosophical problems inherent in the current social policy

iv

allowing for organ donation under the brain death criterion of human death. The
position I maintain is that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that
render it ethically untenable in current practice and should be abandoned as a
criterion for determining death. The chapters are devoted to disclosing these
specific problems, which include the vexing historical ties between brain death
and organ donation, the incoherence of its philosophical, biological, and clinical
conceptions, the confusion of the general public, medical community, and law
makers regarding its meaning and use, and the problems of alternatives to the
current standard such as consciousness based definitions of death, eliminating the
dead donor rule, and the enactment of conscience clauses. The dissertation
concludes by suggesting possible avenues to expand discussion in terms of how
we might proceed in efforts to further organ transplantation in light of the major
problems that call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means
for organ procurement.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The boundaries which divide Life from Death are at best shadowy and vague.
Who shall say when the one ends, and the other begins?
Edgar Allan Poe
In Edgar Allan Poe’s short story, The Premature Burial, the unnamed
narrator describes in lurid detail his struggle with taphephobia, the fear of being
buried alive. His inebriating fear is provoked by the increasing frequency of
attacks of catalepsy, a condition in which he randomly slips into a death-like
trance. Drawing upon the public’s fascination with stories of people found to
have been buried alive, in some cases years after their crypts were reopened, the
narrator describes how this crippling phobia worsens his condition making him
more prone to slip into a death-like trance. Obsessed with the possibility of
falling into such a trance while away from home, he takes measures to ensure that
he will not be buried prematurely by eliciting promises from friends, not
venturing away from home, and constructing an elaborate tomb with devices to
signal for help should he awaken after burial. The horror story ends with the
narrator finding himself confined in a small space in pitch darkness, believing that
“all his infinite miseries” have been realized despite his precautions. As he cries
out in utter terror, he is directly restored to his memory that he has simply fallen
asleep in the small berth of a boat. This shocking incident serves to relieve the
narrator’s taphephobia thus restoring him to a life of normalcy.
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Poe’s story is a reminder of the persistent human fear of being thought
dead while still alive. While modern technologies (the invention of the
stethoscope, for instance) and embalming practices have virtually eliminated the
possibility of being buried alive, the fear of a premature declaration of death
exists in other modalities. Ironically, modern technologies that brought a sense of
relief with respect to the fear of being buried alive have also created new medical
situations that perpetuate the question, what is death. Most notably are the
perplexing neurological conditions that directly result from the use of lifesustaining technologies. Of particular interest in this work, is the condition
known as brain death. In this dissertation, much attention is devoted to brain
death and its concomitant relation to organ donation. This relation raises several
questions pursuant to this investigation: Does the permanent loss of all brain
function (i.e., brain death) correspond to human death? How did brain death gain
acceptance in medical praxis and social policy? What is the relationship between
brain death and how it is understood and used as the basis for organ donation?
What are the implications in other areas including research ethics and
experimentation? If brain death were abandoned, how might it affect organ
donation? May an exception to the dead donor rule be granted under certain
conditions? Such are by no means purely academic questions. The answers to
these questions touch upon everyone.
The aim of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the social, legal,
medical, and philosophical problems inherent in the current social policy allowing
for organ donation under the brain death criterion of human death. The position I
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maintain is that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that render it
ethically untenable in current practice and should be abandoned as a criterion for
determining death.
The first chapter chronicles the emergence of brain death and its adoption
as a standard of death in both medical practice and legal jurisprudence. The
connections with organ procurement, developing new technologies, and the
Harvard Committee’s recommendation for the adoption of brain death are
explored in detail. In addition, this chapter highlights the various discussions
following the Harvard Committee’s recommendation of brain death, including the
search for a coherent conception in support of it culminating in the rationale of the
President’s Commission Report, and the UDDA (Uniform Determination of
Death Act).
The second chapter focuses on the medical problems associated with brain
death and organ donation. Areas of exploration include the difficulties of
establishing somatic neural dependency with regard to brain-death testing criteria,
the questions raised by common clinical anomalies and physical phenomena in
brain-dead patients, and the difficulties of maintaining brain death’s consistency
with traditional cardiopulmonary death. To further the inquiry into conceptual
coherency, this chapter examines the clinical tests for brain death and the
problems of arbitrariness of application and misdiagnosis of the condition.
The third chapter examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s
conceptual basis, particularly since its inception with the President’s Commission
Report and the introduction of the UDDA as the suggested framework for
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determining death. Accordingly, this chapter highlights various social attitudes
and the overall general public confusion surrounding the meaning and application
of brain death. To illustrate the extent of this confusion, this chapter underscores
the struggles of lawmakers to satisfy the demands of the brain-death standard
resulting in statutory irregularities both here and abroad. This chapter also
includes the provision of a catalog of statutes representative of how states
inconsistently allow death to be defined. The chapter then shifts to discussion of
how brain death is used in other areas, such as medical research and
experimentation on the newly declared dead.
The fourth and fifth chapters focus on concerns brain death raises with
respect to the philosophical challenges of its relation to defining death. Chapter
Four challenges brain death’s veracity with respect to its definitional and
metaphysical foundation. Accordingly, the chapter will discuss the philosophical
groundwork and assumptions of the underlying metaphysics for the definition of
death under the current paradigm, the theoretical inconsistencies between the
organism/substance view and brain death based on the empirical evidence, and
particular instances of inconsistencies among advocates of the substantial view.
Chapter Five continues along these lines by assessing the various alternatives and
modifications to death criteria put forward for the purpose of expanding the pool
of potential organ donors. Particular attention is given to higher-brain models of
death. These models will be evaluated for their philosophical coherence and with
current neurological evidence. Moreover, this chapter explores suggestions
regarding donation apart from the dead donor rule, particularly with respect to
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their potential effects on the medical community and society in general. Finally,
this chapter considers proposals involving the adoption of conscience clauses for
those who oppose the legal standard of death.
In many ways, the sixth chapter is the most important, in that it brings all
the relevant data from the previous chapters together in order to assess the ethical
viability of brain death as it relates to organ donation. This analysis includes the
application of traditional medical ethics to the problems disclosed throughout
concerning brain death. Furthering the evaluative purpose of this chapter entails
the application of the principles of biomedical ethics and relevant case law to the
issue of informed consent for organ donors under the brain-death standard. This
chapter concludes by considering the ethical feasibility of grounding brain death
on pragmatism as a sufficient reason for its continued use.
The final chapter provides a summary of the major problems with brain
death as a means for organ procurement and, in support of the thesis of this
dissertation, calls into question the ethical sustainability of current practice. In
order to sustain the life-saving practice of organ transplantation, this chapter notes
some emerging technologies that may eventually lessen the need for cadaveric
organ and tissue donors. The dissertation concludes by recommending a new
policy of death and donation as a means to expand discussion in terms of how we
might proceed to further organ transplantation in light of the major problems that
call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means for organ
procurement.
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Chapter 1
The Origin of the Brain Death Standard
1.1 Introduction
Determining the moment of human death has always been challenging. In
the past, physicians and lay people alike relied upon the absence of breathing and
pulse as indicators of the occurrence of death. However, in the eighteenth
century, accounts of “corpses” reviving during funerals and the discovery of
exhumed skeletons having clawed at coffin lids created widespread fear of
premature burial. In response, a number of creative measures were developed,
including the sale of coffin lids equipped with speaking tubes or strings linked to
bells above ground and the employment of guards by mortuaries to monitor the
newly dead for life signs. 1 In the years that followed, the medical press addressed
these concerns by proposing various methods for confirming death. 2 As
Margaret Lock observes, “Whether the end point of life is recognized as
putrefaction of the body—a body crawling with maggots, or the point at which a
1

Marc Alexander, "The Rigid Embrace of the Narrow House: Premature
Burial and the Signs of Death," Hasting Center Report 25 (1980).
2

J.M. Elliot, "Brain Death," Trauma 5 (2003): 23. Elliot further notes,
“These included observation for the gradual rusting of a needle inserted into the
biceps, the movement of needles with flags attached inserted transcutaneously
into the heart, and absence of organ movement on X-ray fluoroscopy.”
1

feather held in front of the nose stops fluttering,” 3 humans have always exhibited
a keen interest in ensuring the occurrence of death.
Progress in medical technology, developed in the 1950s, brought with it a
new medical phenomenon, which presented new challenges in the determination
of death. Some patients who suffered head trauma or spontaneous intracranial
haemorrhage, would slip into a condition in which the brainstem would undergo
herniation due to severely elevated intracranial pressure. 4 Indicative of the
severest cases is “permanent loss of consciousness, absence of brainstem reflexes,
and complete loss of respiratory drive.” 5 However, respiratory failure that had
previously resulted in the death of these patients could now be delayed through
mechanical ventilation. Although the patients would expire within a few hours, or
in some cases a few days, their clinical condition would become known as ‘brain
death.’ 6
The emergence of brain death stems from two seminal events—one
occurring in late 1967 and the other early in 1968. In December 1967, Christiaan

3

Margaret Lock, "Inventing a New Death and Making It Believable,"
Anthropology & Medicine 9, no. 2 (2002).
4

Elliot, 23. Elliot writes: “Most cases of brain death are due to head
trauma or spontaneous intracranial haemorrhage. These conditions may lead to
herniation of the brainstem through the formamen magnum (‘coning’), due to
severely raised intracranial pressure. Less often, brain death is caused by severe
cerebral hypoxic-ischaemic events, such as after prolonged and/or inadequate
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Brainstem vascular events (infarction or
haemorrhage) may lead to primary death of the brainstem, with identical clinical
features.”
5

Ibid.

6

Today, brain death declarations account for about 1% of all deaths.
2

Barnard successfully transplanted the first human heart into a patient dying from
heart failure in South Africa. Although the recipient died eighteen days later, the
well-publicized event led to the advent of heart transplantation, with over one
hundred attempted the following year. 7 Early failures were attributed to the
problems of organ rejection by recipients’ immune systems and organ
deterioration due to the need to wait for sufficient time after cardiac arrest to
ensure that the donor would not spontaneously resuscitate. 8 Although transplant
researchers debated the neurological criteria for determining death, the Harvard
report of 1968 marked the first recognized diagnostic criteria for determining
brain death. The advantage this offered for transplantation technology was
obvious—no longer would transplant surgeons have to wait several minutes after
cardiac arrest to retrieve organs for transplantation, thereby risking organ
degeneration. It also increased the viability of transplantable organs because,
through mechanical ventilation, donors’ hearts would continue to beat. Thus,
despite the absence of brain activity, vital organs were infused with oxygenated
blood until the time that the organs were removed. Despite sporadic objections
from physicians and philosophers on both biological and moral grounds, public
policy embraced the brain death criterion which was reflected in American law.
During the 1970s, the ethical controversy regarding brain death, as well as
7

Tony Smith, “Clinical Freedom.” British Medical Journal 295 (1987):
1583. Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death (New York: St. Marin's Press,
1994).
8

Some reports suggest that the clinical use of heart-beating cadavers as
organ sources was taking place years before by some transplant surgeons. See
Mita Giacomini, "A Change of Heart and a Change of Mind? Technology and the
Redefinition of Death in 1968," Social Science Medicine 44, no. 10 (1997): 1466.
3

inconsistencies in legislative initiatives during the 1970s, contributed to the
creation of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission was
charged, among other things, with the task to study "the ethical and legal
implications of the matter of defining death, including the advisability of
developing a uniform definition of death." 9 In 1981, the Commission issued its
report, entitled, Defining Death, which proposed a “Uniform Determination of
Death Act” as a model for legislation. Over the next twenty years, all states
adopted, through either legislation or common law, the brain death standard. 10
Despite its prevalence, brain death continues to generate both controversy
and criticism. This chapter will discuss the criticism, particularly with respect to
the claim that brain death does not have valid justification other than advancing
transplantation research. 11 This chapter, therefore, will investigate the historical
development of brain death and critically assess the justifications proffered by
various commissions in order to promote its use in medical practice. Specifically,
the chapter will provide a brief history of emerging new medical technologies and
their effect on medical research and practice. The chapter will then examine the
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s recommendation of the brain death criterion and

9

President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Defining Death: A Report on the
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981).
10

Jerry Menikoff, Law and Bioethics: An Introduction (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2001), 450.
11

Josef Seifert, "Is 'Brain Death' Actually Death?" Monist 76, no. 2 (1993).
4

explore the motivations behind the recommendation. Finally, the chapter will
address and evaluate the report of the President’s Commission.

1.2 Emergence of New Medical Technologies
Historically, brain death emerged at the crossroads of two intersecting
technological “advances” in medicine, i.e., artificial life-support mechanisms and
organ transplantation. 12 With the advent of flexible plastic tubing and mechanical
ventilation, 13 the beating hearts of patients could be sustained through respiratory
support when the capacity for breathing was inhibited or lost due to severe or
irreversible brain damage. In 1959, P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, two French
physicians, published an article describing certain mechanically ventilated
patients in a condition they termed comma depasse, or ‘beyond coma.’ 14 These
patients not only exhibited loss of consciousness, but also “showed apnoea, loss
of brainstem reflexes, and other abnormalities (such as hypotension, presumed
diabetes insipidus and disturbances of temperature regulation) consistent with the

12

Marin S. Pernick, “Brain Death in Cultural Context: The Reconstruction
of Death, 1968-1981,” in The Definition of Death: Contemporary Controversies,
ed. Stuart J. Youngner, Robert M. Arnold, and Renie Schapiro (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
13

C. Ben Mitchell, “The Church and the Cultural Imperative,” in
Bioengagement, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Scott E. Daniels, & Barbara J.
White (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 211.
Mitchell writes, “Were it not for flexible plastic tubing, we could not keep
patients alive on ventilators and IVs. Without flexible plastic tubing, there would
be very few end-of-life decisions to make.”
14

P. Mollaret and M. Goulon, "A State Beyond Coma. Preliminary
Report," Revue Neurologique 101 (1959).
5

modern concept of brain death.” 15 Patients in this condition nevertheless retain
hypothalamic-pituitary axis, temperature regulation, and spinal activity for several
hours, though no documented case of recovery exists. 16 Earlier that same year, an
article was published by M. Jouvet who suggested the use of the
electroencephalogram (EEG) for diagnosing the death of the central nervous
system. 17 This set the stage for discussions in the decade that followed regarding
the ethical and legal aspects of comma depasse.
Although the first successful transplant of a human organ occurred in
1954, 18 organ and tissue transplantation would not thrive until advances in
surgical techniques and immunosuppression drugs were developed in the 1960s.
Due to these advancements, a growing need for cadaveric organs (particularly
kidneys), which living, related donors could not meet demands, prompted
discussion concerning the potential source of comma depasse patients. 19 These

15

Elliot, 24.

16

G. Saposnik, J. Maurino, and J. A. Bueri, "Movements in Brain Death,"
European Journal of Neurology 8 (2001): 209.
17

M. Jouvet, "Diagnostic Electrosouscorticographique Da La Mort Du
Systeme Nerveux Central Au Cours De Certains Comas.,"
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 3 (1959).
18

The first successful kidney transplant was performed by Dr. Joseph
Murray of the Harvard Medical School on December 23, 1954. Dr. Murray
transplanted a kidney from one identical twin brother to another, thereby avoiding
immuno-system rejection, a practical impossibility at that time.
19

Nereo Zamperetti, Rinaldo Bellomo, Carlo Alberto Defanti, & Nicola
Latronico, "Irreversible Apnoeic Coma 35 Years Later: Towards a More Rigorous
Definition of Brain Death?," Intensive Care Medicine 30 (2004). Giacomini,
1467.
6

discussions preceded 1968, the year in which diagnostic criteria for brain death
were formally proposed. As Mita Giacomini observes:
As early as 1964, researchers considered redefining death to solve
several technical and ethical dilemmas in transplantation research.
The shift to cadavers as kidney sources and the superior viability
of heart-beating cadaver kidneys impelled transplantation interests
in brain death [although not called brain death at the time].
Cadaver transplants had become possible owing to improvements
in immunosuppression. More importantly, they had become
necessary owing to the scarcity of—and the health risks to—living
kin donors. 20
Perhaps the most significant discussions preceding 1968 occurred at the 1966
Ciba Foundation symposium entitled, Ethics in Medical Progress: With Special
Reference to Transplantation. 21 Included in the discussions were physicians
(two-thirds of whom were transplant researchers), legal scholars, journalists, and
theologians from the United States and Europe. Their discussions centered on
deterioration of organs (kidneys) obtained from cadavers and the possibility of
procuring more viable organs from brain-injured patients. With developing
diagnostic technology such as the EEG, the use of brain-based criteria for
diagnosing death promised to relieve concerns for donor “mutilation” from live
kidney donors, which seemed for some a violation of the ethical imperative to

20

Ibid. , 1467. Although Giacomini employs language indicating the issue
to be one of redefining death, it is more accurate to say the issue was one of
proposing a new criterion for determining death.
21

G. E. W. Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor, Ethics in Medical Progress:
With Special Reference to Transplantation. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1966). Cited in Giacomini.

7

“first do no harm.” 22 Nevertheless, some physicians at Ciba were not as
optimistic about the prospects of what they considered “redefining death” in order
to advance transplant research. These critics charged that proponents of a brainbased criterion were interested only in its use on potential organ donors and
showed resistance to its use on “themselves or their loved ones” should they go on
life support. 23 Moreover, there was some question regarding the physiologic
meaning of EEG indications in some comatose patients. Particularly, its sporadic
use in the study of coma and death raised questions as to its reliability in depicting
death. As the conference concluded, more questions were raised than were
answered. The apparent unease of many of its participants to propose a new
criterion for death reflected an overall concern to safeguard respect for the
medical profession. Giacomini captures this concern when she writes:
There was a lack of consensus on whether death should be
redefined at all, and if so, what the new signs of death might be.
Those involved in the debate were well aware that, should a new
definition of death be promoted, any uncertainty might undermine
respect for the profession of medicine.24
At that time, doctors seemed reluctant to advance a new criterion for determining
death due to uncertainties in diagnostics and an awareness that such a venture
might have serious ramifications on the reputation of the medical profession. To
be sure, beginning in the 1960s, medical practitioners began to face challenges

Hippocrates, Hippocrates, Vol. I: Ancient Medicine, Airs, Waters,
Places, Epidemics 1 & 2. Oath, Precepts, Nutriment, trans. W. H. S. Jones
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.)
22

23

Ibid. , 1467.

24

Ibid.
8

from competing claimants of authority with regard to medical treatment
decisions. 25 Whatever reluctance existed in 1966, Christiaan Barnard’s successful
heart transplant in December 1967 seemed to embolden some in the medical
community and assuage previous concerns. Indeed an “Ad Hoc Committee to
Study the Problems of the Hopelessly Unconscious Patient” convened at the
Harvard Medical School in early 1968 to propose new diagnostic criteria for
determining death.

1.3 The Harvard Ad Hoc Committee’s Recommendation
Henry K. Beecher, who was an anesthesiologist and well-known critic of
unethical research practices, appealed to Robert Ebert, then Dean of the Harvard
Medical School suggesting that a committee be established to consider some new
questions. 26 In consultation with Dr. Joseph Murray, a kidney transplant pioneer
at Massachusetts General Hospital, Beecher wrote in a letter to Dean Ebert, “Both
Dr. Murray and I think the time has come for a further consideration of the
definition of death. Every major hospital has patients stacked up waiting for
suitable donors.” 27 This was not the first time Beecher expressed interest in

25

Pernick. Pernick writes, “…decisions previously left to the discretion of
individual practitioners began to be contested by other claimants to authority.”
(4) In this important and influential article, Veatch set forth a challenge to end
paternalistic medicine.” Robert M. Veatch, "Generalization of Expertise,"
Hasting Center Report 1, no. 2 (1973).
26

The letter is dated 30 October 1967. Henry K. Beecher, Beecher
Manuscripts. Holmes Hall, Harvard Medical School. Cited in Giacomini.and
Singer.
27

Beecher Letter, cited in Ibid. , 24.
9

furthering transplantation efforts. In a seminal article published a year earlier,
Beecher wrote a scathing exposé of the exploitation of patients in clinical
research. While the article focused on problems of patient consent and protection,
Beecher expressed a concern for “the recently added problems arising in the
transplantation of organs.” 28 In the coming months, news of a modestly
successful heart transplant in South Africa would attest to Beecher’s expectation
of impending advances in transplantation as well as the necessity of preparing the
way for its acceptance into medical practice.
Christiaan Barnard, a young heart surgeon who had conducted heart
transplant experiments on canines, decided to attempt the new procedure on a
human subject. 29 Barnard recounts in his autobiography how Louis Washkansky
was initially presented to him as a candidate for open-heart surgery. Despite the
experimental nature of the surgery, Washkansky readily accepted the eighty
percent chance he was given for the procedure. Although Washkansky’s
condition deteriorated during the waiting period for a donor heart, finally one was
secured when Denise Darvall, a young girl suffering severe brain damage from a
pedestrian traffic accident, was brought to the hospital where Washkansky was
waiting. As her condition deteriorated, her father consented to the harvest of her
kidneys and heart for donation. After a touch-and-go double surgery, surgeons
successfully transplanted her heart into Louis Washkansky. Washkansky’s death

28

H. K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research," New England Journal of
Medicine 274 (1966): 1354.
29

Christiaan Barnard, Curtis Bill Pepper, One Life (Oxford: Macmillan,

1969).
10

eighteen days later did not diminish media celebration of the world’s first heart
transplant. As Giacomini notes, “The vast publicity focused unprecedented
attention on the problem of vital organ donation.” 30 Questions regarding the
practice of heart transplantation and the conflicting accounts of Darvall’s death
raised numerous ethical and conceptual concerns. A Time editorial illustrated the
nature of these concerns:
The real moral and ethical difficulty in heart transplants arises
from medical uncertainty…The surgeon wants the donor’s heart as
fresh as possible…--that is, within minutes of death. This has
raised the specter of surgeons becoming not only corpse snatchers
but, even worse, of encouraging people to become corpses. The
question remains: Where should the line be drawn between those
to be resuscitated and those not to be? 31
Barnard’s own account reveals a wait of about three minutes after
Darvall’s heart stopped before proceeding with its removal. 32 In an interview
with Time magazine, Marius Barnard, Christiaan Barnard’s brother and member
of his surgical team, recalled, “I know in some places they consider the patient
dead when the electroencephalogram shows no more brain function. We are on
the conservative side, and consider a patient dead when the heart is no longer
working, the lungs are no longer working, and there are no longer any complexes
on the ECG.” 33 Indeed, the procedure followed by Barnard is practically identical
to what is currently called, non-beating heart donation. 34
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Autopsy results revealed that Washkansky’s death was caused by lobar
pneumonia. 35 During the eighteen days following the transplant, the medical
team struggled to control infection, but with aggressive immunosuppression
drugs, infection eventually overcame Washkanky’s weakened and defenseless
body. Nevertheless, the transplant surgery was considered a success. This
surgical milestone became the impetus not only for further attempts at heart
transplantation, but it also may have provided the incentive for a committee to
examine a new criterion of death.
Within a month of the well-publicized transplant in South Africa,
Harvard’s Dean Ebert approved Beecher’s request for convening a committee and
appointed him to chair it. Ebert believed Harvard was in the best position to
undertake the project, owing to its achievements in transplant technology. In a
letter of invitation to committee members, Ebert wrote:
Dr. Beecher’s presentation re-emphasized to me the necessity of
giving further consideration to the problem of brain death. With its
pioneering interest in organ transplantation, I believe the faculty of
the Harvard Medical School is better equipped to elucidate this
area than any other single group. 36
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Ebert appointed a thirteen-member committee, most of whom were
physicians and “well-acquainted colleagues.” 37 The committee finished its work
six months later and published its report in the Journal of the American Medical
Association under the title: “A Definition of Irreversible Coma.” 38 The report
addressed several items, including the clinical description of irreversible coma,
recommended procedures for its diagnosis, and justifications for this new criterion
for diagnosing death. Chiefly, the committee established four requirements for a
determination of death: 1) lack of reception or response to external stimuli; 2) no
spontaneous respiration for three minutes off of a respirator; 3) no reflexes; 4) a
flat electroencephalogram for at least ten minutes, repeated after twenty four
hours. 39
The most publicized aspect of the report is the Committee’s reasoning
behind ‘brain death’ as the criterion for determining death which was described as
follows:
Our primary purpose is to define irreversible coma as a new
criterion for death. There are two reasons why there is a need for a
definition: (1) Improvements in resuscitative and supportive
measures have led to increased efforts to save those who are
desperately injured. Sometimes these efforts have only partial
success so that the result is an individual whose heart continues to
beat but whose brain is irreversibly damaged. The burden is great
on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their
families, on hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds
already occupied by these comatose patients. (2) Obsolete criteria
37
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for the definition of death can lead to controversy in obtaining
organs for transplantation. 40
The public’s initial impression of these remarks was that the Committee began
investigating the features of irreversible coma as a criterion for death and
discovered fortuitously the benefits it also would have in obtaining transplantable
organs. Scant references to transplantation in the report suggest that the issue was
peripheral to the Committee. Gary Belkin, responding to critics of the report,
argues that, “A more careful history of the report pushes interest in transplantation
to the side,” and instead highlights “…the combination of ethical concerns and
clinical efforts to consider limits on the use of intrusive technologies, framed
within emerging paradigms of the neurology of consciousness.” 41 While these
efforts and concerns contributed to the content of the report’s rationale,
transplantation interests were far from marginal, as Belkin suggests. Earlier
manuscript drafts and memos reveal that the Committee’s mission was to
“advance the cause of organ transplantation.” 42 In fact, one early draft concludes
with words explicitly demonstrating the centrality of organ transplantation: “The
question before this committee cannot be simply to define brain death. This
would not advance the cause of organ transplantation since it would not cope with
the essential issue of when the surgical team is authorized—legally, morally, and
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medically—in removing a vital organ…” 43 However, Dean Ebert requested the
committee to “tone down” the references pertaining to the need of transplantable
organs to better ensure public acceptance of the report.44
Additional evidence of the need to accommodate transplantation surfaces
in earlier drafts of the report in which protocols for speeding up the diagnosis of
death (to ensure fresher organs) were advanced. For example, originally the
report recommended protocols for signs of death at twenty-four-hour intervals
over a period of three days before terminating life support. 45 Transplant
surgeons, however, objected to this long interval and the committee acquiesced to
a twenty-four-hour period. In a later address published in the International
Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, Beecher stated:
There is indeed a life-saving potential in the new definition, for,
when accepted, it will lead to greater availability than formerly of
essential organs in viable condition, for transplantation, and thus
countless lives now inevitably lost will be saved…At whatever
level we choose to call death, it is an arbitrary decision. Death of
the heart? The hair still grows. Death of the brain? The heart may
still beat. The need is to choose a level where the brain no longer
functions. It is best to choose a level where, although the brain is

43

Ibid. , 1474.

44

An earlier draft stated: “With increased experience and knowledge and
development in the field of transplantation, there is great need for the tissues and
organs of the hopelessly comatose in order to restore to health those who are still
salvageable.” Ebert responded, “The connotation of this statement is unfortunate,
for it suggests that you wish to redefine death in order to make organs readily
available to persons requiring transplants. Immediately the reader thinks how this
principle might be abused…Would it not be better to state the problem, and
indicate that obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in
obtaining organs for transplantation?” Beecher, "Definition of Irreversible Coma,
Manuscript Draft of 11 April, 1968. Cited in Giacomini, 1475.
45

Ibid.
15

dead, usefulness of other organs is still present. This we have tried
to make clear in what we have called the new definition of death. 46
With the rise of advanced transplantation technology in the 1960s, a new
form of scarce medical resource was created, viz., transplantable organs. The
need for life-saving organ transplants increased exponentially as more patients
were added to waiting lists for suitable donors. The new brain death criterion, it
was hoped, would facilitate transplantation efforts by increasing the pool of organ
donors, thus providing a practical solution to organ shortages. Although the
Committee attempted to cast transplantation interests as a secondary concern, the
second of the two justifications in the report was heralded (more accurately,
perhaps) as the primary justification for brain death by major news reporting
agencies from the New York Times to the Chicago Tribune. 47 From the outset
there was public suspicion about the Committee’s criterion due in part to both the
way in which it was reported and the increasing unease of public sentiment
toward the medical profession as a whole. Reports of secret governmentsponsored medical experimentation on unknowing human subjects no doubt had
affected the public’s perception of experimental medicine. Transplantation
technology was still considered as experimental in the late 1960s, and thus for

46

Henry K. Beecher and H. I. Dorr, "The New Definition of Death: Some
Opposing Views," International Journal of Clinical Pharmacology 5 (1971): 1201.
47

Pernick. Pernick reports, “Although the Harvard report mentioned both
respirators and transplants as reasons for redefining death, all 17 New York Times
articles on the issue from 1967 to 1970 and 9 of 14 such articles from 1971 to
1974 attributed the need to redefine death primarily to transplantation. The
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Associated Press followed suit.”

16

many people it represented an uncertain practice. An impression that medical
professionals introduced brain death as a way to further organ transplantation
likely contributed to public distrust.
According to Pernick 48 and Giacomini, 49 the Committee was less
concerned with conceptual abstractions such as personal and organism identity,
and more concerned with solving practical problems. In conjunction with the
promotion of organ donation, the Committee also wanted to protect the medical
profession against critics of transplantation. As Pernick observed, “[Beecher]
hoped the Harvard criteria would not only increase the supply of organs but, more
broadly, defend the entire medical profession against the public perception that
transplant surgeons were organ-stealing killers.” 50 In addition, Pernick noted
“Beecher’s repugnance at what he considered the futile waste of vital resources
linked his concerns about transplantation and mechanical ventilation.” 51 For
Beecher, according to Pernick, the use of mechanical ventilation on those who
had no use of their organs was a futile endeavor and constituted a waste of
transplantable organs. As Beecher himself asked, “Can society afford to discard
the tissues and organs of the hopelessly unconscious patient when he could be
used to restore the otherwise hopelessly ill, but still salvageable individual?” 52
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Moreover, having a keen interest in human experimentation, Beecher recognized
the permanently comatose as a potential source of various sorts of medical
experimentation. Relying on Beecher’s personal correspondences, Pernick
suggests, “Beecher apparently hoped that experimenting on brain-dead bodies
could reduce the need for live human guinea pigs and thereby avoid the ethical
complications caused by using live human subjects.” 53
Giacomini offers an expansive contextual analysis concluding that, “Brain
death was socially as well as clinically constructed.” 54 He notes how various
competing and cooperating interests negotiated their claims over the new territory
represented by “the irreversibly comatose body.” Giacomini characterizes these
discussions as, “A veritable zoo of 1960s-era technologies meandered through
early brain death debates.” Included among them were successes such as heart
transplantation and renal dialysis, and failures (at the time) such as the artificial
heart and lung transplantation. One such evolving technology was the EEG, as
mentioned earlier. But, as Giacomini notes, “By 1968 the EEG presented neither
necessary nor sufficient diagnostic evidence for [determining] death to the
satisfaction of authoritative groups.” 55 Clearly, transplantation influenced the
Committee’s deliberations: “The criteria [for determining brain death] were
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deliberated within a very short time frame, due to the publicity created by the first
heart transplant.” 56
The Harvard Committee’s concerns over solving important practical
problems made it vulnerable to criticisms. Central to the criticisms is the lack of
supporting evidence substantiating the burden posed by coma depasse patients. 57
The report indicates that these patients pose great burdens on themselves, their
families, hospitals, and those who need beds otherwise occupied by comatose
patients. While it is difficult to know how patients in this state are a burden to
themselves, the notion that care of these patients is a burden on hospital resources
seems incredible for two reasons. First, as the Committee noted, most coma
depasse patients undergo conventional death within a few hours to a few days. It
is unlikely that, in 1968, care for these patients had created a crisis. Second, as
Giacomini observes, “The burden of transplantation research on scarce resources
may have captured more critical attention” 58 than the burden of care for
permanently comatose patients. Indeed, the survival rate of heart-transplant
recipients in the year following Barnard’s success was no greater than eleven
months. Resources consumed for the first heart transplant in the United States
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included $30,000 for the transplant surgery and 304 pints of blood that eclipse any
other consumption of resources. 59
Describing the burden posed to families of the permanently comatose,
Josef Seifert notes, “The discontinuation of extraordinary means of life-support
(artificial respirators, etc.) could be justified without maintaining that irreversible
breakdown of brain function is identical with death.” 60 Since 1957, 61 Catholic
theologians and ethicists have recognized that there is no moral obligation to
extend the lives of the gravely suffering or permanently unconscious through
extraordinary means. Hence, the first justification of the report that “the burden is
great on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on their families, on
hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by these
comatose patients” is unnecessary. Indeed, some commentators note that
physicians, prior to 1968, had long been making decisions regarding foregoing
treatment for patients whose conditions they judged as irreversible. Margaret
Lock writes:
Prior to 1968 physicians in North America and Europe had, as a
matter of course, quietly turned off the ventilators of patients
whose condition they firmly believed was irreversible and would
59
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soon result in conventional death…In performing such acts,
physicians were participating in a long-standing but discreet
medical tradition. As the number of artificial ventilators
accumulated in ICUs, intensivists had to deal increasingly with
unconscious patients with severe head trauma whose condition
was, in their estimation, irreversible. Although many died
precipitously, others lingered on for days, and doctors had to
decide whether to remove such individuals from life support.
Nevertheless, the practice of unplugging the ventilator remained
informal, and more or less concealed, in large part because neither
the media nor the public evinced much interest in the practice. 62
In addition, Giacomini observes that in public forums during the 1950s and 1960s,
“the sporadic criticism of life support centered not on the appropriate
determination of death, but on the extent of a doctor’s obligation to postpone
dying.” 63 Family members often lamented over the indignity imposed on their
loved ones due to medicine’s ability to prolong the dying process unnecessarily.
Hence, the crisis at the time seemed less focused on “the ambiguity of the
patient’s alive-vs-dead status, but rather… on the horror of dying slowly in the
hospital and new anxiety about the doctor’s ability to prolong it.” 64 Physicians
seemed to find little moral impediment to withdrawing life-support from patients
when they deemed that continuation was futile. According to critics, this
seriously undermined the legitimacy of the Harvard report’s first justification. Its
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second justification, (Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to
controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation), is equally questionable.
In bioethics literature, critics of brain death continue to characterize it as
“legal fiction” whose only purpose is to facilitate organ donation. 65 From this
perspective, the endorsement of brain death seems to have been a utilitarian move
lacking an adequate justification. One writer, for example, characterizes the
second justification of the Harvard report as both unnecessary and
counterproductive. 66 He notes that the first successful heart and liver transplants
in the 1960s were carried out without the need for a brain death declaration. A
careful analysis of the harvesting procedure employed in early transplantations
suggests that declaring brain dead patients as “dead” may have been unnecessary
for the retrieval of their organs. Indeed, Barnard’s first heart transplant involved
removing the heart and kidneys of a donor post circulatory standstill following the
discontinuation of ventilator support. Shewmon presents the procedure as an
alternative to brain death for procuring vital organs for transplantation. He writes,
“The procedure would not begin until after final (though not yet irreversible)
circulatory standstill following discontinuation of the ventilator and after a latency
sufficient for moral certainty that the heart will not spontaneously start beating
again if the body is left undisturbed (probably a couple of minutes would
suffice).” 67 Prior placement of arterial catheters in order to perfuse select organs
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with preserving medications ensures minimal deterioration upon cardiac arrest.
“Although the heart is still in principle resuscitatable,” Shewmon writes, “if the
foregoing of the ventilator is ethical, all the more so would be the foregoing of
resuscitation immediately thereafter.” Hence, the excision of the heart at this
point would not alter in any way the physiology of the circulation-less body in the
remaining few minutes of the dying process. “Thus,” he concludes,
“transplantation techniques could be modified (and in some centers already have
been) to fall under the moral rubric of donation inter vivos rather than of the Fifth
Commandment or the so-called ‘dead-donor rule.’" To be sure, the entire
procedure would require prior informed consent.
What Shewmon is describing is a form of NHBD (non-heart-beating organ
donation). Although NHBD is currently controversial, it nevertheless represents
an alternative to the use of brain death, especially in light of the fact that it was
the procedure employed by Christiaan Barnard in the first human heart transplant.
However, prior to the use of brain death, this method of procurement ran the risk
of producing damaged, unusable organs due to the lack of blood flow during
procurement. Today medical advances lessen the problems faced by transplant
teams in the 1960s and 1970s and the premature deaths of many organ
recipients. 68
The preceding discussion thus far indicates several important implications.
First, initial discussions concerning the permanently comatose patient took place
in the context of advancing transplantation interests in the early to mid 1960s.
68
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However, due to uncertainties in diagnostics, as well as concern for the reputation
of the medical community, it seemed that many physicians were reluctant to
advance a new criterion of death at that time. Second, despite these reservations,
with the highly publicized success of heart transplantation, this reluctance was
overcome when the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee proposed neurological criteria
for determining brain death. Though effort was made by the Committee to cast
transplantation as a secondary benefit of the new criterion, there is strong
evidence that the motivations of the Committee were centered on the
advancement of organ transplantation. Third, as critics note, the Harvard report’s
dual rationale failed to accord with the concern of the times and rather may have
inadvertently caused more confusion and harm to the advancement of
transplantation than good. Regardless of these problems, in the decade that
followed the new criterion of death found its way into medical practice and law,
stimulating further debate and refinements.

1.4 The Need for Further Refinement
In the decade that followed the Committee’s recommendation, several
crucial activities suggested the need for further refinement. First, “judicial
decisions and state legislation created a patchwork pattern of conflicting new and
old methods for establishing that a person had died.” 69 As early as 1970, “the
Kansas legislature took the first legal action in an American jurisdiction
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recognizing brain-based criteria for the determination of death.” 70 The Kansas
Legislature drafted a statute employing brain death in response to the
developments in organ transplantation as well as medical support of dying
patients. The Kansas statute included the traditional heart-lung criterion and the
Committee’s criteria for determining brain death. 71 Critics of the Kansas statute
complained that the language appeared to suggest two separate, conflicting
definitions of death. 72 Depending on which paragraph is used, a person can be

70

President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Defining Death: A Report on the
Medical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 62.
71

“A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is
the absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the
disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease,
or because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at
resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have occurred
at the time these functions ceased; or a person will be considered medically and
legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain functions; and if based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either
maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence
of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or
supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time
when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial
means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation. These
alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this state,
including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary
notwithstanding.” Ibid.
72

Georgetta Glaves-Innis, "Organ Donation and Incompetents: Can They
Consent? Comparative Analysis of American and Canadian Laws of Consent and
Brain Death Determination," Touro International Law Review 10 (1994).
25

dead or alive. 73 Attempting to correct the problems of the Kansas statute,
Professor Alexander Morgan Capron and Dr. Leon R. Kass proposed a model
statute in a law article published in 1972. The Capron-Kass proposal more clearly
spelled out the synchrony between the two standards of death and avoided
language that implied terminating treatment for the dying. This model statute was
adopted in some form by seven states. 74
Between 1970 and 1978, nineteen states adopted legislation recognizing
the brain death criterion. 75 In 1975, the American Bar Association House of
Delegates formulated a legal definition of brain death. The ABA defined brain
death as an “irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual and
customary standards of medical practice.” 76 In 1979, the National Conference of
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Commissioners of Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Brain Death Act,
which incorporated the ABA’s recommended definition. 77
Despite the approval of legal scholars and practitioners, the act fell short
in two important respects: 1) it addressed the concept of brain death only, but not
the criteria used to conclude that death had occurred, 78 and 2) it omitted the
traditional cardiopulmonary criterion. 79
To further illustrate these shortcomings, an article published in 1979 by
the New England Journal of Medicine claimed that, unlike many other countries,
no American consensus existed as to which criteria should be used in determining
a brain death diagnosis. 80 Moreover, the article pointed out that despite the fact
that many articles had been written claiming that brain death criteria were
“dependable and duplicable,” various advisory groups had recommended over
thirty different sets of criteria. Later, the President’s Commission would
acknowledge the problem of statutory inconsistencies and the need for a uniform
standard. 81
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Another major activity in the same decade was the emergence of the
bioethics community. Foremost among the issues discussed by members of that
community were those related to death. Those issues included whether death was
an event or a process, whether whole brain or “higher” brain functional loss was
adequate to determine death, and whether certain brain functions could be ignored
in declaring patients brain dead. 82 Although these questions were not new, they
emphasized the need to conceptualize brain death for both medical practice and
legal policy.
In summary, two important factors emerge from the debates over the
Harvard criteria in the 1970s. First, the struggle of the medical community to
retain its professional power in the face of increasing distrust by the press and
public led to the intervention of law in standardizing death. Second, a growing
recognition “that the development of criteria for determining death is at once a
medical and a philosophical-theological task,” 83 led to the influence of a larger
and varied group of cultural elites. 84 This set the stage for the President’s
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Commission whose mandated study included refinement of the definition and
criterion of death.

1.5 The President’s Commission Report and the UDDA
Following developments in transplantation and the Harvard Ad Hoc
Committee’s report, President Jimmy Carter appointed a Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
in 1978. Specifically, the President charged the Commission with the
responsibility to “study and recommend ways in which the traditional legal
standards can be updated in order to provide clear and principled guidance for
determining whether such [artificially maintained] bodies are alive or dead.” 85
Assuming that traditional standards of death were outdated and incapable of
accounting for artificially maintained bodies, the Commission sought to discover
“whether the law ought to recognize new means for establishing that the death of
a human being has occurred.” 86 In addition, the Commission endeavored to
improve upon the inadequacies of the diagnostic criteria of the Harvard
Committee’s recommendation. The Commission’s report was published in July
1981 under the title, Defining Death, in which the Commission defended the
concept of “whole brain death.” The Commission, working in conjunction with
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the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, recommended in
its report a Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). The Act essentially
bifurcated the standard of death in the following way:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is
dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards. 87
Owing to the influence of the President’s Commission report, the UDDA’s
inclusion of brain death into its bifurcated standard has since been adopted in
some way by every state. 88
The reports issued by the President’s Commission and the Harvard
Committee differed in several important respects. First, unlike the Harvard
Committee, which was composed mostly of physicians, less than half of the
Commission’s members were physicians. This was to ensure that the discussions
included the interests and concerns of those outside the medical field. Second, a
related but distinct concern was to ensure that there were no conflicts of interest
by excluding transplant surgeons from the Commission’s make-up.

Third, the

Commission heard testimony on a range of issues related to a standard for
determining death from experts in fields ranging from neurology to philosophy.
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And finally, a careful review was conducted of the views of prominent members
of the “right to life” movement, to ensure support of the idea of “whole brain
death.” 89 These measures exemplified the Commission’s attempts to propose
policy recommendations that would “accurately reflect the social meaning of
death and not constitute a mere legal fiction.” 90
Central to the Commission’s report is its conceptual foundation for wholebrain death (or simply, brain death), which is attributed to the influence of a group
of physicians from Dartmouth. Led by James L Bernat, 91 they argued that the
conception behind brain death rested on the notion that the brain was the source of
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financial resources. See page 10 of the Commission report.
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integration for the organism as a whole. As such, when the brain suffers
irreversible loss of its integrative functions, then the capacity for organizational
function for the organism as a whole is also lost and, hence, the organism is
essentially dead. Although artificial support for respiration and heart rate may
give the appearance of some organizational unity, the capacity for spontaneous
function is, in reality, non-existent. According to the Dartmouth group, this lies
in the fact that the human body is an integrated organism of interrelated systems
and organs. 92 No single part of the integrated organism constitutes life itself, but
rather it is the unitary functioning of the organism as a whole that constitutes a
living body. The fact that a heart can be taken from one body and placed into
another indicates that the organizational unity of the body does not necessarily
reside in the heart. While the heart is a vital organ, it can be replaced. Not so,
however, with the brain. Since the brain is responsible for integrating bodily life,
when the whole brain permanently loses it functional capacities, the body is, for
all practical purposes, dead. The application of artificial life support, however,
maintains a collection of interrelated organs and systems, thereby giving the false
impression of a living body.
Following investigation of and debate about the issues, the Commission’s
report maintained that the whole-brain definition of death is best suited to provide
the means for accurately diagnosing the death of the person.93 Additionally, the
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report asserted that brain death was a universally accepted concept, although there
was no evidence to substantiate that assertion. 94 The Commission seemed
inclined to ensure that the new brain death conception appeared consistent with
the traditional cardio-pulmonary understanding of death. Some members of the
Commission feared that the appearance of a radical “paradigm shift” from
conventional death may prevent public cooperation with donation due to the
perception that the definition of death was being manipulated. 95 In response to
this concern, the report “made clear [that] the traditional means of diagnosing
death actually detected an irreversible cessation of integrated functioning among
the interdependent bodily systems.” 96 Traditionally, heart and respiration were the
basic vital signs whose absence denoted the cessation of organic unity.
Accordingly, the President’s report explains, “Breathing and heartbeat are not life
itself. They are simply used as signs—as one window for viewing a deeper and
more complex reality: a triangle of interrelated systems with the brain at its
apex.” 97 Thus, the traditional heart and respiratory means of detecting death are,
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in fact, detecting the permanent cessation of the integrated functioning of the
organism as a whole. In contrast, the brain death criterion allows doctors to see
through the mask of artificial life support in order to ascertain whether the
integrated functioning of the organism as a whole has irreversibly ceased. In
short, this means that the criterion has changed but the conception remains the
same.
More to the point, when the use of artificial life support mechanisms
obscures the means for viewing the traditional signs of heart and respiration, these
vitals are reduced to artifacts of the mechanical life support itself. One approach,
which seeks to explain the conception behind the whole brain definition, views
“the traditional ‘vital signs’ of heartbeat and respiration [as] merely surrogate
signs with no significance in them.” 98 The importance of these vital signs is that
when they irreversibly cease, the brain ceases to function. 99 Under this
conception, a functioning brain is necessary for regaining consciousness and
regulating the vital functions of the body.
Furthermore, the Commission recognized that its work would have
ramifications on organ transplantation. While the Commission acknowledged that
“advances in organ transplantation were a major impetus in the early development
of brain-based criteria for death,” it reasoned that current practice indicates, “that
98
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the criteria are being applied primarily outside the context of organ donation.” 100
For example, a study was conducted in which prolonged ventilator support
became the primary qualification for a determination of brain death. Like the
Harvard Committee’s report, the Commission’s report lacked a cohesive legal
framework with respect to foregoing life-support and hence saw brain death as a
means to relieve the burden of ventilator-supported patients who had no hope of
recovery. Even so, transplantation interests influenced the framing and direction
of many of the arguments contributing to the uniform standards the Commission
recommended. As one commentator observed, “It was…emphasized that
physicians must know as early as possible along the continuum of dying when a
mechanically supported patient’s brain ceases to function, in order to care
properly for organs designated for transplant.” 101 The Commission noted that the
internal organs of ventilator-supported patients undergo substantial changes
making them less fit for transplantation. Hence, the earlier a brain-death
declaration, the sooner transplantable organs can be perfused with organ
preserving medications. Moreover, given that these discussions were taking place
as new immunosupressive drugs were becoming available and organ transplants
were increasing, 102 it is evident that, as with the Harvard Committee’s report,
transplantation interests played an important role in the formation of
recommendations in the Commission’s report.
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The Commission, like the Harvard Committee, adopted a neurological
conception of death consistent with “irreversible loss of all brain function.” This
conception distinguishes patients in a persistent vegetative state, whose brain
stems continue to function, from those patients who fail to exhibit brain function
in either the upper or lower portions of the brain. Patients in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS), such as Karen Quinlan 103 and Nancy Cruzan, 104 whose
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In 1975 in New Jersey, 21-year-old, Karen Ann Quinlan slipped into a
coma and was later diagnosed as PVS. Karen was admitted to an ICU and placed
on a vent because of her inability to breathe properly. Her parents were of the
Catholic faith and remained hopeful until a meeting in which Karen’s physicians
informed them Karen would not recover. They understood the Catholic teaching
as not requiring extraordinary means to prolong life and felt they knew their
daughter’s wishes. With this in mind Karen’s parents asked the physicians to
remove the vent and after signing a release form the physicians and hospital
agreed. However, the next day the physician informed the Quinlans he could not
remove the vent unless they obtained a court order allowing the action. Mr.
Quinlan then launched the battle for guardianship of Karen and the right to
remove his daughter from the vent. The Quinlan’s lost their first round in the NJ
Superior Court but they prevailed in the NJ Supreme Court and Mr. Quinlan was
granted guardianship. The Quinlan’s attorney filed for removal of the vent under:
1. The first amendment: Freedom of Religious Beliefs 2. The eighth amendment:
Cruel and Unusual Punishment 3. The thirteenth amendment: Liberty. The courts
agreed with Liberty, i.e., intimate personal decision making and the vent was
removed. Karen died nine years later. In this case the courts talked of the need
for Ethics Committees.
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In 1983 a motor vehicle crash left 25 year old Nancy Cruzan in a
persistent vegetative state, permanently unconscious and without any higher brain
functioning. She was kept alive with a feeding tube. After seven years in this
state Nancy’s parents went to the circuit court on her behalf to ask that the feeding
tube be removed. Nancy’s parents argued if it was not for the feeding tube she
would die of her head injury and the circuit court judge agreed with her parents.
However, the Missouri attorney general appealed to the MO Supreme Court and
the decision was reversed. The court ruled that ‘the states’ interest in life is
unqualified’ and that clear and convincing evidence was needed when a life was
hanging in the balance. The Cruzans appealed to the US Supreme Court and with
a 5 to 4 vote the US Supreme Court ruled the Cruzans needed clear and
convincing evidence and there was none that proved Nancy would not want the
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brain stems continue to function, would not fall under the Commission’s criteria
for brain death. The significance of this is that such patients, under the
Commission’s conception, constitute persons, while brain dead patients merely
constitute a collection of interrelated organs and systems. Some critics of the
Harvard Committee note the lack of clarity of the report and the potential
confusion between patients who suffer permanent loss of consciousness and
patients who suffer loss of all brain function. In response to this, the Commission
sharpened the distinction, thereby rejecting appeals to incorporate neo-cortical
death into the standard.
The influence of the Commission’s report with respect to social policy is
evident in several important cases. Following the UDDA, several courts
established legal precedence that recognized the new standard. In 1980, the
Supreme Court of Washington took up several questions relating to brain death In
re Bowman. 105 Five year old William Matthew Bowman (Matthew), suffered
massive physical injuries which resulted in the irreversible loss of brain activity.
The question presented to the court was to whether Matthew had in fact died upon
suffering irreversible loss of brain activity, and as a result, medical practitioners
were legally protected when removing life support systems from patients
tube feedings despite what her parents had reported. The family then went back
to the MO courts and the courts ruled to remove the feeding tube based on “clear
and convincing evidence” after new evidence was presented. Nancy died within a
few days of having the tube removed. The case established: 1. State courts can
require clear and convincing evidence when life is hanging in the balance. 2.
There is no “right to die” but instead a right to liberty, which recognizes the right
to refuse treatment. 3. The case was instrumental in Congress passing the
“Patient Self-Determination Act.”
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suffering from brain death. The trial court employed the UDDA standard, under
which the court ruled that Matthew was dead. The State Supreme Court, on
appeal, recognized that Bowman raised a number of issues involving the
cooperation of law and medicine concerning the determination of death. The
court ruled that it is for the law to define the standard of death, that brain death
should be the standard in Washington, and that it is for the medical profession to
apply acceptable medical standards in determining brain death. 106
Courts have applied the UDDA standard even in the most difficult of
cases. In re T.A.C.P is instructive in this regard. 107 There, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that the parents of an anencephalic infant could not donate her organs,
despite the fact that the child possessed only a brain stem. (In this condition,
children lack the ability to develop cognition, a sense of pain or sensation, and
usually die shortly after birth.) 108 The court reasoned that an anencephalic child
does not satisfy Florida’s statutory definition of death, and declined to carve out
an exception in this case. 109 The court recognized that, according to the UDDA,
brain death is defined as the permanent cessation of all functions of the entire
brain, including the brain stem. The court reasoned that anencephalic children,
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though lacking significant parts of their brains (cerebrum and cerebral cortex),
nonetheless possess active brain stems. As such, they do not satisfy the brain
death criterion. 110 Based upon common law and the UDDA, the Florida court
recognized that T.A.C.P. was a “live” birth and not a “fetal” death. Although the
courts in both Bowman and T.A.C.P. ruled that brain death was the legal standard,
the Washington court held that it was for the law to determine the standard of
death, and the Florida court refused to grant an exception to brain death, thus
upholding it as the legal standard.
In both of these cases, the courts reached uniform legal conclusions
recognizing the legal standard and conception of death as exemplified in the
President’s Commission report and the UDDA. In short, death is best defined as
the death of the organism as a whole, satisfied by either the cardiopulmonary or
brain death criterion.
Despite the fact that some state courts and legislatures have struggled to
consistently apply the new standard, today all U. S. jurisdictions have accepted
brain death as the legal standard underscoring the Commission’s success in
standardizing death in the United States. Further confirmation of this success is
supported by the fact that later commissions have neither sought to revise nor
revisit the earlier commission’s findings or recommendations. To characterize the
two seminal events which brought about the establishment of brain death in the
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United States, it would be fair to say that while the Harvard Committee
endeavored to frame death as a purely medical matter, the President’s
Commission transformed it into a matter of law. 111

1.6 Summary and Assessment
This chapter explored the historical development of brain death in the
context of emerging technologies. In particular, the chapter investigated the
criticism that brain death has never been legitimately justified as a valid criterion
of death, but instead was advanced by committee in order to promote organ
transplantation. This chapter represents one part of a larger analysis in support of
the thesis that brain death is fraught with numerous difficulties that render it
unethical as a means for determining death.
The boundary between life and death has always been a subject of
discussion and controversy. The emergence of new biomedical technologies
brought new challenges and controversies concerning the proper diagnostic
methods for determining death. The concept of brain death was created in the
midst of a complex of 1960s-era technological innovations and interests which
involved, in some cases, competing claims over a curious product of medicine’s
ability to exponentially suspend the dying process, viz., the irreversibly comatose
patient.
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Historical analysis reveals that the earliest discussions concerning the
irreversibly comatose patient took place in the context of developing kidney
transplant technology in the 1960s. Due to improvements in immunosuppression,
cadaver kidney transplants became realizable as a new source to supplement the
scarcity of living kin donors. Recognizing the superiority of heart-beating
cadaver kidneys, as well as emerging EEG technology as a potential diagnostic
tool, transplant researchers began discussing the possibility of facilitating the
brain dead as organ sources. However, most physicians who participated in these
early discussions were reluctant to advance a new criterion for death owing to
disagreements regarding the signs of death and concern for how respect for the
medical community might be affected.
Perhaps the most significant influence was the first heart transplant in
1967, which inspired a surge in heart transplants around the world. This was
followed almost immediately with the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee from
the Harvard Medical School, known for its interest in transplantation, whose
purpose was to discuss how best to diagnose neurological death. Though the
published report made scant reference to transplantation interests, other
documents from committee members reveal transplantation interests to be the
primary motivation for advancing a new criterion for death. The memos of
Beecher and Ebert document their concerns and interests in advancing
transplantation while at the same time attempting to downplay its prevalence in
the published report. Additionally, rather than offering support through
scientific literature, the report offered two pragmatic justifications: 1) to relieve
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the burdens posed by permanently comatose patients; and 2) to relieve the
controversies surrounding obtaining transplantable organs. Analyses provided by
Seifert, Lock, and Giacomini indicate that the degree to which these patients
posed burdens upon themselves, their families, and medical resources was little
noticed in the late 1960s. Indeed, given that the practice of withdrawing lifesupport from ventilator dependent patients at that time was morally justifiable and
commonplace, it is doubtful that the concerns expressed by the Harvard
Committee, at least in this respect, reflected the concerns of the public or medical
community in general.
The necessity of advancing a new criterion of death to advance
transplantation also was challenged by Shewmon. He noted that early heart
transplant surgeries were performed without the need for a neurological criterion,
rendering such a move as unnecessary and perhaps counter-productive as an effort
to secure more transplantable organs. Pernick suggested that other interests
contributed to the motives of the committee headed up by Beecher, including the
use of permanently comatose patients for medical experimentation purposes.
Despite general acceptance by the medical and legal press in the decade
that followed, some ambiguities remained with respect to the meaning and
application of brain death in medial praxis and social policy. In light of varied
sets of diagnostic criteria and model statutes, the President’s Commission in 1981
published its report, Defining Death, in which it proposed a conceptual basis for
brain death and a model statute in an attempt to make death uniform. What was
lacking in the Harvard Committee’s report, the President’s report attempted to
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clarify and amend, viz., a biological, philosophical, and legal basis for
standardizing death.
This chapter has argued that, historically, brain death emerged at the
crossroads of intersecting technological developments and interests. In an effort
to advance experimental medicine, particularly organ transplantation, some
researchers looked to the permanently comatose patient as a means of resolving
some practical obstacles in research medicine. In failing to provide an adequate
justification for why permanently comatose patients should be considered dead,
the Harvard Committee opted to a problems-oriented approach thus disclosing the
seemingly dubious priority of advancing research interests over precision
regarding the definition and criterion of human death.
Although the President’s Commission report enjoyed success in
standardizing death in the 1980s and 1990s, further analysis regarding the
controversies of the President’s Commission’s adopted conceptual framework
reveal that controversy regarding brain death continues to linger on, and in some
cases, has grown in intensity. 112 The aim of Chapter Two is to investigate the
conceptual challenges raised by numerous thinkers in regard to the consistency of
brain death with the death of the organism as a whole, calling into question its
legitimacy in the face of emerging science. Included in the discussion will be an
examination into the scientific validity of the criteria and clinical tests for brain
death, as well as the doubts and unease exhibited by many clinicians regarding the
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use of brain death for transplantation. While some have described the issue of
brain death as “well settled yet still unresolved,” 113 a closer examination discloses
reasons for re-thinking previous conclusions concerning the conceptual basis for
brain death as a valid standard of death.
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Chapter 2
Medical Misgivings with Brain Death
2.1 Introduction
Brain death was first introduced as a pragmatic solution to the problem
surrounding the treatment of comma depasse patients and the removal of donative
organs. Although the Harvard Committee recommended tests for determining
brain death in patients, the report failed to say why a diagnosis of brain death
should be equated with human death. Over a decade later, the President’s
Commission articulated a conceptual basis for brain death in an attempt to
validate its use as a criterion for human death. Additionally, the Commission
provided a model statute in an attempt to standardize brain death in the United
States. Since that time, there has been global acceptance of brain death. This has
led many to conclude that, despite questions that still persist, the issue of brain
death is “well settled yet still unresolved.” 114
Specifically, medical experts question the scientific basis for brain death,
often pointing to arbitrariness in testing and clinical evidence of long-term

114

Alexander Morgan Capron, "Brain-Death: Well Settled yet Still
Unresolved," The New England Journal of Medicine 344, no. 16 (2001): 16.
45

survival of some brain dead patients. 115 In 2002, a survey conducted in eighty
countries revealed major differences in the procedures for diagnosing brain death
in adults. 116 Chief among those differences is the apnea test, which in some cases
may lead to a misdiagnosis, or even premature death. 117 Researchers from the
Harvard Medical School also have reported that brain death “fails to correspond
to any coherent biological or philosophical understanding of death.” 118 A
growing number of experts in neuroscience, philosophy, and religion claim that a
prognosis of brain death, which will inevitably lead to somatic death, is not
identical to a diagnosis that somatic death has actually occurred. 119
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the challenges surrounding brain
death and its clinical and scientific basis in particular. This will involve an
assessment of its biological conceptual basis, giving particular attention to the
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difficulties of establishing somatic neural dependency respecting brain death’s
clinical criteria. Additionally, the chapter will discuss the various clinical
anomalies and physical phenomena that occur in brain-dead patients and
determine whether they are consistent with the “standard paradigm” as set forth in
the brain-death standard. Related to this discussion are the difficulties of using
the brain-death criterion along with the cardiopulmonary-death criterion as
required by the President’s Report.
This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 2.2 deals with the
problems of conceptual consistency. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 explore the evolution of
brain death’s clinical criteria and tests. Section 2.5 discloses and assesses data
from various surveys of clinicians (doctors and nurses) who deal with brain death
and its use in organ procurement.

2.2 Problems of Conceptual Continuity
Despite more than thirty years as the standard for determining death, 120
brain death “remains as confused and controversial today as ever.” 121 Beginning
in the 1970s, a number of experts challenged the idea that brain death could be
conceptually sustained and clinically diagnosed. 122 Bioethics literature reflects
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criticisms and calls for the abandonment of brain death altogether, which medical
practitioners and policy makers have tended to ignore. When one considers the
implications of the collapse of brain death for solid organ donation, it is not
difficult to understand why such calls have been ignored. As several writers note,
“The issues of brain death and organ transplantation go hand in hand, for when
unpaired vital organs are taken from heart-beating brain dead patients, it causes
their somatic death, as in the case of heart transplantation.” 123
Inconsistencies in determining brain death give rise to a three-tiered
problem: 1) the tests for diagnosing brain death; 2) the clinical criterion for brain
death; and 3) the definition or conception of death. 124 As Robert Truog explains:
“In other words, individuals who fulfill the tests must also fulfill the criterion, and
those who satisfy the criterion must also satisfy the definition.” 125 The definition
of death is: “the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a
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whole.” 126 The criterion is: “The permanent cessation of functioning of the entire
brain.” 127 The clinical testing includes:
…A battery of tests and procedures, including establishment of an
etiology sufficient to account for the loss of all brain functions,
diagnosing the presence of coma, documenting apnea and the
absence of brain-stem reflexes, excluding reversible conditions,
and showing the persistence of these findings over a sufficient
period of time. 128
This interrelationship satisfies each of the three levels; otherwise, serious doubt is
cast on the legitimacy of brain death as criterion of death. Brain-death supporters
are at great pains to maintain this consistency in the face of growing challenges.
Indeed, some researchers maintain that brain death cannot sustain such challenges
any longer and therefore should be discarded entirely. 129
The concept of brain death, originally articulated by Bernat, Culver, and
Gert, which had been adopted by the President’s Report, rests on two related,
though distinct, claims. First, the brain is the source of integration for the
organism as a whole, and as such, is consistent with the traditional
cardiopulmonary criterion. Consistency is maintained given the fact that after an
accurate brain-death diagnosis, cardiopulmonary death quickly follows despite
continued intensive care. This is known as the somatic disintegration

126

James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver, & Bernard Gert, "On the
Definition and Criteria of Death," Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981).
127

Ibid.

128

Truog, "Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?" , 30.

129

Ibid.

49

hypothesis. 130 Under this hypothesis, the brain (whole brain) is the critical organ
that controls or integrates other bodily systems, and when it ceases to function,
the remaining bodily systems are unable to survive.
Early in the debate over the Harvard Report’s recommended new criterion
of human death, Hans Jonas raised questions regarding the accuracy and
sustainability of a brain-oriented definition of death. Parsing out the distinction
between “organism as a whole” and “whole organism”, Jonas saw the latter as
constituting local subsystems (e.g., the continued functioning of cells and tissues)
and hence, not “affecting the definition of death by the larger criteria of the
whole.” 131 He argued that respiration and circulation do not fall into this
category because their effect is realized throughout the organism as a whole and
“ensures the functional preservation of its other parts.” 132

Additionally,

introducing the idea of “irreversible cessation” provides no further clarity since it
may refer to the function itself or to the spontaneity of the function. Jonas
reasoned that a cessation could be either irreversible or reversible depending on
which is emphasized. For example, if physicians could do for the disabled brain
what they can do for the heart and lungs, i.e., provide an external agency for its
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continued functioning, such functioning would not matter more so than the lack of
spontaneity at its cerebral source. 133 In other words, the location of the agency of
functioning, whether interior or exterior, has no bearing on the integration itself.
Thus, maintaining cardiorespiratory functions artificially simply does not affect
the status of the life of the organism as a whole.
Another early critic of the whole-brain conception of death is Robert
Veatch. For more than thirty years Veatch has challenged brain death on the basis
that it cannot be sustained. 134 Focusing on the notion that the entire brain must be
dead for the individual as a whole to be dead, Veatch has raised—and continues
to raise—doubts about whether a whole-brain conception can be consistently
maintained. His main argument is that remaining cellular, electrical, and
supercellular functions are ignored as insignificant by brain-death defenders. 135
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To be sure, today it is universally recognized that many brain-dead patients who
satisfy all the standard clinical tests continue to exhibit integrative functions of the
brain. 136 Some of these functions include: 1) continued functioning of the
auditory pathways as evidenced by brainstem evoked potentials; 2) continued
cortical functioning as evidenced by EEG readings; 137 and 3) continued retention
of free-water homeostasis through the neurologically mediated secretion of
arginine vasopressin, as evidenced by serum hormonal levels and the absence of
diabetes insipidus. 138 The arbitrary way in which these qualifications occur hardly
represents the idea that the whole-brain must be dead in order to declare an
individual dead. If one accepts that all functions of the entire brain must
permanently cease for an individual to be dead, then it is difficult to justify why
certain functions can be ignored in clinical testing. 139
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These concerns have not gone unanswered. While recognizing that all
functions of the brain must cease irreversibly before declaring that an individual is
dead, Bernat suggests, “Not all functions of the organism as a whole must be lost
in brain death.” 140 In an effort to refine his earlier account of brain death, Bernat
suggests that “Death should be defined as the permanent cessation of the critical
functions of the organism as a whole.” 141 He defines the critical functions as
those necessary for the continued health and life of the organism as a whole.
While many functions are attributable to the organism as a whole, only the
critical functions such as breathing, circulation, and awareness matter in assessing
whether the critical system of the organism as a whole has been destroyed.
Bernat makes clear that it is these critical functions that he and President’s
Commission had in mind when they used the term functions. 142
Bernat further suggests that, “With destruction of the organism’s critical
system, inevitably spontaneous fluctuations will irreversibly further degrade the
organism and increase entropy until all systems no longer retain the capacity to
operate.” 143 His suggestion is based on a thermodynamics theory in which the
brain governs entropy production. “When the brain is destroyed,” he explains,
“the critical system is destroyed and the organism can no longer survive in a state
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of minimal entropy production.”144 The loss of all critical systems of the brain
entails the beginning of this process, in which case, the death of the organism as a
whole has occurred.
Such refinements like that offered by Bernat have not satisfied critics of
brain death who argue that Bernat’s criteria seem arbitrary 145 and ad hoc. 146 In
particular, they complain that Bernat dismisses any evidence or anomaly contrary
to the “standard paradigm” simply because it does not comport with the notion
that the brain is the primary integrator of the organism’s critical functions. It is
unclear as to whether narrowing the sense of “integrated functioning” to include
only those functions that are consistent with maintaining the current standard is
justifiable. Indeed, due to the more “dynamical-systems-enlightened biology of
the 1990s” 147 a broader reading of “integrated functioning” suggests that
integration is not localized in any one part of the body, including the brain. This
broader reading poses a direct challenge to the claim that the brain is the primary
source of integration. This challenge, among others, will be considered in the
next section.
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2.3 Arbitrariness of the Criterion
According to the current standard that comprises brain death, death occurs
when the whole brain irreversibly ceases to function. As Bernat explains:
[I]t is primarily the brain that is responsible for the functioning of
the organism as a whole: the integration of organ and tissue
subsystems by neural and neuroendocrine control of temperature,
fluids and electrolytes, nutrition, breathing, circulation, appropriate
responses to danger, among others. The cardiac arrest patient with
whole brain destruction is simply a preparation of unintegrated
individual subsystems, since the organism as a whole has ceased
functioning. 148
Alan Shewmon, a pediatric neurologist, has scrutinized Bernat’s rationale in light
of the empirical evidence opposing the idea of the brain as the organ of somatic
integration. The criterion rests on the idea that the brain serves as the integrator
of the organism as a whole. That is, the integrated unity of the organism as a
whole is sustained and directed primarily by a functioning brain. If this claim is
mistaken, the conceptual basis for brain death is untenable. Shewmon, whose
multiple conversions, (due to the more “dynamical-systems-enlightened biology
of the 1990s”) 149 from neo-cortical death to whole-brain death, and finally to a
holistic, systems oriented criterion of death, offers criticisms that are instructive
on this point. 150 Many physicians cite to Shewmon’s work and that the role of the
brain, with regard to its contribution to the organism as a whole, is best described
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“as modulator and enhancer rather than integrator.” 151 As such, integration may
not be reducible to a single part or organ of the body. Rather, as Shewmon
explains, “Each part of the body, especially the brain, contributes to the stability,
robustness, and richness of the body’s vitality and unity, but no one part or even
combination of parts constitutes that vitality or unity.” 152 As Shewmon further
explains, “What is of the essence of integrative unity is neither localized nor
replaceable—namely the anti-encephalic mutual interaction of all the cells and
tissues of the body, mediated in mammals by circulating oxygenated blood.” 153
This suggests that the traditional cardiopulmonary criterion (or some modified
form of it) is best suited for determining the death of the organism as a whole.
In support of his claims, Shewmon documents 175 brain-dead patients
whose survival rates varied from one week, to several months, and, in one case, to
fourteen years. 154 The greatest survival rates were among children who had
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exhibited a remarkable capacity for prolonged survival. Other cases include
brain-dead pregnant women and other adult patients whose survival rates were
significantly less. Shewmon concludes:
These data teach us several lessons: (1) "Brain death" does not
necessarily lead to imminent cardiac arrest despite all treatment.
(2) The heterogeneity of survival duration is largely explainable by
non-brain factors. Moreover, the process of brain damage leading
up to "brain death" frequently induces secondary damage to heart
and lungs. Therefore, the tendency to early cardiac arrest in the
majority of patients is attributable more to somatic factors than to
mere absence of brain activity per se. (3) The first few weeks are
especially precarious. But those who make it through tend to
stabilize, no longer requiring sophisticated technological support.
Some have even been discharged home on a ventilator. Although
some personhood-consciousness reductionists might try to argue
that these are not human persons, no one can seriously claim that
they are not living human organisms, living human beings. 155

T.K.'s mother gave me permission to examine him and to document
everything photographically. I was satisfied that he had no brainstem function.
The skin of his face and upper torso did, however, become mottled in response to
my pinching parts of his body, associated with a rise in heart rate and blood
pressure. This spinally mediated stress response could not be elicited from the
face, sensory input from which is processed in the brainstem, which in him is
missing.
Further confirming the diagnosis, evoked potentials showed no cortical or
brainstem responses, a magnetic resonance angiogram showed no intracranial
blood flow, and an MRI scan revealed that the entire brain, including the
brainstem, had been replaced by ghost-like tissues and disorganized proteinaceous
fluids.
T.K. has much to teach about the necessity of the brain for somatic
integrative unity. There is no question that he became ‘brain dead’ at age four;
neither is there any question that he is still alive at age nineteen.” I should note
that in a recent conversation (November, 2006) with Dr. Paul Byrne, a
neonatologist who treated TK, he disclosed that TK lived five more years before
passing away at age 23.
155
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Some brain-death defenders have challenged the diagnoses in Shewmon’s
cases. Wijdicks and Bernat, 156 for example, raised doubts given the incomplete
information provided by the cases. Particularly, they cite to the lack of a
‘denominator’ and the exclusion of information regarding drug effects as well as
the details of apnea testing as shortcomings. Yet, as Elliot notes, “It seems
unlikely that all of these cases could have been misdiagnoses,” otherwise, “the
implication must be that many other misdiagnosed patients have had support
discontinued, or have been subjected to organ harvesting.” 157
To further support his claim that brain-death criteria are arbitrary,
Shewmon refers to non-brain integrative ‘holistic’ functions of patients who had
been declared to be brain dead. 158 These functions include:

156

E. F. Wijdicks and J. L. Bernat, "Chronic "Brain Death" (Letter),"
Neurology 53 (1999).
157

Elliot. , 32.

158

Shewmon is careful to define his terms and parameters. As a physician
and philosopher, his precision is evident as he lays out the necessary criteria for
testing the coherency of defining death as follows. “Criterion 1. "Integrative
unity" is posessed by a putative organism (i.e., it really is an organism) if the
latter possesses at least one emergent, holistic-level property. A property of a
composite is defined as "emergent" if it derives from the mutual interaction of the
parts, and as "holistic" if it is not predicable of any part or subset of parts but only
of the entire composite. Criterion 2. Any body requiring less technological
assistance to maintain its vital functions than some other body that is nevertheless
a living whole must possess at least as much robustness of integrative unity and
hence also be a living whole.” Shewmon, “The brain and somatic integration,”
460-462. Further documented cases of maintained survival of brain dead patients
include: I. M. Bernstein, M. Watson, G. M. Simmons, P. M. Catalano, G. Davis,
R. Collins, "Maternal Brain Death and Prolonged Fetal Survival," Obst Gynecol
74 (1989). D. R. Field, E. A. Gates, R. K. Creasy, A. R. Jonsen, R. K. Laros,
"Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy," JAMA 260 (1988). A. Iwai, T.
Sakano, M. Uenishi, H. Sugimoto, T. Yoshioka, T. Sugimoto, "Effects of
58




















homeostasis of a limitless variety of physiological
parameters and chemical substances
assimilation of nutrients
elimination, detoxification and recycling of cellular wastes;
energy balance
maintenance of body temperature (albeit subnormal)
wound healing
fighting of infections and foreign bodies
development of a febrile response to infection (albeit
rarely)
cardiovascular and hormonal stress responses to incision
for organ retrieval
successful gestation of a fetus (as in thirteen pregnant
women of the prolonged survivors)
sexual maturation (in two prolonged-surviving children)
proportional growth (in three children)
recovery and stabilization following cardiac arrest and
other complications (at least in some cases)
spontaneous improvement in general health, such as loss of
the need for pressor drugs to counteract hypotension, return
of gastrointestinal motility (allowing tube feedings), etc.
ability to maintain fluid and electrolyte balance with rare or
no serum monitoring and rare or no adjustment of fluid
volume and composition
the overall ability to survive with little medical intervention
outside a hospital (as in seven of the prolonged survivors).
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lungs (in the bellows sense) involving the “the phrenic nerves, diaphragm and
intercostals muscles.” 160 However, as Shewmon notes, given that “fetuses in
utero and patients on cardiopulmonary bypass or extracorporeal membrane
oxygenation are quite alive without movement of air driven by either brain or
ventilator,” breathing in the bellows sense is best understood as “merely a
condition for somatic integration to take place under ordinary circumstances, not
an essential aspect of somatic integration itself.” 161 If breathing is understood as
respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide), then breathing is not
mediated by the brain. Similarly, if nutrition is understood as “eating and
drinking” or merely “swallowing,” it is a brain-mediated function. But if it is
understood as the break down of food into smaller elements for absorption into
the body’s structure, it is not.
The somatic disintegration hypothesis is further weakened when the
integrative capacities of certain brain-dead patients are considered. 162 Perhaps the
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greatest difficulty for advocates of the brain-death standard, and the one that some
have suggested is “the straw that breaks the conceptual camel’s back,” 163 is found
in brain-dead pregnant women who are sustained on life support and continue to
carry developing children in their wombs to near full term delivery (in one case
107 days). 164 Commenting on the implications of this phenomenon, a Japanese
cardiologist, Dr. Yoshio Watanabe, explains,
…if the entire brain including the brain stem has indeed sustained
irreversible damage, cardiorespiratory arrest would inevitably
ensue, bringing about the person’s death. However, the duration of
this stage may well last for several days to several weeks when a
respirator is used and hence, this stage at best only predicts that
death of the individual is imminent, not that it is confirmed. The
fact that some brain dead pregnant women have given birth to
babies can be taken as strong evidence that the person is still alive,
and the use of terms such as biomort or heart-beating cadaver is
nothing but a sophism to conceal the contradiction in transplant
protagonists’ logic. 165
It seems difficult for those who advocate the brain-death standard to account for
this phenomenon if the brain provides the integrative functioning of the organism
as a whole. As Karen Granstrand Gervais observes, “The organism as a whole
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must be functioning for the uterus to remain a hospitable environment for the
developing fetus.” 166
The preceding discussion suggests several implications. First, the
rationale for the brain-death criterion, as developed and articulated by Bernat, et
al, continues to be challenged in spite of refinements. Specifically, recent
findings by Shewmon disclose that brain-dead patients exhibit a litany of
biologically integrative activity indicative of somatic life, not death. As a result,
many thinkers no longer consider the somatic disintegration hypothesis a
legitimate conceptual basis for brain death. The influence of Shewmon’s work is
particularly troublesome for brain-death advocates. In a recent exchange between
James Bernat and another researcher, he candidly admits, “Alan Shewmon has
written convincingly that the integration argument alone is inadequate. After
numerous conversations with him over the years I have come to conclude that he
is probably correct. I have struggled to discern what else is important in addition
to the integrator theory.” 167 Nevertheless, the problems surrounding the braindeath standard do not end here. They include the difficulty of maintaining
consistency in clinical testing. This difficulty is central to the standard as a
whole, which will be critiqued in the next section.

166

K. G. Gervais, Redefining Death (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986), 146.
167

Personal correspondence cited in: Leslie Mary Whetstine, “An
Examination of the Bio-Philosophical Literature on the Definition and Criteria of
Death: When is Dead Dead and Why Some Donation After Cardiac Death Donors
are Not” (Dissertation, Duquesne University, 2006): 122.

62

2.4 Incoherencies of the Clinical Tests
Maintaining conceptual clarity requires consistency with regard to the
clinical tests-criterion relation for determining brain death. Since its inception,
brain-death testing guidelines have undergone numerous revisions. The Harvard
Committee recommended testing to determine the following: 1) lack of reception
or response to external stimuli; 2) no spontaneous respiration for three minutes off
of a respirator; 3) no reflexes; and 4) a flat electroencephalogram for at least ten
minutes, repeated after twenty four hours. 168 Missing from the Committee’s
report was data from studies that qualified uses of these tests. In 1971, two
Minneapolis neurosurgeons published their study of twenty-five brain-dead
patients. 169 Of the twenty-five, only nine had EEG testing and of those, two had
“biologic” activity after having been declared brain dead. The Minnesota
Criteria, as it became known, not only removed the necessity of EEG testing, but
also reduced the twenty-four hour period for neurologic confirmation of no
spontaneous movement to twelve hours.
The most significant study to date was conducted by the National Institute
of Health. 170 This “Collaborative Study” was conducted on 804 patients, with
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data provided for only 503 of them. The limits of the study resulted in a
recommendation for a larger clinical trial, which has not occurred as of the
writing of this project. In contrast to the thirty sets of criteria that were used as
the basis for brain death during the 1970s, today there are over forty.
While brain death has gained global acceptance, the criteria for
determining brain death varies considerably from country to country, and in
different areas of the same country. In 2002, neurologist Eelco Widjicks,
published a study on brain death, which consisted of a survey of eighty countries
regarding diagnostic testing procedures. 171 Of the eighty countries, Widjicks
found that seventy had adopted guidelines permitting a brain-death diagnosis.
Although relative uniformity exists with respect to the definition of brain death,
the requirements for diagnosing the condition can differ. In some countries,
several specialists must confirm the clinical diagnosis, while in others a single
physician can make the diagnosis.
Of specific concern to Widjicks are the differences between countries
regarding confirmatory testing, such as the apnea test. Variations in guidelines
for apnea testing indicate these tests are not conducted uniformly. In fact, some
countries do not accept apnea testing as confirmatory, while others vary in the
timing of its application. 172 A study conducted by Coimbra suggests that apnea
testing may result in a misdiagnosis of respiratory center failure if inadequately
171
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stimulating, and if stringently applied may induce brain death. 173 Apnea testing is
carried out by disconnecting the patient from the ventilator over a period of time
(up to ten minutes) allowing for a specified build-up of carbon dioxide in the
blood sufficient to exceed the threshold level for stimulation of the respiratory
center. Simultaneously, oxygen is delivered at a high flow rate directly through
the trachea throughout the period of disconnection to protect transplantable organs
from hypoxic damage. The problem is that the addition of oxygen to protect
wanted organs removes the stimulus for spontaneous breathing in patients who
may have lost their hypercapneic respiratory drive. In addition, when CO2 levels
rise in the brain, additional swelling occurs which may further compromise an
already damaged brain. 174 If the apnea test is stringently applied prior to other
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bedside reflex testing (as is often the case), it practically ensures patient failure of
the other tests. Coimbra suggests that some patients could have survived if organ
removal had not been rushed.
[A] review of the literature shows that some of even the most
severely head-injured patients (GCS of 3 or 4, with pupils fixed to
light) who are not subjected to apnoea may recover to normal life.
Early labeling of these patients as dead (for transplant purposes)
during the past 3 decades has diverted medical researchers away
from developing novel therapeutic resources that could already
have saved many thousands of human lives throughout the
world. 175
Surely a test that predisposes a patient to be declared brain dead is unacceptable.
Doctors in the United States also are inconsistent when determining brain
death in patients. For example, in diagnosing brain death in children, special (and
in some cases exclusionary) criteria must be considered. 176 This is due to “many
factors including difficulties of clinical assessment, determination of proximate
cause of coma, and certainty of the validity of laboratory tests” unique to infants
and children. 177 In addition, variations exist from state to state. For example,
while most states require one physician to make the determination, others require
a second independent physician to confirm the diagnosis. 178 In two states, a nurse
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can determine that a patient is brain dead, provided that a physician confirms that
determination within twenty-four hours. The New Jersey State Board of Medical
Examiners has recently considered “easing” brain-death testing criteria in an
effort to procure more transplantable organs. 179 If approved, the new criteria
would require only one physician to make the diagnosis instead of two, and
furthermore, eliminate the need for a neurologist or neurosurgeon to confirm the
condition. As previously discussed in relation to the problem of clinical
confusion, these changes also may increase the potential for misdiagnoses.
Of particular concern is the exclusion of EEG testing. 180 In the United
Kingdom, EEG tests are not required because the death of the brainstem is
sufficient to produce the irreversible loss of consciousness and the capacity to
breathe. 181 If EEG testing is eliminated from the testing protocol, it is possible
that some patients who satisfy the other tests may nonetheless retain some
neocortical activity which suggests the possibility of minimal consciousness in
some of these patients. More troubling is the fact that even if EEG testing is
applied, it only is capable of evaluating the outer part of the cortex. Most
investigators conclude that brain-dead patients lack consciousness when the
anatomic seat of consciousness is destroyed. However, some investigators
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suggest that it is not possible to exclude the possibility that some deeply comatose
patients who satisfy standard clinical testing may retain preserved cerebral
hemispheres, and hence might be capable of thinking, feeling, etc. 182 Given the
subjective nature of consciousness, “…even though wakefulness may be
permanently lost, the preformed content of consciousness may still reside intact in
the cerebral hemispheres—at least in the cases of ‘BD’ [brain death] where there
is real electrical cerebral activity—but it is impossible to be inspected directly.” 183
The preceding discussion discloses several implications. First, although
the Harvard Committee recommended tests for determining brain death, a
substantial clinical trial confirming diagnostic tests has never occurred. As a
result, over forty different sets of criteria are presently in use worldwide. For
many, this generates further confusion and controversy with respect to the
meaning of a brain-death diagnosis. More troubling is the questionable nature of
some confirmatory tests for brain death, such as the apnea test, which may induce
brain death in patients, when stringently applied. In addition, the use of the EEG,
as a confirmatory measure, lacks universal application. This is due in part to the
ongoing complexities surrounding the nature of consciousness. To be sure,
variations in diagnostic criteria for brain death signify the difficulties of satisfying
a perpetually qualified criterion, calling into question the clinical tests-criterion
relation. Indeed, some proponents of brain death admit that the criterion and
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related testing seem arbitrary. 184 Robert Truog, a critic of brain death, calls into
question whether brain death can be accurately diagnosed prior to
cardiopulmonary death. He writes:
Unfortunately, a study of over 500 patients with both coma and
apnea (including 146 autopsies for neuropathologic correlation)
showed that "it was not possible to verify that a diagnosis made
prior to cardiac arrest by any set or subset of criteria would
invariably correlate with a diffusely destroyed brain." On the basis
of these data, a definition that required total brain destruction could
only be confirmed at autopsy. Clearly, a condition that could only
be determined after death could never be a requirement for
declaring death. 185
Physicians and nurses acutely experience these uncertainties, particularly those
who are involved in organ procurement and transplantation procedures. While
many clinicians “feel comfortable” with brain death as the standard by which to
declare human death, others are uneasy with it in practice. The nature of their
uneasiness will be the focus of the next section.

2.5 Doubts Among Clinicians
Chief among clinicians’ doubts is the way in which the brain-dead display
behavior indicative of life, not death. Many patients who satisfy the standard tests
for brain death often exhibit unusual physical movements. These include, unusual
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spontaneous movements, such as the “Lazarus” sign 186 , unusual extension and
rotation of limbs, referred to as “decerebrate posture,” 187 and the continuation of
heart rates for brain-dead patients for months, and sometimes years.188 For some
clinical investigators, this indicates that continued brain function remains. As
David Hill, an anaesthetist, expressed: "A measure of life is the continuing
hypothalamic function which controls body temperature. If the patient is warm
then that part of the brain is functioning." 189 All of these phenomena, it is argued,
are indicative of some remaining integrative function in the so-called “dead
brains” of patients who satisfy the tests.
Those who are most closely associated with the removal of donor organs
express unease and doubts that brain death is not actually death. When
considering the experiences of surgical organ transplant team members involved
in organ retrieval, it is easy to understand why. Brain-dead “corpses” rarely act
like other corpses. When surgeons insert scalpels to surgically remove the organs
from the brain-dead corpses, the heart rates and pulses increase and bodily
movements suggest “fear and panic.” 190 In some cases, the reactions suggest
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“coordinated attempts to ‘grab the knife.’” 191 The solution to this reaction is to
immobilize the patient by administering paralyzing drugs. An anaesthetist in the
United Kingdom has expressed the concerns of many surgeons who have
participated in the procurement of organs:
Almost everyone will say they have felt uneasy about it. Nurses get
really, really upset. You stick the knife in and the pulse and blood
pressure shoot up. If you don't give anything at all, the patient will
start moving and wriggling around and it's impossible to do the
operation. The surgeon always asked us to paralyze the patient. 192
These concerns have prompted one physician to quip, “I don't carry a donor card
at the moment because I know what happens.” 193 Indicative of this uncertainty is
the reluctance of many intensivists to become organ donors. One survey discloses
that among intensivists, only about nineteen percent are card-carrying organ
donors. 194 Lock reports that none of the reasons given for failing to sign organ
donor cards is convincing.
Reports of uneasiness from nursing staff and physicians of transplant
teams are not uncommon. Such uneasiness stems from the belief that they
actually killed the organ donors. 195 Nurses, too, believe this and have recorded
the time of death of donors after the retrieval surgery. 196 Perhaps the most
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difficult task for nurses in the management of patients who have been diagnosed
as brain dead is to suppress their own intuitive sense that the patient is not yet
dead. 197 This counter-intuitive notion is further confounded when the brain-dead
are seen to yawn, cough, or cry. 198 While most accept the rationale for brain
death, it is nonetheless taxing on one’s acuity to consider a patient who remains
warm, pink, with an independently beating heart as dead. Moreover, transplant
surgeons convey continued uneasiness with the difficult job of organ procurement
even after multiple surgeries. Dr. David Evans, for example, states that
physicians do not seem to get over the uneasiness of organ procurement, despite
doing it many times. 199
In the study of organ procurement, Margaret Lock reports that, although
all of the physicians she interviewed agree that accurate brain-death diagnoses are
robust, simple, and infallible, they do not believe that patients are biologically
dead when taken to the operating room for organ retrieval. She reports that none
of the physicians interviewed thinks brain death is the end of biological life,
though they believe that brain death is an irreversible diagnosis. 200 Despite
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uniformity among clinicians regarding the irreversibility of brain death, doubts
and uncertainty still remain as to its accuracy in depicting human death.
Given the prevalence of doubts and uncertainties among health care
professionals who diagnose and declare brain death, it seems sensible to think that
similar doubts and uncertainties about brain death exist in the community at large,
including a deep-seated fear of being declared dead while still alive. As Michael
Potts points out, “A deep seated fear may yet be rational.” 201 Further
investigation regarding public sentiment on brain death will be the subject of
Chapter Three.

2.6 Summary and Assessment
In the previous chapter a historical analysis was conducted in an effort to
chronicle the development of brain death as well as the rationale for its
incorporation into medical praxis and social policy. It was argued that the
proposed justifications for advancing a brain-based criterion for death were based
not on conceptual or biological grounds, but rather on desires to advance
experimental medicine—most directly transplantation efforts. In support of the
central thesis of this dissertation, this argument demonstrates that the way in
which the brain-death standard arose has contributed greatly to ongoing
controversy and confusion regarding its meaning and application in law and
medicine.
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The focus of Chapter Two was to explore the clinical and scientific
challenges to brain death. Specifically, several important implications emerged.
First, this chapter began by exploring the conceptual foundation for brain death as
advanced by Bernat and colleagues in conjunction with the President’s
Commission report. From its inception, brain death, understood as the permanent
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, has been criticized at its conceptual
basis. Section 2.2 focused on early critics, such as Jonas and Veatch, who pointed
out that despite satisfying all the standard clinical tests, many brain-dead patients
continue to exhibit neurological activity in some form. Additionally, clinical
anomalies and physical phenomena in brain-dead patients suggest that not all
neurological functions have ceased. In full recognition of these problems, braindeath supporters have attempted to qualify which functions (deemed “critical”)
should count in constituting the conceptual foundation that the brain is the
primary integrator of the organism as a whole.
Their attempts notwithstanding, it is increasingly apparent that the
conceptual foundation for brain death is crumbling. As section 2.3 made clear,
there is substantial evidence for continued somatic integrative life in brain-dead
patients. The evidence included a litany of non-brain integrative functions that
continue in patients, despite satisfying the clinical tests for brain death. Perhaps
the greatest challenge to the somatic disintegration hypothesis, is brain-dead
pregnant women who continue to provide a hospitable environment for fetal
development.

Yet some still seem to ignore the mounting evidence against

neurologic somatic dependence in these patients. This seems arbitrary, at best.
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Given Bernat’s admission that somatic integration is insufficient to ground brain
death, the first claim upon which the conception is based collapses. Simply put,
most integrative functions are not brain mediated. As such, the primacy of the
brain with respect to somatic integration is seriously challenged. 202 It would seem
that brain-dead individuals are alive as long as at least one integrative bodily
system remains in tact (the circulatory system being the key). 203
Moreover, the second claim regarding consistency within the bifurcated
standard cannot be sustained. When the brain dies, bodily functions may continue
for some time when life-support measures are provided. Jonas has pointed out
that maintaining cardiorespiratory functions “artificially” does not affect the life
of the organism as a whole. Given that certain capacities can be supplemented, as
is the case with brain-dead patients, such capacities cannot be said to constitute
life, or with their permanent loss, death. Rather, it is what these capacities do that
constitute life, i.e., sustaining bodily functioning. Since these capacities can be
supplemented, then life can continue despite the loss of certain capacities.
Advanced technologies will no doubt continue to supplement the loss of particular
brain functions. 204 Should they become readily available, then it appears Jonas’
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inquiry concerning what matters most (i.e., the functioning itself or the lack of
spontaneity at its cerebral source) becomes all the more relevant. Understood in
this way, brain death may be a form of reductionism, particularly when viewed as
a lack of capacity for consciousness, respiration, and heart rate, even when these
capacities are supplemented.
While brain death has been accepted worldwide as the standard for
determining death, clinicians’ inability to uniformly apply the testing criteria
suggests that the concept of brain death is flawed as well. In particular, section
2.4 revealed the lack of coherence with respect to the criterion-tests relation.
While brain death has been accepted by most modern countries, clinical testing
varies greatly from country to country, state to state, and in some cases from
hospital to hospital, depending on which of the forty available sets of criteria are
utilized. Currently lacking is a thorough clinical trial capable of establishing
uniformity with respect to the proper diagnostic tests in confirming the criterion.
Recent challenges regarding confirmatory testing, such as the use of the apnea test
or the meaning of EEG analysis, demonstrate a lack of understanding with regard
to the proper tools for confirming a diffusely destroyed brain. Indeed, data
indicates that, at present, brain death cannot be confirmed prior to autopsy
following cardiopulmonary death.
Adding to these concerns are the doubts and unease of clinicians,
highlighted in section 2.5, who are directly involved in the organ procurement
process. Given that brain-dead patients often exhibit behavior indicative of life,
not death, some transplant team members struggle in their efforts to suppress their
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intuitive sense that those who are declared to be brain dead are not really dead.
That these uncertainties are influential is evidenced by the fact that few clinicians
directly involved in organ procurement carry organ donor cards. But if the
analysis to this point is correct, it is not clear why clinicians and patient relatives
ought to suppress their intuitions concerning the brain dead. Perhaps, as Potts has
suggested, fear has its basis in reason.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to relate how the conclusions of this
chapter contribute to the central thesis of this dissertation. Thus far, it has been
noted that the conceptual foundation for brain death is crumbling due to the
overwhelming data contradicting both its biological basis as well as its clinical
coherency. Contributing to the analysis undertaken in this dissertation to examine
the social, legal, medical, and philosophical problems of brain death, this chapter
contributes to the central thesis that brain death is ethically untenable due to its
lack of a biologically coherent foundation.
Further analysis entails an examination of social policy issues related to
brain death. Chapter Three examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s
conceptual basis, particularly since its inception with the President’s Commission
Report and the introduction of the UDDA as the suggested framework for
determining death. Various social attitudes and overall general public confusion
surrounding the meaning and application of brain death are explored. To
illustrate the extent of this problem, the struggles of lawmakers to satisfy the
demands of the brain-death standard resulting in statutory irregularities both here
and abroad are underscored. Chapter Three catalogs how states define death.
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Moreover, it is important to discuss how brain death is used in other areas, such as
medical research and experimentation on the newly declared dead. These uses
generate important moral, ethical, and policy questions regarding the scope and
extent of application.

78

Chapter 3
Social Policy Problems with Brain Death
3.1 Introduction
Prior to the advent of advanced medical technologies, the moment of death
seemed clearly definable; namely, when all visible life signs have ceased, then the
person is dead. For most, the absence of such signs was definitive and final.
Public attitudes about death were shaped largely by shared experiences often
steeped in religious and family traditions. Common deathbed scenes at home
with families gathered around a loved one waiting in vigil for the final draw of
breath and exhalation reflect a by-gone era. 205 Today, medical institutions
regulate and organize death to such an extent that families often have to be told
when their loved ones have died. Life-sustaining technologies not only expand
the time to death, but also have altered, in some cases, the way in which death is
now conceived. Most important among these advanced medical technologies is
the influence of organ transplantation. In previous chapters it was argued that the
need for obtaining transplantable life-saving organs from cadaver donors has in
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large measure shaped and expanded the criteria of death, which ultimately led to
the inclusion of brain death. That process, beginning in the late 1960s has been
little informed, if any, by public attitudes and opinions. For the most part, the
debate about brain death has occupied a relatively small group of professionals.
Although a clear consensus of acceptance exists, the public in general remains
confused and poorly informed about the controversies surrounding brain death
and organ donation.
Additional confusion is evident as lawmakers attempt to craft statutes in
order to satisfy a standard about which they have little understanding. Though
most states follow the Uniform Determination of Death Act as the framework for
the determination of death, applying the bifurcated standard does not lead to
consistency in how states allow for a determination of death. Statutory
irregularities are common, indicating for some that defining death is outside the
purview of law. 206 This is significant, given the overall goals of both the
President’s Commission and the UDDA to facilitate termination of treatment,
improve organ supply, and make death uniform. Despite widespread adoption of
brain death, problems of “overtreatment—the continuation of life-sustaining
treatment on patients who have no reasonable prospects for meaningful survival
and often no clear interest in or desire for such treatment” 207 —and a widening gap
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between organ supply and demand indicate the problems are more widespread
today than in 1968.
Although brain death is most often associated with organ donation, many
are unaware of its unsettling use in certain areas of medical research and
development. Performing medical procedures on the newly dead or dying is a
traditional training activity among physicians. 208 Experiments and other
procedures vary from endotracheal intubation and central venous catheter
insertion to the administration of certain drugs to measure effectiveness. It is
argued by some physicians that since corpses no longer have autonomy, and
families have limited determination over a decedent’s remains, consent is
unnecessary for training purposes. Issues of informed consent and the treatment
of the dead come into question upon consideration of the methods of
experimentation and resuscitation of the newly dead for research purposes. What
is more, if the brain dead (sometimes referred to as “biomorts”) are not really
dead, then further troubling implications arise, deserving careful examination.
This chapter examines the ongoing problems of brain death’s conceptual
basis, particularly since the President’s Commission Report and the introduction
of the UDDA as a model framework for standardizing death in the US. This will
involve an assessment of social attitudes and ongoing public confusion
surrounding the meaning and application of brain death. Related to this
discussion is the way in which influential pro-life groups have rationalized their
208
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acceptance of brain death. Additionally, the chapter will discuss the measure of
success purported by supporters of the UDDA, despite ongoing inconsistencies in
statutory law. Finally, this chapter considers how brain death is used in other
areas, such as medical research, training, and experimentation on the newly
declared dead.
This chapter is divided into four parts. Section 3.2 deals with the
problems of general societal confusion. Section 3.3 explores the rationale of
various pro-life groups regarding their acceptance of brain death. Section 3.4
assesses the way in which some states have attempted to incorporate the UDDA
into statutory from. Section 3.5 discloses the way in which brain death is applied
into areas of medical training and experimentation.

3.2 Social Attitudes and Public Confusion
There is little doubt that public attitudes regarding the diagnosis of death
were aroused as news coverage of Christaan Barnard’s first heart transplant raised
ethical concerns about the practice. As early as 1968, a survey of public attitudes
toward the determination of death revealed that popular awareness had been
influenced by the reports. Of the 112 people surveyed, about sixty percent
indicated they had “[given] thought to the issues of how death is determined.”
Nevertheless, only nine percent “thought of death in terms of irreversible loss of
cerebral function.” 209 A few years later, another survey indicated that sixty
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percent of lay people, forty-two percent of medical students, and forty-six percent
of physicians did not consider brain death an adequate criterion for death. 210
In the decade that followed, the popular press and scholarly publications
continued to question the theoretical and moral bases of neurological death. 211
Regardless of these challenges, more recent evidence suggests a greater
acceptance of brain death, due in great measure to its commonplace use. Yet
what is unclear is whether the term brain death is sufficiently understood by both
laity and professionals alike.
Youngner, in a 1992 article, notes the problems of linguistic ambiguity
regarding the use of the term brain death and the ongoing debate concerning the
whole-brain and higher-brain definitions of death. 212 Any semblance of
consensus, he notes, is both superficial and fragile, given public confusion on the
meaning of the term. In a noteworthy study delivered at the 1996 Annual
Meeting of the Division of Transplantation, significant gaps were found to exist in
families’ understanding of brain death despite the fact that 95.7 percent discussed
brain death with their relatives’ physicians. Indeed, of the 164 donor and nondonor families surveyed in the study, forty-five percent could not differentiate
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between brain death and coma, and 31.7 percent believed that a brain dead patient
could recover. 213
More recent surveys of public attitudes and beliefs about death and
donation reveal similar findings. 214 Of particular note is a recent survey revealing
that, “in every country 20 to 40% of the population doubts the idea of brain
death.” 215 In the United States, Siminoff et al 216 report that while ninety-eight
percent of survey respondents were aware of the term “brain death”, only about
one third believed that a brain-dead patient is legally dead. While roughly eightysix percent were able, under a certain scenario, to identify a brain-dead patient as
dead, about fifty-seven percent confused patients in a coma as dead and 34.1
percent identified PVS (persistent vegetative state) patients as dead. Regarding
the desire to donate organs under different scenarios, most respondents were
unwilling to violate the dead donor rule. However, a substantial minority (33.5
percent) was willing to donate the organs of patients under certain scenarios they
classified as still alive. This study concluded with a call for further public
dialogue and education concerning brain death and donation.
213
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The preceding chapter illustrated substantial variation with regard to the
clinical testing methods employed by health-care professionals to determine brain
death. Among those professionals who should have intimate knowledge of braindeath criteria and its application, further detailed examination of their knowledge
reveals that misinformation and confusion still exists. One survey reports that of
the 195 physicians and nurses likely to be involved in organ procurement, only
thirty-five percent were able to correctly identify both the legal and medical
criteria for brain death. 217 Another study reveals that one-half of ICU nurses
believe physicians were unsure of the criteria for determining organ donor
eligibility, while one-third of nurses also expressed their own uncertainty of the
criteria. 218 Moreover, a 2006 article reported a survey that revealed “significant
confusion about the concept of BD among pediatric intensivists.” 219 In an effort
to determine whether pediatric intensivists are aware of the controversies
surrounding the concept of brain death, the authors reported that among those
comfortable diagnosing brain death, only twenty-two percent identified brain
death with the loss of integration of the organism as a whole. The report
217
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concluded with a call to the medical community to reconsider whether brain death
is equivalent to death.
Additionally, this author conducted formal and informal surveys among
physicians in three community hospitals in West Virginia and Ohio. 220
Physicians who had experience with cadaveric organ procurement registered
significant opposition to the use of brain death. Some of these physicians
indicated that their experience led them to oppose organ donation and admitted
encouraging other health-care providers to do the same because of their first-hand
knowledge of the details of the organ procurement process. 221 While most
physicians indicated they were organ donors and encouraged their patients to
become donors, many of these same physicians exhibited a lack of awareness
with regard to the controversies surrounding brain death. More than two-thirds
expressed they were concerned or troubled upon disclosure of the details of these
controversies. 222 In the final analysis, most physicians, while able to identify the
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brain-death criterion as stated in the UDDA, nonetheless exhibited confusion and
uncertainty with respect to the legitimacy of its application in the clinical setting.
This confusion and uncertainty extends to the experiences of donor
families as well. Commenting on his personal experiences with donor family
members, one bioethicist writes,
When members of the family later investigate and find out, for
instance, sometimes for the first time, that organs are taken while
the heart still beats, or that the practice is to administer a general
anesthetic to donors for the harvesting operation (which the
relatives often interpret as implying the need to suppress capacity
to feel pain indicating continued brain function), they may be
extremely distressed and feel exploited. 223
He further notes that in many of the accounts given by donor families, “the
matter of being confronted by the concept and reality of death by brain death, and
being asked for consent to donation, was later seen as part of the original
trauma.” 224 In other words, the trauma of events which occur for the sake of
organ donation, added to the devastating events of the brain injury suffered by the
relative, often cause family members to feel assailed or assaulted. Indeed, many
times after having agreed to organ donation, family members expressed doubt as
to whether their loved one was in fact dead at the time of organ procurement.
Often overlooked is the fact that the grieving process experienced by family
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members can be greatly complicated in such circumstances by the notion that they
have betrayed their loved-one. 225
In the aftermath of the surgical removal of their children’s organs, mothers
often express a sense of betrayal and guilt for their consent to a procedure and
event (brain death) the details of which they were uninformed. As a case in point,
one mother describes the pressures and uncertainties of being confronted with the
prospects of donating her fifteen year-old son’s organs after he suffered a tragic
accident and was later diagnosed as brain dead. She laments, “The doctor urged
us to consent as there were other parents being as desperate as we sitting at the
bedside of their children but we were able to help them! I didn't want anyone to
die neither my child nor any other children.” 226 Depicting her uncertainties about
the meaning of her son’s brain-death diagnosis, she expresses how she “had to say
goodbye to him forever while he was still treated while he was warm while the
monitors were on and while he was given infusions.” She continues, “I failed to
see that he was ‘dead’, but believed in what the doctors said and trusted them.” 227
However, after looking through the medical report and discovering three different
death notices, she asks, “How often can a human being die, how many deaths can
he die?” To complicate matters further, the family discovered after the surgery
that, unknown to them at the time, their consent included their son’s heart, liver,
225

Ibid.

226

Renate Greinert, "Renate Greinert's Story," The Life Guardian,
(accessed 28 October 2007); available from:
http://thelifeguardian.com/?action=mother_greinert.
227

Ibid.

88

kidneys, eyes, and the removal of his pelvic bones, which were sold. In an
expression of guilt and betrayal, the boy’s mother writes, “Our consent to the
removal of one organ had been changed into a multi-organ removal without
asking us. The last sight of my child burnt itself into my soul. When I think of
him I have to fight the horrible impression that he was looking so undignified and
exploited. This sight of my son still haunts me in my dreams.” 228
This mother is not alone in expressing her doubts and anguish concerning
her personal experience in consenting to donation under the brain-death criterion.
After exhibiting similar frustrations with the process of consenting to donation of
her son’s organs, another mother quips, “The lives of a lot of donor families have
been shaken, and many of us have lost their [sic] peace of mind.” 229 Believing
that the process lacks relevant disclosure for informed consent, she offers this
eight-fold advice:









228

You have the right simply to say NO, especially when they ask
you about the presumed will of your brain dead family
member.
If you are willing to donate your organs, insist on your rights!
Make sure that you get all the relevant information.
Discuss organ donation with your family because it will have
an impact on their mourning.
Decide which organs and tissues you are willing to donate and
which not.
Insist on a general anesthesia during the organ removal.
Your next of kin has the right to see your dead body right after
the organ removal operation.
Ibid.
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Your next of kin has the right to inspect the files. 230

Although lack of education about brain death and organ donation may
account for some of the above data, there remains for many the difficulty of
reconciling common-sense notions about death with a corpse that exhibits many
characteristics indicative of organizational life. As R. Taylor notes,
Persons who meet whole-brain criteria of death, if mechanically
ventilated, typically remain normothermic, continue to grow hair
and fingernails, often retain spinal reflexes, maintain cardiac and
circulatory function, digest and absorb food, filter blood through
both liver and kidneys, urinate and defecate, heal wounds and may
even gestate fetuses. 231
Peter Singer observes that the view of life and death implicated in the concept of
brain death is counterintuitive even to those who employ it. 232 In an attempt to
ease the counterintuitive reactions of family and medical staff that the brain dead
are still alive, these systemic integrative activities are often attributed to
remaining insignificant vestiges of non-integrated biological activity. 233 As one
commentator remarks, “The antagonism between the perception of a warm and
breathing body and the notion of death is rationalized by proponents of ‘brain
death’ as an opposition between sensual perception and intellectual
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knowledge.” 234

In assessing what to do with patients who are diagnosed as brain

dead, it is argued that conclusions should not be based on empirical observations
but rather on rational grounds. 235 As such, brain death is thus depicted primarily
as a rationalistic conception, which boasts a superior epistemic foundation for
distinguishing between reality and illusion. 236
However, as previous chapters indicate, there is little by way of scientific
reason to substantiate the conceptual coherence of brain death. As a valid rational
conception, it must withstand challenges to its internal coherence and remain
impervious to empirical challenges. The tendency to dismiss any empirical
evidence that challenges the rationalistic framework of brain death reveals the
assumptive nature indicative of a purely rationalistic approach. Indeed, the a
priori dismissal of the intuitive notions of family and medical staff reveals the
ongoing lack of import from the public that has characterized the emergence of
brain death from its inception.
Regardless of these epistemological gaps, the fact remains that brain death
has slowly gained acceptance since its introduction in 1968. Important to this
chapter is an examination of several dominant religious groups, particularly those
identified as pro-life. Given the sociological impact that these groups continue to
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have on social policy, it is worth exploring and evaluating the rationale behind
their acceptance of brain death.

3.3 Social Influence of Pro-Life Groups
Michael Potts notes, “One of the most remarkable aspects of the
introduction of brain-based criteria for human death…has been its almost
universal acceptance by society, both among the intelligentsia and people in
general.” 237 Few seem willing to challenge the fundamental change in the way
life and death is construed with the acceptance of the brain-death standard. Of
particular note is the seeming lack of resistance by traditional pro-life groups.
Peter Singer, commenting on this point observes:
But the most extraordinary aspect of the process was the lack of
opposition from the groups that could be expected to protest
vigorously against any attempt to deny the sanctity of any member
of our species, from the point of conception onwards. Where was
the pro-life movement? Where was the Roman Catholic
Church? 238
Singer suggests that the acceptance of brain death in 1968, and later confirmed in
1981 by the President’s Commission Report, served as a turning point away from
the traditional Judeo-Christian ethic, which upheld the absolute wrongness of
taking innocent human life. He further suggests that society now seemed willing
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to accept that a certain group of individuals could be “excluded from the
community of human persons,” 239 and be killed for the sake of others.
Singer offers two suggestions to explain the lack of substantial pro-life
opposition to the proposed brain-death criterion. First, in a 1958 address by Pope
Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists, 240 the Pope seemed to
suggest that defining death belongs to the physician alone, exclusive of
theological or philosophical input. Hence, when a group of physicians, such as
the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee, recommended a new way for determining death,
it was only reasonable for Roman Catholics to embrace it.
Second, Singer says those in the pro-life movement “…were worried that
the wave of support for turning off the respirators on those whose brains would
stop working would sweep over into other areas and, in particular, euthanasia.” 241
In an effort to work more effectively to ban euthanasia, pro-life strategists
embraced the rationale, beginning with the Harvard Committee and culminating
in the President’s Report, that the permanent loss of all brain function indicates
the loss of organic integrated unity and the death of the organism as a whole.
A third reason is suggested by Potts. He proposes that widespread
acceptance of organ transplantation made it difficult to argue against the new
239

Potts, 121.

240

Pope Pius XII, "The Prolongation of Life: An Address of Pope Pius XII
to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists," The Pope Speaks 4 (1958).
The statement in question is: “It remains for the doctor, and especially the
anesthesiologist, to give a clear and precise definition of ‘death’ and the ‘moment
of death’ of a person who passes away in a state of consciousness.”
241

Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, 29.

93

criterion of death without appearing to be anti-life. 242 For if the brain dead are
not dead, he argues, then removing their vital organs for transplantation would be
the direct cause of their deaths. A strict sanctity of life ethic opposes the
intentional direct killing of an innocent person. However, people who receive
vital organs would die without them. 243 Given the overwhelming wave of support
for organ transplantation, and in an effort to avoid appearing to oppose life-giving
organ donation, the pro-life movement accepted brain death. This section will
explore the rationale for pro-life acceptance of brain death in light of the above
suggestions.
Strong papal support for organ donation comes directly from Pope John
Paul II’s encyclical letter, Evangelium Vitae. In an effort to promote and build up
a “culture of life,” the Pope speaks of the everyday heroism exhibited by various
individuals. As an example he promotes organ donation as a heroic measure
when he writes, “A particularly praiseworthy example of such gestures is the
donation of organs, performed in an ethically acceptable manner, with a view to
offering a chance of health and even of life itself to the sick who sometimes have
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no other hope.” 244 Some conservative Catholic groups maintain that the Church’s
official teaching embraces brain death as a moral means for organ procurement.
Supportive of this claim are certain comments in an address given by Pope John
Paul II to the XVIII International Congress of the Transplantation Society. In
words reminiscent of Pope Pius XII, John Paul II writes:
With regard to the parameters used today for ascertaining death—
whether the “encephalic” signs or the more traditional cardiorespiratory signs—the Church does not make technical decisions.
She limits herself to the Gospel duty of comparing the data offered
by medical science with the Christian understanding of the unity of
the person, bringing out the similarities and the possible conflicts
capable of endangering respect for human dignity.
Here it can be said that the criterion adopted in more recent times
for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the complete and
irreversible cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously applied,
does not seem to conflict with the essential elements of a sound
anthropology. 245
In these two paragraphs the Pope seems to confirm that defining death primarily
resides in the realm of medical science. Since medical science has, in recent
times, expanded the criteria for determining death to include the irreversible
cessation of all brain activity, then there seems to be no conflict with the
anthropology taught by the Church.
Further recognition of this is evident in the commentary on brain death
offered by the National Catholic Bioethics Center, a group devoted to the teaching

244

Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae (Vatican City:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html, 1995), 86.
245

Pope John Paul II, Address of John Paul II to the 18th International
Congress of the Transplantation Society (Rome:
http://cnserver0.nkf.med.ualberta.ca/misc/Rome/Encyclical.htm, 2000).

95

Magisterium. They contend that the use of neurological criteria (brain death) is
legitimate according to the Catholic Church, noting that, “ Pope Pius XII and
Pope John Paul II both said the Church has no competency in determining death;
this properly belongs to medical science.” 246 They further note that those who
reject brain death as a viable criterion for determining death “are in tension with
sound Catholic teaching.” This, of course, presupposes that medical science
offers a coherent biological basis that supports brain death as human death. In
same address, the Pope writes, “Acknowledgement of the unique dignity of the
human person has a further underlying consequence: vital organs which occur
singly in the body can be removed only after death—that is, from the body of
someone who is certainly dead.” However, what is evidently uncertain, as
previous chapters indicate, is that the brain dead are in fact certainly dead.
Other Catholic writers reveal the same presumption as they attempt to
qualify consistency of brain death with traditional Christian anthropology. 247
Traditional Christian anthropology construes a living human person as an
essential unity or composition of body and soul. 248 Following Thomas Aquinas,
this view rejects a strict dualism of body and soul, as Plato and Descartes held,
while recognizing a duality of body and soul, in which the soul informs or
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animates the body as the life-giving principle. As long as organizational integrity
is intact, then the soul’s presence remains.
Jason Eberl argues that a Thomistic understanding of death entails that,
“A human being dies when her body ceases to function as an organism with
integrative unity.” 249 Eberl articulates Bernat’s conceptual basis of brain death
and then applies the single organ hypothesis to the integrative functions of the
whole brain. While St. Thomas contended that organizational unity is maintained
by the heart, Eberl suggests that were St. Thomas alive today, he would
recognize, based on current medical opinion, that the brain is the organ of
integration. In concert with this understanding, a Working Group with the
Pontifical Academy of Science issued a statement in which they conclude:
It appears evident that the establishment of total and irreversible
loss of all brain functions is the true medical criterion of death and
that this criterion can be established in two ways. Either by
establishing the cessation of circulation and respiration or directly
by demonstrating the irreversible loss of all brain function (brain
death). 250
It is significant to note that Catholic authorities are more careful than some of
their interpreters to avoid absolute language with regard to their acceptance of
brain death. Notice that “it appears” in the above paragraph and “does not seem
to contradict” in Pope John Paul II’s statement reflect a cautious embracing of the
conclusions of medical science. This is understandable given the tentative nature
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of general scientific conclusions, which are subject to modification and change.
Moreover, these statements reflect that current accepted medical criteria for
defining death do not “constitute binding magisterial teaching.” 251
A second large constituancy of the pro-life movement are Evangelical
Protestant Christians. Though diverse in many respects, this group maintains a
core of five fundamental doctrines of belief. They are: (1) the innerrancy and
infallability of the Bible, (2) the deity of Jesus, (3) the substitutionary atonement
of Jesus, (4) the literal, physical, bodily resurrection of Jesus, and (5) the literal,
bodily return of Jesus from heaven to earth.252 Additionally, many Evangelical
Christians hold to a central conviction regarding the sanctity of life from
conception to natural death. Their greatest social concerns include the issues of
abortion and euthanasia, both of which are viewed as moral evils plaguing secular
society. These Christians, under the dictate to be “salt and light,” see themselves
as preservers of truth and light in a morally decaying and dark world.
Having a high regard for Scripture, Evangelical scholars generally attempt
to ground their thinking on principles and commands derived either explicitly or
inferentially from biblical texts. Campbell explains:
The believer identifies and organizes the facts of Scripture
regarding the nature of reality and then derives general principles
and underlying patterns that are coherent with these facts. For
example, the biblical posture about life gradually unfolds and
supports a claim about the sanctity of human life. A discerning
organization of biblical evidence on human nature is expressed in
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the idea that persons are created in the “image of God” (Gen. 1:2728). All of life, from beginning to end, is portrayed as subject to
the sovereignty and dominion of God who gives breath to human
beings that they may live (Gen. 2:7) and deprives them of breath
when they expire (Ps. 104:29). Human beings are therefore
accountable and responsible for exercise of their moral agency,
expressed in the value of stewardship. 253
Campbell further notes that discussions regarding the definition of death are most
likely situated within the context of the social acceptance of euthanasia. Social
policy that attempts to revise death in order to facilitate organ procurement is
viewed as a means to hasten death for the comatose and other vulnerable patients.
The most ardent opposition regarding the debate on how death should be defined
concerns the use of the neo-cortical or higher-brain criterion. 254 The fear is that
as the line of demarcation between life and death is moved forward, more
vulnerable populations are put at risk. As John M. Frame notes: “Without a strict
criterion of death, it is difficult to guard against abuses, such as hastening a
declaration of death to obtain organs for transplant.” 255
While emphasizing a “rigorous medical definition of death,” most
evangelical scholars nevertheless embrace brain death. J. Kerby Anderson
expresses his acceptance when he writes, “A comatose patient without any brain
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wave activity (A flat EEG, electroencephalogram) should be removed from lifesupport systems; he is considered to be already dead.” 256 Similarly, Norman L.
Geisler expresses a cautious embrace of brain death when he writes:
Death is difficult to define, but in general terms it means vital signs
are lacking, such as breathing, pulse, nerve reaction, or brain wave
(EEG). This does not mean that after the person dies that the body
cannot be kept “alive” by machine to prevent organ decay. It
simply means that we should not hasten death in order to get a
fresh organ. 257
In sync with Roman Catholic authorities, Evangelicals tend to express concern as
to how death is defined, while nevertheless generally accepting the medical
consensus regarding brain death. 258
Judaism, “guided by the concept of the supreme sanctity of human life and
of the dignity of man created in the image of God,” 259 also has a stake in the
debate about death. Although the idea of ethics is not found in Jewish thought,
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latter-day scholars have attempted “to describe the methods and concepts implicit
in the tradition itself.” 260 In so doing, certain statements are gleaned from the
tradition providing guidelines for adjudication in moral matters. The process by
which this is accomplished proceeds out of a deep respect for halakhah 261 (Jewish
Law). Halakhah encompasses the legal aspect of Judaism and “embraces
personal, social, national, and international relationships, and all the other
practices and observations of Judaism.” 262 It may be said that it provides the
basis, or story, for meaning in the ascertainment of duty and obligation in the
world. This story contains the narrative of creation and the responsibilities for
which beings created in God’s image are accountable. It also includes the story of
the fall resulting in a broken world and adding to the responsibilities of which
human persons are obligated to each other, and ultimately to God to maintain.
The traditional methodology for deliberation concerning current ethical
discussions is characterized as a legal process by which individual texts are
sought out for application. The process includes examining commentaries and
previous legal decisions of these texts in an effort to discover their applicability to
current situations. David Novak explains:
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The basic scriptural norm is located, its rabbinical elaborations are
traced through the Talmud and related literature, its authoritative
structure is determined, relevant precedents (if any) are culled from
the vast literature of legal responsa by individual rabbinic
authorities, and finally the person accepted by a community of
Jews as their legal authority frequently seeks the council of learned
colleagues. 263
This method is by no means easily achieved. It is a careful process that
recognizes human fallibility by including minority opinions and interpretations of
biblical texts. The sources from which one must cull are vast containing many
legal decisions, propositions, narrative accounts, and debates. As Jewish thinkers
grapple with the relation between tradition and modernity, they vary in opinion on
the criterion of death, often engaging in intense debate. However, what is rarely
at issue among Jewish thinkers is the question of whether Jews should donate
organs. 264
Jewish thinkers, like their Catholic and Evangelical Protestant
counterparts, express concern that organ donors may be killed for their
transplantable organs. Thus, in matters of organ donation, defining criteria
appropriately consistent with traditional modalities is crucial for Jews. In
accordance with Jewish methodology, rabbinic opinion is by no means unitary
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with regard to whether brain death is an acceptable criterion for human death. It
is a well-known fact that some Orthodox Jews do not accept brain death, and that
significant segments of their population in the state of New Jersey have
influenced the passage of a statutory exception regarding the use of brain death
for religious reasons. 265 J. David Bleich, an Orthodox Rabbi states: “It is
axiomatic, according to Halakhah, that death coincides with cessation of
respiration.” 266 Owing to the Scriptural references “God breathes life into Adam”
(Gen 2:6) and “…all in whose nostrils is the breath of the spirit of life” (Gen
7:22), Jewish sources (e.g., Yoma 85a) indicate that evidence for life resides at the
nose. However, after citing a variety of opinions from Jewish sources, he
concludes that death only occurs at the cessation of both cardiac and respiratory
functions, due to the fact that the “lack of respiration is also indicative of prior
cessation of cardiac activity.”267 According to Bleich, Halakhah does not permit
the use of brain death as a criterion of death. In fact, Halakhah obligates medical
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treatment and resuscitation for all human beings, no matter how debilitating their
injury.
Nonetheless, other Orthodox Jews are more willing to accept brain death.
They cite sources in the Talmud and Codes of Jewish Law which indicate that a
criterion of irreversible cessation of respiration in an individual who shows no
movement and is unresponsive to stimuli is to be considered dead. Fred Rosner
notes, “Jewish writings provide considerable evidence for the thesis that the brain
and brainstem control all bodily functions, including breathing and heartbeat.” 268
Hence, cessation of all brain function, including the brainstem, is an acceptable
criterion for determining death. Further qualification of the acceptability of the
brain-death criterion is advanced by a figurative analogy with the thesis of
physiological decapitation. Based on a talmudic discussion regarding individuals
who had sustained broken necks, these persons are considered dead despite
retaining for a short period of time spastic, convulsive movements and heartbeats.
Since the brain dead exhibit similar phenomena, these thinkers suggest that one
may therefore conclude they are the functional equivalent of a decapitated body.
The physiological decapitation thesis receives favorable attention from
many commentators and is deserving of evaluation. 269 Though some have found
the analogy convincing, questions pertaining to the critical differences between
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decapitated individuals and the brain dead suggest the thesis involves a faulty
analogy. As Paul A. Byrne et al note:
It may be noted that decapitation is not the cutting off of a brain
but of a head, with all its arteries and veins, bony and muscular
structure, and upper spinal cord, so that neither literal beheading
nor its equivalent through having one’s head smashed in an
accident is the same as ‘brain death.’ In decapitation, the heart
quickly stops and the rest of the body begins to disintegrate. By no
means is the brain alone affected. Indeed, one could argue that
death by decapitation comes primarily from cardio-respiratory
failure. 270
Despite the lack of similarity between a decapitated body and a brain-dead
patient, the decapitation thesis continues to be the primary mode of persuasion for
many, including those who would not necessarily describe themselves as pro-life.
In fact, a participant in a recent discussion on brain death by the President’s
Bioethics Commission relayed to this writer that the main argument upon which
its continued acceptance rests, is the decapitation thesis. 271 This is unfortunate
given the fact that the empirical evidence renders the thesis demonstrably false.
As one former supporter of this thesis notes:
Until relatively recently (1992), as an ethicist, I was myself misled
in this respect, having had brain death explained to me and seen it
explained to donor families many times as the brain event
equivalent of having been guillotined. Having now studied the
medical literature I know that to be false, and more than that, it
270

Paul A. Byrne and others, "Brain Death-the Patient, the Physician, and
Society," Gonzaga Law Review 18 (1982/83): 37.
271

This information was relayed to me by Patrick Lee, a former colleague
of mine, and Professor of Bioethics at Franciscan University of Steubenville. In
2007, he was invited by Robert George, a member of the President’s Bioethics
Commission, to observe and participate in the panel’s discussion on brain death.
He provided helpful information relevant to the current misunderstandings
surrounding the decapitation hypothesis.

105

was known to be false as early as 1977 following the multi-center
study funded by the National Institutes of Neurological Disease
and Stroke. 272
Other Jewish thinkers accept brain death on other grounds. Since 1976,
Conservative Jews have embraced, as sufficient for determining death, a flat
electroencephalogram (EEG), which indicates “succession of spontaneous brain
activity.” 273 Their willingness to adopt the new criterion rests on the fact that
since “ancestors determined Jewish law in light of medical practice of their
time,” 274 it seems reasonable to accept testing that conforms to current medical
practice. In 1988, the Chief Rabbinate of Israel demonstrated its approval of a flat
EEG when it approved heart transplantation, since the test “guarantees that a
patient can no longer independently breath or produce a heartbeat.” 275 Elliot
Dorff, commenting on the use of brain death for the procurement of organs says,
“If a flat electroencephalogram is confirmed, the donor is officially dead within
the terms of Jewish law as now interpreted, and the transplantation is
permissible.” 276
In summary, it may be noted that dominant pro-life religious groups share
a number of concerns and agreements regarding brain death and organ donation.
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All three groups recognize the life-saving potential of donation and, to varying
degrees, endorse organ donation as an act of heroism, charity, and in some cases a
legal obligation. Also noteworthy is the fact that, despite the claims of Singer that
pro-life groups have abandoned their traditional sanctity of life ethic, all groups
surveyed share a uniform concern over the criterion of death, founded upon the
sanctity of life. What Singer seems to overlook is that pro-life thinkers are
dependent upon the medical community for providing a biologically coherent
model reflective of their theologically (and to some degree, philosophically)
informed anthropology. Now that more investigators are recognizing the faulty
foundation upon which brain death rests, it remains to be seen whether pro-life
groups will continue to support a criterion that fails to represent the death of the
organism as a whole. 277 Legislation is based on public policy, and the next
section will consider the UDDA’s success in ‘standardizing’ death.

3.4 Statutory Irregularities
Death marks the end of bodily life, a curiosity shrouded in mystery. On an
individual level, it represents the end of a person’s temporal existence in human
society. As such, the moment death occurs is of profound importance to the
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individual. 278 Moreover, on a social level, “death represents a tearing of a large
web of social relationships.” 279 In both representations, society has an interest in
protecting the rights of individuals to pursue life as far as possible, and to ensure
that the social fabric is protected from great harm when death severs social ties. It
is on this point that the law has profound interests in protecting human life and
ensuring that the societal web of relationships is safeguarded. Social policy,
therefore, must attempt balance between the interests of the individual and society
in such a way that ensures the least amount of harm to the security of all citizens.
While the law’s role in standardizing death principally involves the task of
framing a legal rule, the procedure is dependent upon the nodes of interaction
between various disciplines which inform the direction of social policy. 280
Defining death is, by all accounts, multi-disciplinary. Laypersons and experts
alike rely on religion, philosophy, medicine, law, and everything in between, to
reflect on the meaning of death. 281 The law’s interest in framing social policy
concerning death utilizes the disciplines of medicine and philosophy to a large
degree. If ambiguity exists in medicine and philosophy with regard to the
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diagnosis and definition of death, legal framers have little hope of capturing the
level of coherence necessary for a uniform policy.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) issued by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws states:
Any individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards. 282
It is important to note that the uniform act not only codified the common law
standard but also extended it to address the problem of brain death. Though some
states directly employ the language of the UDDA, others have opted to utilize it
as a framework leading to some inconsistencies in how states allow for a
determination of death. In states like Nebraska and South Carolina the UDDA
standard is specifically applied. In South Carolina, Article 6, section 44-43-460
of the Uniform Determination of Death Act, states:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is
dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards. 283
From here states deviate from the UDDA in at least four different ways.
First, some states have crafted death statues that fail to address any
situation other than those with patients on artificial life support. For instance, the
Florida statute provides:
282
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For legal and medical purposes, where respiratory and circulatory
functions are maintained by artificial means of support so as to
preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, the
occurrence of death may be determined where there is the
irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, determined in accordance with this
section. 284
As Menikoff observes, “The statute does not purport to codify the common law
standard applied to other jurisdictions, as does the uniform act.” 285 Although the
statutory framers expressly limit the statute to those cases in which “respiratory
and circulatory functions are maintained by artificial means of support,” Menikoff
further notes, that “the use of the permissive ‘may’ in the statute” suggests that
the legislature envisioned other ways to diagnose death. This is made evident in a
later subsection which declares:
Except for a diagnosis of brain death, the standard set forth in this
section is not the exclusive standard for determining death or the
withdrawal of life-support. 286
Thus, the Florida legislature appears to have struck out on its own in its departure
from the bifurcated language of the UDDA.
A second way that states have deviated from the UDDA is by employing
language more closely resembling the brain-stem criterion. For example, the
Iowa statute 702.8 titled Death includes this provision:
In the event that artificial means of support preclude a
determination that these functions have ceased, a person will be
considered dead if in the announced opinion of two physicians,
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based on ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has
experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain
functions. Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant
functions ceased. 287
Similarly the Texas death statute states:
If artificial means of support preclude a determination that a
person’s spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions have
ceased, the person is dead when, in the announced opinion of a
physician, according to ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain function.
Death occurs when the relevant functions cease. (c) Death must be
pronounced before artificial means supporting a person’s
respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated. 288
These provisions suggest that the determination of death rests solely on the
irreversible cessation of brain-stem functions. As such, they do not reflect the
“whole-brain” criterion of death specified in the UDDA by the phrase,
“irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain
stem.”
The third way in which states deviate from the UDDA concerns how states
incorporate clinical criteria into their statues in place of the UDDA’s somewhat
ambiguous phrase, “A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards.” The difficulty posed by the lack of specificity as to
what constitutes “accepted medical standards” has caused some legislatures to
incorporate their own clinical criteria into their death statutes. Several examples
are worth noting. In Delaware, the same bifurcated approach is applied but with
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some qualification regarding the details of diagnosis. Section 1760, titled
Determination of Death says:
A determination of death pursuant to the provisions herein may be
made, by a physician admitted to practice under this chapter, by
either: (1) Personal examination, or (2) By the use of information
provided by an EMT-P (paramedic) using telemetric or
transtelephonic means in accordance with protocols approved by
the Board of Medical Practice, following recommendations of its
Advanced Life Support Committee. 289
In Virginia, a registered nurse may pronounce death, if the following criteria are
satisfied:
(i) the nurse is employed in this Commonwealth by a home health
organization, by a hospice, or the department of corrections; (ii)
the nurse is directly involved in the care of the patient; (iii) the
patient’s death has occurred; (iv) the patient is under the care of a
physician when his death occurs; (v) the patient’s death has been
anticipated; (vi) the physician is unable to be present within a
reasonable period of time to determine the death; and (vii) there is
a valid Do Not Resuscitate Order. 290
Moreover, Oregon statute 432.300 titled, Determination of Death, carves out
another difference not seen in other states, when it says: “For the purposes of this
section as it relates to fetal death, heartbeats shall be distinguished from transient
cardiac contractions and breathing shall be distinguished from fleeting respiratory
efforts or gasps.” 291 Although these particular differences may seem peripheral
to the standard, they nevertheless reflect the difficulties law makers face when
confronted with standards that “vary both geographically and from hospital to
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hospital.” 292 Indeed, many physicians readily acknowledge de facto violations of
the dead donor rule due to the difficulties in attempting to satisfy a conceptually
flawed criterion of death. 293 Variations in the criteria for determining BD,
coupled with statutory irregularities, raise doubts about accuracy of the braindeath standard.
However, the most serious challenge to the goal of the UDDA is
exemplified by the State of New Jersey’s legislative initiative which recognizes a
personal religious exemption for those objecting to the brain-death criterion.
Signed into law in 1991, the New Jersey Declaration of Death Act provides a
statutory exception to the brain-death criterion, specifically for those in the
Orthodox Jewish, Japanese, and Native American communities, who adhere to a
belief that life is primarily identified by the circulatory and respiratory activities
of the body. The Act provides:
The death of an individual shall not be declared upon the basis of
neurological criteria…of this act when the licensed physician
authorized to declare death, has reason to believe, on the basis of
information in the individual’s available medical records, or
information provided by a member of the individual’s family or
any other person knowledgeable about the individual’s religious
beliefs that such a declaration would violate the personal religious
belief of the individual. In these cases death shall be declared, and
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the time of death fixed, solely upon the basis of cardio-respiratory
criteria. 294
The rationale for the act rests in the recognition that “when death occurs
[it] is not solely a medical judgment about a biological fact, it is also a value
judgment, which for some rests on personal religious beliefs for moral
convictions.” 295 New Jersey’s legislative body reasoned against the “state’s
general interests in uniform legal recognition of neurological death” as justifying
the law to “compel those with contrary personal religious beliefs to accept
neurological criteria for declarations of their own deaths.” 296 Instead of
embodying the position advanced by the President’s Commission, (that societal
interests in a uniform standard of death precludes a statutory recognition of a
conscious clause), the State of New Jersey struck out on its own in order to
accommodate the personal interests of a minority group whose religious beliefs
and the exercise thereof were being threatened. 297
While some commentators have seen the New Jersey legislative initiative
as a model for expanding the law to satisfy the demands of greater pluralism
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regarding the definition and criterion of death, 298 others see it as a threat to the
judicial stability evinced by a uniform standard. For example, Capron writes:
By providing that the neurological standard should not be applied
when a physician has reason to believe that a brain-based
declaration of death would “violate the personal religious beliefs”
of the patient (in which case “death shall be declared, and the time
of death fixed, solely upon the basis of [the] cardio-pulmonary
criteria” specified elsewhere in the statute), the New Jersey law
sows confusion and invites litigation. 299
The concern rests on the prospects of a dispute arising due to the religious beliefs
of a patient whose condition satisfies one set of findings while not another. The
situation could produce confusing “oscillating results (alive, not dead, not alive,
and so forth) depending upon fluctuation in the resolution of the dispute.” 300 In
other words, a policy that fails to provide the uniform stability necessary to
resolve disputes concerning the timing of death invites greater confusion to an
already delicate process.
As the preceding discussion of state statutes demonstrates, though states
have the ability to draft statutes to better suit their jurisdictions, the purpose of the
UDDA was to standardize laws. The two primary elements exist in most of the
statutes unchanged, but there are clear inconsistencies that challenge the overall
success of the brain-death standard. The fact that policy makers struggle to write
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laws in accordance with a poorly conceived medical condition prone to perpetual
qualification further substantiates what may be called “the mirage of
consensus.” 301 There should be little expectation that these social policy
problems will be resolved as long as a technically latent, medically confused
concept continues to be embraced by law and medicine.

3.5 Applications to Medical Research
A less publicly known and perhaps portentous application of the brain
death criterion is its unsettling utilization in certain areas of medical research and
development. A little over a decade after the Harvard Committee recommended
tests for determining the condition known today as brain death, reports of medical
experimentation on brain dead patients began to emerge. The first of these reports
involved the use of children who satisfied the brain death criterion. 302 Several
years later, a report documenting the experimental use of an adult diagnosed as
brain dead was published. 303 While some of these experiments involved the
administration of certain drugs, other more invasive procedures include:
endotracheal intubation, central venous catheterization, peripheral venous and
artery catheterization, thoracentesis, pericardiocentesis, and temporary
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transvenous pacemaker insertion. 304 These reports resulted in a small spate of
articles evaluating the ethical issues associated with research on the newly
dead. 305 The primary focus centered on the need to secure consent for medical
experiments on the newly dead either by the deceased prior to death or from the
deceased’s family after death. Among these commentators, there was general
agreement that such experiments are justified if consent is obtained.
Although a survey of the early literature suggests concord regarding the
requirement of consent for medical experimentation on the newly dead, Mark R.
Wicclair notes, “That whatever the merits of their arguments, opponents of
consent significantly outnumber its proponents among those who practice
procedures on the newly dead.” 306 More recently, Wicclair reports that
discussions have centered on the issue of whether the standard of consent
pertaining to research on living patients is applicable to post-mortem research as
well. According to some opponents of the consent requirement, the right to make
decisions concerning one’s bodily integrity is a personal one, which ends with
death. 307 A dead body is no longer a person possessing autonomous rights that
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can be violated. 308 Moreover, given the irrational reactions to death by the nextof-kin, presumed consent is preferable in that it eliminates heightened grief or
anxiety over family members consenting to such practices.
Recall that one of the advantages of brain death envisioned by Henry
Beecher was the use of brain dead bodies for research, which could potentially
eliminate many of the ethical problems associated with the difficulty of obtaining
informed consent from living patients. In keeping with this vision, many
researchers simply do not see how nonautonomous corpses can be abused or
harmed by experimentation that promises to benefit society as a whole. Indeed,
as some opponents of consent suggest, “Patients who die in emergency
departments have implicitly given at least limited consent to practice and teach
life-saving techniques by using the services of emergency medical personnel and
by merely living in modern society which provides everyone a right to this
care.” 309 Hence, it is argued, “The absence of harm to patients in conjunction
with the benefits from training opportunities support training procedures
independent of family consent.” 310
Proponents of informed consent for research on the newly dead generally
focus on the nature of the harm that obtains upon failure to respect pre-mortem
308
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preferences and values, even in the absence of advance directives indicating
personal preferences. Typically, “harm” refers to the negative effects an action or
event may have on the well-being of an individual. Wicclair asks, “Can actions
and events that occur after a person has died affect that person’s well-being?” 311
Not according to a mental state criterion of well-being. Since the dead are
incapable of good and bad experiences, medical experimentation proffers no harm
to their well-being. However, according to a desire-based or preference theory, 312
in which well-being is defined exclusively as a function of desire or preference
satisfaction, a different answer emerges. Wicclair offers the following
illustration:
Professor Perkins, a Constitutional scholar, is dying of cancer. She
has spent the last five years writing a book on the Second
Amendment. Since she is too frail to read the publisher’s
response, her husband opens the letter. It states that reviewers
rejected the manuscript because it was based on claims that have
been decisively refuted in a soon-to-be published monograph.
Professor Perkins’ husband cannot bring himself to tell her the
truth. Instead, he tells her that the manuscript was accepted for
publication, which causes her to feel very happy. She dies without
discovering the truth…[A]ccording to a desire-based or preference
conception, even though she was unaware of the negative
assessment of her work and felt good about what she falsely
believed she had accomplished, the fact that she failed to achieve
her goal of making a significant scholarly contribution had a
negative effect on her well being. 313
The preference theory of well-being accords with many cultural norms, as
well as ethical principles well established in medical practice. Central among
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these principles is that in the absence of pre-mortem consent, the sensibilities and
preferences of the deceased’s family members ought to be respected. 314 Highly
regarded medical associations, representing the interests of physicians, including
the AMA, the AHA, and the Report of the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
support the position that research on the newly dead should proceed only when
consent has been obtained by a substitute decision maker, next-of-kin, or family
member. 315 Common among health care providers is the concern that public
awareness of practicing procedures on the newly dead, absent consent, may
“undermine generally held faith in physician fidelity,” 316 eroding public trust of
the medical profession. 317
Public trust relies on disclosure, truth-telling, and consent. Society
expects the medical profession to respect the values and preferences of patients,
even after death. Individuals who agree to be organ donors may not be aware of
the scope of their “anatomical gifts.” In some states, the “organ donor”
designation printed on a driver’s license includes authorization for transplantation,
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therapy, research, and education. 318 Instead of allowing people to restrict the
scope of their anatomical gift, they are simply asked, “Do you wish to have the
organ donor designation printed on your driver’s license?” 319 without any
disclosure on all that entails. Meaningful consent about the scope of “anatomical
gift” includes informing organ donors and their families that such gifts cover
therapy, research, and education as well. Additionally, opportunity should be
given to limit or restrict an individual’s gift according to his or her preferences. 320
However, it remains unclear as to whether this satisfies consent to the
degree to which it is informed. As Wicclair notes, “When the scope of postmortem research includes uncommon and potentially controversial activities, it is
not sufficient to refer generically to ‘research’ in consent instruments.” 321
Moreover, as Susan R. Martyn observes, it is doubtful whether individuals would
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conceive of post-mortem research as including mechanically ventilated, heartbeating corpses. 322 Assuring consent is properly informed requires some detail of
the particulars of the research to be conducted. 323
Some researchers may worry that specific disclosure may have serious
effects on future research and training efforts deemed invaluable for the progress
of life-saving intervention techniques in emergency medical situations. For them,
disclosure practically ensures the elimination of these vital training and research
efforts, which society cannot afford to lose. It is worth noting, however, that
advances in resuscitative training tools, such as mannequins and computer
simulators, is increasingly narrowing the advantage of using corpses. 324
Furthermore, as Sperling notes, “It has been indicated that using only mannequins
and didactic sessions for teaching these skills is not less successful than using
cadavers.” 325 Whatever advantages corpses had in the past is increasingly being
supplemented by developing technology for research education.
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3.6 Summary and Assessment
There is little doubt that the way in which death is managed today differs
greatly from the past. Medical practitioners regulate death to the extent that it is
estimated that the timing of eighty percent of deaths in hospitals is chosen. 326 The
import of public opinion in the debate about brain death remains scant, at best.
Surveys indicate confusion abounds, even when the attempt is made to disclose
the meaning of the diagnosis. Given that life support mechanisms sustain life
signs in patients who have suffered chronic cognitive and physiological
impairment, family members are sometimes reluctant to accept that their loved
one has died. At other times, people simply cannot understand the complexity of
terms meant to convey various levels of cognitive impairment, the details of
which their own physicians may be uncertain. Indeed, most people simply accept
their doctors’ assurances that their loved one has died, without knowledge of the
controversies surrounding brain death and organ donation. Whatever consensus
about brain death exists in public opinion rests on an uncertain foundation.
Various pro-life groups also have helped shape public opinion through
their acceptance of brain death. This is significant, given the fact that ongoing
moral controversies in society (e.g., abortion and euthanasia) are supported by
these groups’ reliance upon a sanctity-of-life ethic that highly values the lives of
all human beings, particularly the most vulnerable. It is evident that while some
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explanation exists in the efforts of these groups’ authorities to remain relevant and
mainstream, the most influence comes from reliance upon the medical
community’s acceptance that brain death is the death of the organism as a whole.
With this biological basis now in question (see Chapter Two) it remains to be seen
whether these groups will continue to support a condition that fails to represent
the death of the organism as a whole.
Statutory irregularities are an indication of the struggles of law-makers to
apply a conceptually confused criterion of death. Variation in the clinical tests for
determining brain death contributes to the arbitrariness in the way in which states
determine how brain death should be applied. Though most states incorporate the
two main elements provided in the UDDA, variations in the statutes lead to
inconsistencies between jurisdictions. This “trickle-down” effect underscores the
need for a more coherent conceptual foundation that better provides for a legal
framework that can guarantee the legal protection society depends upon for a web
of social relationships.
Finally, the most disconcerting aspect brought out in this chapter is the
problem of consent with regard to how the brain dead are exploited for medical
training and research purposes. It is highly questionable whether consent is
possible, given that the details of extent of one’s anatomical gift are rarely
disclosed. Researchers who propose that corpses have no autonomy and interests,
fail to appreciate that people in general care deeply about their interests, including
what happens to their bodies after they die. As acute as this concern seems to be,
it is further heightened when consideration is given to the ambiguity regarding the
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physiological status of the brain dead. If indeed, as previous chapters maintain,
the brain dead are not dead, then consent to post-mortem research under the braindeath criterion is not possible. These concerns invite a larger conceptual analysis,
which will include a philosophical investigation of brain death in the following
two chapters.

125

Chapter Four
Philosophical Problems with Brain Death
4.1 Introduction
The “standard paradigm” framing current discussions about death
represents a multi-level debate concerning: (1) the concept or definition of death;
(2) the criteria for determining death; and (3) the diagnostic testing for the clinical
signs of death. 327 In previous chapters the medical criteria as well as the clinical
tests for brain death were discussed in detail. Chapter One revealed the historical
development of levels two and three in which a new criterion (brain death), along
with clinical tests, was adopted in what may be described as a “conceptual
vacuum.” 328 Based on pragmatic concerns, brain death was initially adopted in
medical practice and social policy, despite having no theoretical basis for
explaining why it represents human death. But since the use of particular tests is
contingent upon particular criteria, and the use of particular criteria rests on a
particular conception of death, it follows that a constructional definition is central
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to understanding why a criterion is valid. Recognition of this is evident in the fact
that various theorists, since the Harvard Committee, have attempted to construct a
conceptual basis consistent with the criteria and tests adopted in practice and law.
Considered this way, it appears that the development of brain death has occurred
exactly backwards than it should have. Normally, one starts with a particular
paradigm and then proceeds to identify corresponding criteria and the various
tests consistent with the paradigm. Instead, the Harvard Committee simply
identified tests for a medical condition and then recommended that condition as a
criterion for death. Failure to appreciate the importance of an underlying
philosophical conception to ground the criterion may be the primary reason for
the controversy and misunderstanding surrounding the use of brain death. David
Lamb expresses the importance of philosophical clarity with regard to defining
death as follows:
Clarity concerning the concept of death provides a point of
reference when deciding upon criteria, but some definitions of
death are philosophically inadequate despite the fact that criteria
can be logically derived from them. Consequently an investigation
of the philosophical basis of any concept of death is
important…. 329
In a previous chapter, it was suggested that the problems evident in the
tests-criterion relation would ultimately be found in a faulty relation with the
definition. Bernat articulates the definition of death as “the permanent cessation
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of functioning of the organism as a whole.” 330 If this definition is accepted, then
the definition ought to be sufficiently consistent with its corresponding criteria
(cardiopulmonary death and brain death). It has been demonstrated in the
analysis in Chapter Two that there is plausible evidence that the diagnostic tests
fail to comport with the brain-death criterion. This chapter aims to carry the
analysis further by critiquing the criterion-definition relation in the standard
paradigm. The purpose of this chapter is to challenge brain death’s veracity with
respect to its definitional and metaphysical foundation. Accordingly, section 4.2
addresses the philosophical groundwork and assumptions of the underlying
metaphysics for the definition of death under the current paradigm. Section 4.3
discloses the theoretical inconsistencies between the organism/substance view and
brain death based on the empirical evidence, and section 4.4 discusses particular
instances of inconsistencies among advocates of the substantial view. Finally,
section 4.5 presents several important objections to the substance view.

4.2 Philosophical Groundwork and Assumptions
Philosophical notions of personal identity, though notoriously
controversial, are essential for laying the groundwork for thinking about many
important biomedical issues. Exactly how one thinks about what constitutes
being human in general and being a person in particular directly translates into
how one formulates positions on issues such as abortion, embryonic stem cell
research, and defining death. Indeed, many of the issues currently under
330

James L. Bernat, Charles M. Culver, & Bernard Gert, "On the
Definition and Criteria of Death," Annals of Internal Medicine 94 (1981).
128

discussion among bioethicists today hinge on the underlying metaphysical
assumptions regarding the constitution of human persons. As J. P. Moreland and
Scott B. Rae note: “Philosophical clarity and, especially, careful metaphysical
distinctions are crucially relevant to the task of assessing various views of human
persons and the ethical positions that follow from those views.” 331 Failure to
recognize the importance of metaphysical starting points with regard to defining
death leaves out the philosophical scaffolding necessary for constructing medical
criteria and tests consistent with the death of human persons. In short, failure to
adequately address the philosophical underpinnings in the debate about death
would amount to, at best, the establishment of criteria and tests on petitio principii
grounds.
Among many theorists, there tends to be a generally accepted distinction
between psychological-based criteria and organism-based criteria for death. If
one adopts and defends a higher-brain model, then one has adopted a
psychological-oriented conception of human death. If, on the other hand, one
adopts and defends something beyond the higher-brain model, (i.e., the whole
brain model) then one is usually characterized as having an organism-oriented
conception. 332 So, the two models evidently depend on two conceptions of
“person.” The former asserts that persons come to be when certain properties or
functions emerge associated with a human organism, and with the permanent loss
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of those properties or functions, the person ceases to be. The latter, however,
asserts that personal identity is congruent with the life of the organism as a whole,
from its coming to be as a human organism to its ceasing to be as such. Hence,
the question ultimately is one that concerns the ontological status of the braindead individual. Put differently, the question concerns whether it is correct to
think that human persons are human organisms who cease to be when the
organism ceases to be, or are persons who are something different than the human
organisms with which they are associated.
When the President’s Commission defined death as “that moment at which
the body's physiological system ceases to constitute an integrated whole,” 333 the
Commission unambiguously adopted an organism-based conception of human
persons. The Commission was deliberately conservative in their deliberations
and chose to base them on the idea that humans have been traditionally viewed as
organisms belonging to a substantial kind. This is evident in the parts to whole
relation in the Commission’s rationale for opting to an organism-oriented view of
death. The Commission’s report states:
The functioning of many organs—such as the liver, kidneys, and
skin—and their integration are "vital" to individual health in the
sense that if any one ceases and that function is not restored or
artificially re-placed, the organism as a whole cannot long survive.
All elements in the system are mutually interdependent, so that the
loss of any part leads to the breakdown of the whole and,
eventually, to the cessation of functions in every part. 334
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Desiring to maintain constancy with a more traditional view of life and death, and
to avoid the perception of a radical shift in the definition of death, the
Commission recognized that “the adoption of a higher brain ‘definition’ would
depart radically from the traditional standards” implying “that the existing
cardiopulmonary definition had been in error all along.” 335 Thus, the President’s
Commission was deliberate in opting away from a psychological-oriented view
and instead chose a definition of death consistent with the idea that humans are
organisms of a substantial kind. The question of conceptual continuity between
the definition and the proposed criterion depends on whether brain death is
consistent with the metaphysical theory that avers human persons to be essentially
physical organisms.
An organism-based conception of human persons is indicative of a
substance view of human persons, the metaphysics of which requires some
explication. As in any philosophical discussion, the level of coherence will
depend on the clarity of the terms employed. Imprecision undoubtedly leads to
confusion about how data is incorporated into the philosophical framework.
While a detailed explication and defense of the metaphysics of substances is
beyond the scope and purpose of this dissertation, it is nevertheless necessary to
carefully define the relevant terms employed by contemporary proponents of the
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substance view in order to assess the coherence of brain death with the
metaphysics implicitly adopted by the President’s Commission. 336
The traditional view of a substance (in accordance with Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas) suggests several features indicative of the core of substantial
identity. Norris Clarke sets forth four characteristics of a substance:
(1)it has the aptitude to exist in itself and not as a part of any other
being; (2) it is the unifying center of all the various attributes and
properties that belong to it at any one moment; (3) if the being
persists as the same individual throughout a process of change, it is
the substance which is the abiding, unifying center of the being
across time; (4) it has an intrinsic dynamic orientation toward selfexpressive action, toward self-communication with others, as the
crown of its perfection, as its very raison d’etre . . . . 337
Substances, therefore, are basic individual wholes or unities of properties, parts,
and capacities and are capable of maintaining absolute identity or sameness
through change. The idea of change indicates sameness. If something has
undergone a change, then something has to remain the same, otherwise nothing
has changed. Human persons, for instance, undergo various changes throughout
their existence, such as gaining consciousness and growing in rationality, but
nevertheless remain the same thing, the same substance, throughout these
changes.
Unlike the weak unity a pile of junk on the curb might have, substances
possess a deeper unity of parts. Indeed, the parts of a substance obtain their
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identity with respect to their connection to the substance as a whole. As
Moreland explains:
The parts of a substance are united in such a way that the whole is
ontologically prior to its parts in this sense: the unity of a substance
is basic and primitive, it is not derived after its parts come together,
and the parts of a substance are what they are in virtue of the role
they play in the substance as a whole. 338
To illustrate, the parts of a human heart are what they are by virtue of the role
they play in relation to the heart as a whole; the heart is what it is by virtue of the
role it plays in relation to the circulatory system; and the circulatory system is
what it is by virtue of the role it plays in relation to the organism as a whole. If a
part is removed, then the relation is severed, thus effecting a relational change in
the identity of the part. 339
Important to substantial unity is the way in which capacities (sometimes
called potentialities, tendencies, or predispositions) adhere in a substance.
Among different substances are natural groupings of capacities, with each natural
group containing a hierarchical ordering of capacities. The human substance has
various capacities that other substances do not possess. For instance, humans
have the capacity to believe and think certain things, as well as to feel and to
choose in ways other beings do not. Humans are of a particular identifiable
substance by virtue of their natural grouping of capacities such as intellectual,
emotional, and volitional.
338

Moreland and Rae, 71.

339

The substance view thereby recognizes that when an organ is
removed from one individual and transplanted into another, a different
substantial relation obtains and hence a new identity.

133

In addition to natural groupings, capacities also come in hierarchies.
Hierarchies may be divided into first-order, second-order, and so on until ultimate
capacities are obtained. Moreland explains:
…if Sue can speak English but not Russian, then she has the firstorder capacity for English as well as the second-order capacity to
have this first-order capacity (which she has already developed).
Sue also has the second-order capacity to speak Russian, but lacks
the first-order capacity to do so. 340
In other words, second-order capacities are realized only when first-order
capacities are first developed. A tomato seed has the ultimate capacity to produce
tomatoes, but this ultimate capacity cannot be actualized until lower-order
capacities are developed first, such as developing a root system. The only things
preventing the natural development of the lower-order capacities necessary for the
substance to realize its ultimate capacities are a suitable environment and possible
defects in lower order capacities. Consequently, when a substance fails to
develop its ultimate capacities due to some defect or some other factor that
prevents the development of a lower-order capacity, the substance cannot be said
to lose its ultimate capacity, but rather “lacks some lower-order capacity it needs
for the ultimate capacity to be developed.” 341
Hence, all the capacities of a substance find their culmination in a set of
ultimate capacities which are possessed by a particular thing by virtue of its
belonging to a natural kind. It is the inner structure or nature of a substance that
orders and directs the development of lower-order capacities necessary for the
340
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realization of its ultimate capacities. Failure to fully develop ultimate capacities,
or lose the capacity to exhibit them once obtained, is not necessarily tantamount
to a substantial loss or change in identity. As long as the substance remains a
member of its natural kind, at whatever level of development or diminished
capacity, it retains its substantial identity.
Important to advocates of the metaphysics of substances is the contrast
made with artifacts (sometimes referred to as property-things.) Unlike
substances, which are internally structured according to a set of internal relations,
artifacts are structured entirely by a set of external relations. While a pile of junk
on the curb contains a weak unity of sorts, artifacts represent a deeper unity in that
the parts constitute a whole by virtue of their ordered relations. The kind of order
or unity obtained by an artifact is imposed on its pre-existing parts. For example
several parts, such as four legs and a top, compose a table. The external relation
imposed upon the parts makes it a structured thing. But the parts, legs and top,
are what they are by virtue of their ordered relations. Metaphysically speaking,
unlike substances whose unity is prior to its parts, the parts of artifacts are prior to
the whole. Clearly, the unity of parts is not derived and ordered according to an
internal nature within the being of the table. Rather, the table is structured
completely by a design previously conceived in the mind of a designer. Hence
the unity of the table does not “spring from within the parts…or within the [table]
taken as a whole: it resides merely in the designer’s mind.” 342
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Moreover, an artifact has no capacity to realize “new kinds of properties
not already resident in [its] parts.” 343 For instance, tables cannot actualize new
parts latent in their previously existing parts. At best, new spatial relations may
be imposed on tables which rearrange their parts in different locations. But this
new arrangement is not due to an internal agency directing from within. Rather it
is due to an external imposition of spatial relations already existing in the parts
prior to its existence as a whole.
Finally, artifacts also are subject to a change of identity in ways that
substances are not. Recall that for a substance, events such as losing or gaining a
part do not constitute a change in identity. However, when an artifact loses or
gains a property (or part) something about its identity changes. As new parts
replace the old parts of a table, the table itself would undergo a change in identity
and literally become a different table. This is due to the idea that “[artifacts] are
mereological compounds, systems constituted by separable parts standing in
external relations.” 344 In other words, the individual parts are essential to its
identity; and thus with respect to an artifact’s loss or gain in its network of parts, a
new entity emerges.
Another way to understand the nuances of the substantial view is by
considering its philosophical roots in the metaphysics of Aristotle and Thomas
Aquinas. Through the philosophical literature of Aristotle, Aquinas develops a
composite view of living organisms. For Aquinas, “Every natural body which has
343
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life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite.” 345 That is to say, every living
being is composed of two metaphysical components: form and shape. As Ric
Machuga explains:
“Form” is that which makes something what it is. “Shape”…refers
to the totality of a thing’s physically quantifiable properties, i.e., its
physical shape, size, height, weight, chemical composition, etc., in
its most complete description. 346
For Aristotle and Aquinas, the study of shape belongs to the physical sciences,
such as chemistry, biology, and physics. Form, however, belongs to the category
of ontology and hence takes on a more abstract point of view. While chemists,
biologists, and physicists concern themselves with questions of how physical,
bodily processes work, the ontologist takes up the question, “What sorts of things
exist?” To further elaborate, when one asks a question such as, “What is a
table?”, for Aquinas, an adequate answer requires delineating between whether
the question concerns the physical properties of the particular table in question (its
shape), or the nature or essence of a table in general (its form.) The latter is an
ontological question concerning “what is” a table. The answer to the question that
limits itself to physical descriptions of the table’s shape is insufficient to convey
fully what is a table. To answer that question fully one needs to address the
nature of tableness in general, (i.e., its form or essence).
A living thing is a composite of substantial form (called a thing’s soul),
and body (the shape or expression of substantial form.) Regarding the former,
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soul is the metaphysical principle of identification for living organisms belonging
to a universal kind (their whatness). Concerning the latter, body represents a
particular instance of the universal form (its thisness). More than that, soul
represents the vital activity of body. Since matter qua matter is itself lifeless, that
is, life is not intrinsic to body as body, Aquinas contends that soul is the
animating principle or source of life for the body. He writes:
For it is clear that to be a source of life, or to be a living thing, does
not belong to body as a body, since, if that were the case, every
body would be a living thing, or even a source of life, as a certain
kind of body. . . Therefore, the soul, which is the source of life, is
not a body, but the actuating form of a body. 347
For biological organisms, soul is the organizing principle which brings all the
parts of an organism into a unitive expression of its substantial form. As such,
organizational life is a feature of soul that cannot be reduced to the “stuff” of
physics or chemistry. M. Green writes, “Organized systems cannot be understood
in terms of their least parts alone, but only in terms of those parts as organized in
such systems.” 348 Rather, soul is that which organizes and directs bodily parts
and systems into an organized whole. As such, the soul is the organized organizer
of the body.
These distinctions represent a minimal set of characteristics necessary for
understanding the metaphysical foundation for human persons as organisms of a
substantial kind. The next section undertakes assessing the substance view of
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human persons (human persons as organisms of a specific kind) in relation to the
current evidence regarding the brain-death criterion. The measure of success for
this chapter will be whether the conceptual resources for the substance view, as
represented in the current paradigm, are consistent with the brain-death criterion
as proposed by its advocates.

4.3 Brain Death and Substantial Identity
Though the definition of death under the current paradigm is the death of
the organism as a whole, brain-death defenders, such as James Bernat, clarify that
it is the critical functions necessary for the continued health and life of the
organism as a whole that represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for
human life. Thus, in the assessment of a human organism’s functional capacity,
only certain requisite functions count in the determination of whether an organism
has sustained irreversible functional loss. These functions fall into three
biological categories, all of which must be irretrievably lost in order to constitute
the death of the organism as a whole. Bernat cites these as: 1) vital functions of
spontaneous breathing and autonomic control of circulation; 2) integrating
functions that assure homeostasis of the organism . . . and 3) consciousness . . . .”
Bernat further explains, “The presence of any of the three elements constitutes
sufficient evidence for life.” 349
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Crucial to a proper understanding of what constitutes the necessary and
sufficient conditions for life is the underlying distinction between “whole
organism” and “organism as a whole.” In an attempt to maintain consistency with
an organism-based definition, Bernat explains:
‘The organism as a whole’ is an old biological concept that refers
not to the whole organism (the sum of its parts) but to that set of
vital functions of integration, control, and behavior that are greater
than the sum of the parts of the organism, and that operate in
response to demands from the organism’s internal and external
milieu to support its life and to maintain its health. Implicit in the
concept is the primacy of the functional unity of the organism. 350
It should be clear that Bernat’s rejection of the former category (whole organism)
is an implicit rejection of an artifactual (property-thing or functional) view of
human persons. Hence, by accepting the latter category, Bernat has, in some
sense, embraced a substance view, since substantial identity is rooted in the idea
that persons are greater than the sum of their parts. At least this much is
consistent with the substance view as delineated earlier in this chapter.
However, the manifest difficulties of reconciling brain death with the
death of the organism as a whole (as detailed in Chapter Two) suggest that brain
death does not mark the end of human integrated functioning. Indeed, many of
the functions necessary for maintaining organic integration can be supplemented
by medical technology. For instance, with the use of a ventilator the diaphragmic
muscles can operate to provide oxygenated air allowing for the respiratory system
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to maintain its continued functional capacity for O2 and CO2 exchange. 351 In this
sense, respiratory function has not been destroyed. Moreover, artificial
maintenance of other critical functions, such as the regulation of blood pressure
through vassopressors, the maintenance of body temperature, and the suspension
of rapid asystole through “synthetic arginine vassopressin (ADH) and
epinephrine,” suggest that the idea that brain death inevitably leads to bodily
disintegration is overstated.
Additional evidence concerns the dozen or more documented brain-dead
pregnant women who, with the aid of medical support, retained integrated organic
functioning and were able, in many cases, to gestate fetuses to near full term.
Mark Siegler and Daniel Wikler note that these sorts of cases contribute to the
ambivalence associated with “corpses” that exhibit functions indicative of living
patients. They write:
It has been known for some time that brain-dead patients, suitably
maintained, can breathe, circulate blood, digest food, filter wastes,
maintain body temperature, generate new functions, and fulfill other
functions as well. All of this is remarkable in a “corpse.” Granted, these
functions could not be maintained without artificial aid and, even so, will
cease within a few weeks. However, many living patients depend on
machines and will not live long; they are not thereby classified as
(already) dead. 352
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Perhaps the most devastating critique of brain death, as highlighted in Chapter
Two, concerns the work of Alan Shewmon. Recall that Shewmon, a pediatric
neurologist, has advanced considerable empirical evidence in direct opposition to
the idea that the brain is the organ of somatic integration, a necessary condition
for the viability of the criterion. If the brain serves as the integrator of the
organism as a whole, then the integrated unity of the organism as a whole is
sustained and directed primarily by a functioning brain. When the brain loses its
functional capacity, cardiac arrest will follow shortly.
However, observations made by Shewmon demonstrate that “if ‘braindead’ patients are supported during the acute phase of their illness, cardiac arrest
is now not certain.” 353 As the number of counter examples grows (Shewmon
alone documents some 175), there no longer remains any reason under the current
paradigm to accept the claim that brain death marks the end of bodily
integration. 354 As a case in point, Shewmon has carefully documented a
noteworthy example of prolonged somatic survival for a patient who survived
more than fourteen years after a brain-death diagnosis. Despite claims of
misdiagnosis by critics, the autopsy showed a completely destroyed brain. 355 As
one neurologist confirms, “Recent evidence shows that survival is possible in the
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environment of modern Intensive Care Units—and even out of these—despite the
fact that the whole brain seems destroyed, as happened with a series of patients
reported by Shewmon.” 356
The substance view is capable of accounting for the organizational unity
present in medically supported brain-dead patients. The distinction between
lower-order and higher-order capacities is crucial on this point. With respect to
the loss of lower-order capacities, supplementation through external means makes
little difference with respect to the life of the organism as a whole. Many higherorder capacities indicative of organizational life continue despite the fact that
some lower-order capacities are derived through means external to the patient.
Thus, brain-dead patients may lack some lower-order capacities, but still retain
higher-order capacities indicative of living persons. In this sense, the external
agencies of lower-order capacities are, as Tom Tomlinson notes, “The functional
equivalent of the destroyed brain stem.” 357 As far as the substance view is
concerned, continued organizational unity is indicative of the continued presence
of the inner nature, which is constituent of human persons.
The fundamental inconsistency in the standard paradigm concerns the
insistence of internally based functions as necessary conditions for organizational
unity. 358 However, if patients who are not brain dead are dependent on external
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sources for lower-order capacities (or functions), then by that criterion they lack
the necessary conditions for organizational unity as well. Two counter examples
from Robert Truog and J. T. Fletcher highlight the problem. They are: 1)
individuals who, due to spinal cord injuries, rely on mechanical ventilation for
support; and 2) patients who rely on pacemakers for effective heart
functioning. 359 Withdrawal or removal of these external agencies of support
would quickly result in the lack of “integrated organic functioning,” and yet no
one would consider these patients dead.
Stuart Younger and E. T. Bartlett provide a hypothetical situation that
bears further consideration. They ask us to imagine a case in which “someone
has suffered neo-cortical (‘higher brain’) death, and is no longer conscious.” 360 If
the patient retains the capacity for temperature regulation, then according to the
brain-death criterion, he would still be alive. Suppose that this same patient
suffers a stroke in the area of the brain stem that controls temperature regulation;
nevertheless, temperature is maintained through medical support. They ask, “Is
he still functioning as a whole?” 361 Suppose further that the patient suffers
another stroke affecting his respiratory and circulatory centers. Added supportive
measures are taken, such as placing him on a ventilator and regulating his blood
gases. If we continue to imagine further compromises, with each function
359
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supplemented by ICU staff, at what point should we conclude that organizational
unity has sufficiently ceased? The evidence suggests that integrated organic
functioning remains at all stages of lower-order functional loss. According to the
substance view, as long as organizational unity is present, despite the loss of
lower-order capacities, the brain-dead patient retains his or her higher-order
capacities for bodily integration. Thus, the substance-view advocate, if he or she
is to be consistent, must maintain that brain-dead patients do not lose their
substantial identity. They neither “become members of another species” by virtue
of severe brain damage, nor are they mere aggregates of persons who were once
associated with bodies. 362
Since physical organisms undergo constant change throughout their lives,
constancy is explained at the level of substantial form. As an organism gains new
parts or loses old ones, it is its substantial form (as the organized organizer) that
directs these changes according to its essence, or natural kind. In the case of
brain-dead patients, certain physical parts become damaged (constituting a loss of
parts) which results in the loss of certain lower-order capacities. However, since
these lower-order capacities are supplemented through artificial support
mechanisms, the substance retains the capacity for many of its higher-order
capacities. The inability of a particular substance/organism to actualize all its
capacities at a given time is irrelevant as long as the organism as a whole
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continues to exhibit organizational capacities. As one substance advocate notes,
“A substance has a set of capacities that are true of it even though they are not
actualized.” 363
These considerations lead to the conclusion that since brain-dead patients
retain integrated organizational unity, these individuals, at least under the
substance view, are living human beings. While it is true that such individuals
have experienced the loss of certain capacities, because these capacities are
supplemented by medical support, what remains under this view is not the mere
“residual countenance of a person.” 364 Rather, the brain dead, at least from a
substantial perspective, remain persons, albeit severely disabled. In the next
section, consideration is given to particular instances of inconsistency among
proponents of the substance view.

4.4 Inconsistencies Among Substance Advocates
Among substance-view advocates, the majority embraces the reasoning set
forth in the President’s Commission report as consistent with their view that death
should be declared only when organic unity in the body breaks down. They
argue, in conjunction with the Commission’s report, that without the unique
integrated functions of the entire brain, organic functioning of the body is lost.
Typically, substance advocates argue that a human person comes to be when the
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human organism comes to be (at conception) and ceases to be when the organism
as a whole dies. The question of whether these advocates can maintain
consistency based on their claims about the status of the human organism at the
beginning of life with the empirical evidence now uncovered regarding the human
organism who has been declared brain dead is worth considering.
The substance view is most often offered as a means to assess the abortion
debate. 365 Proponents present the view as an attempt to argue that a “human
being is intrinsically valuable because of the sort of thing it is, and the human
being remains that sort of thing as long as it exists.” 366 According to the
substance view, a human being throughout its development and decline does not
undergo any substantial changes that alter its identity until the organism as whole
dies. Indeed, it remains numerically identical to itself as long as it exists even
when it is unable to exhibit those functions normally associated with healthy adult
human beings. Hence, mere membership in the species homo sapiens is sufficient
reason to attribute intrinsic value and rights to any human individual in
recognition that it is “one of us.”
Patrick Lee, an advocate for the substance view, presents a form of the
argument in five steps:
1. You and I are intrinsically valuable (in the sense that makes us
subjects of rights).
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2. We are intrinsically valuable because of what we are (what we
are essentially).
3. What we are, is each a human, physical organism.
4. Human physical organisms come to be at conception (a
biological proposition: a new and distinct human organism is
generated by the fusion of a spermatozoon and an oocyte).
5. Therefore, what is intrinsically valuable (as a subject of rights)
comes to be at conception. 367
Lee, et al note three important points regarding the substantial identity of
the human embryo. 368 First, they note an embryo is from the start distinct from
any cell of the father and mother. This is due to its internal, directed, and distinct
growth toward maturation. Second, the embryo is human with a genetic make-up
characteristic of humans. Third, the embryo, though immature, is a complete or
whole organism that will, barring disease, violence, or variation in environment,
direct itself toward full expression of its essence. All of these features are present
in the embryo and none of the changes it undergoes during its development
generates a new direction of growth. 369
Of specific note is the fact that for those thinkers who employ these sorts
of arguments, the necessity of a functioning brain to denote the presence of a
person is not required. For them, a proper view is one in which personhood is
defined in biological but not necessarily strictly neurological terms. As John S.
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Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg note, “Whatever is or potentially is genetically a
person counts as a person and has a person’s rights.” 370 Yet the necessity of
having a partially functioning brain as a condition for personhood in parallel cases
with the life of the fetus is deemed unnecessary by many defenders of the
substance view, this despite the fact that many of these same thinkers consider
having a (partially) functioning brain necessary at later stages of the human
being’s life. Consider Lee’s comments on the matter:
The reason why irreparable cessation of brain functions constitutes
death is not because having a brain is at all stages of the human
being’s life a necessary property, but because in the mature human
being the brain is the organ which organizes all the systems of the
human organism. So when the brain ceases to function (totally and
irreparably) in a mature human being, the various tissues and
organs cease to form an organism. Now a human being is
essentially an organism (a specific type of organism), and so if the
tissues and organs cease to constitute an organism, then the human
being has ceased to be. 371
Similarly, in an effort to distance their view from a higher-brain formulation of
death, Moreland and Rae state, “Biological functioning is important to a
substance view since it holds that the human person is an organic unity grounded
in an individual essence.” 372 Yet, a few sentences later they state, “The whole
brain definition is consistent with a substance view of the person since once the
entire brain ceases to function, heartbeat and respiration will cease as well.” 373

370

John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg, Ethics for a Brave New World
(Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1993), 123.
371

Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life, 76.

372

Moreland and Rae, 336.

373

Ibid. , 337.
149

Consistent (in their view) with their claim that human persons are organisms (or
substances) of a specific kind, they write: “Whole brain definitions of death are
most consistent with a substance view of a person, in which the person is a unity
of biological, mental, and spiritual components, grounded in an individuated
essence—one’s human nature.” 374
A final example is from Elio Sgreccia, a proponent of the
Aristotelian/Thomistic substance view articulated earlier in this chapter. He
argues that the mental and spiritual components of persons belong to the
substantial character of the human organism. In contrast to the dualism implicit in
higher-brain death, he contends, “The body does not have its own private
existence aside from the spiritual soul. The unity of the person lies in this fact:
there is a single existence for these two components.” 375 Attempting to maintain
distance from the higher-brain criterion, he further maintains that the brain-death
criterion must not be understood “in the sense that one wants to identify the part
(the encephalon) with the whole (the body separate from the soul).” Rather, he
argues, the brain-death criterion is commensurate with the death of the organism
as a whole since “once the functions of the entire encephalon have been
irreversibly lost, including those of the encephalic trunk, which governs the
cardio-respiratory function, the organism loses the unifying principle of life that
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defines it as a living organism.” 376 He goes on to note that this is true regardless
of the use of mechanical ventilation, serving merely as a substitute for
spontaneous breathing, which permits the heart to continue to beat for the
maintenance of organs to be retrieved for transplantation.
What all these substance advocates have in common is their acceptance of
organizational unity as the defining feature of the presence of the human person
from conception to the death of the organism as a whole. Though at earlier stages
of development the human organism does not require a functioning brain, at later
stages the unifying principle of life is present only in those organisms with lowerbrain function intact. As noted in the last section, the discrepancy lies on the
insistence that internally based integrated functions are a necessary condition for
the life of the organism as a whole. Patients who rely on artificial or external
means for these same lower-brain functions maintain unified organic function, as
exemplified in cases of brain-dead pregnant women. Given the empirical
evidence to the contrary, substance advocates like those highlighted above can no
longer maintain that their acceptance of brain death is consistence with the death
of the organism as a whole.
Though these problems are indicative of the substance view as articulated
by those holding to an organism view of human persons, other thinkers have
criticized the metaphysical foundation upon which the organism view is
grounded. These critics, most of whom embrace a dualism of one kind or
another, generally approach the issue from a psychological-oriented view of
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personhood. They maintain that the problem with the current paradigm lies not in
the brain-death criterion, but rather in the definition of the death of the organism
as a whole. In the following section, several objections to the substance/organism
view are presented.

4.5 Some Objections to the Organism/Substance View
As previously noted, psychological-oriented conceptions of human
persons tend to be dualistic—often distinguishing between the psychological self
which comes to be and may cease to be at times other than the organism with
which it is associated. Advocates of the psychological ilk often criticize the
organism view on the basis of its inability to satisfy contemporary emphases and
advances in metaphysics and biology. While variations at the theoretical level are
wide, a few instances should suffice to illustrate the challenges leveled against the
substance/organism view.
The question raised by some current thinkers regarding the traditional
substance view pertains to its inadequacy in accounting for both biological and
mental structures. William Hasker, a prominent emergentist proposes a dualism
based on the idea that the conscious mind, which constitutes psychological
identity, emerges at a time different than that of the organism itself. Representing
a growing trend among some philosophers of mind, his dualism rests on the
recognition that the unity of conscious experience cannot be accounted for by
virtue of its relation to physical properties and parts. He argues that if it is taken
seriously the vast amount of data coming out of neuroscience, as well as that of
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the phenomena of the mind itself, it is clear that a mechanistic/reductionistic view
is unable to supply an adequate accounting of both fields of data. On the
mechanistic view, mental properties are properties of brain. Although the brain is
an extremely complex organ consisting of identifiable sub-organs, which in turn
consist of billions of neurons, the brain nonetheless consists of these parts. So
whatever is done by the brain must also consist of “the properties of, and relations
between the parts of the brain.” 377 However, when the application of this is made
to conscious experience, a certain incongruity results. When one views a complex
scene, such as a landscape interplayed with multiple objects, colors, and depths,
the image is experienced by the person as a unity, not a cacophony of fragmented
parts. As Hasker notes, “It is simply unintelligible how this experience can
consist of activities of and relations between parts of the brain each of which does
not have the experience in question.” 378 Something over and above the parts must
be posited in order to account for the unity in question. 379 This is best explained
by a substantial form that organizes the complexity of the parts and their
operations into a unified conscious experience. This view is dualistic in that it
distinguishes between the bodily substance and the mental substance, the latter of
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which has some reliance for its emergence and operation on the brain and is
indicative of the conscious self.
Hasker objects to the Aristotelian/Thomistic substance view by noting that
current biology has done away with the need for postulating form as the
organizing and life-giving principle of body. Reflecting on what he considers an
untenable metaphysics, he notes: “Aristotelian souls are responsible for
energizing bodily functions such as digestion, growth, and reproduction as well as
for consciousness, sensation, and reasoning: this runs head-on into the
commitment of contemporary biology to mechanistic explanations of such
biological processes.” 380 Hasker is suggesting that current biological
explanations are capable of adequately accounting for the biological processes
formerly attributed to form by Aristotle and Aquinas. Implicitly, he suggests that
notions of an immaterial form responsible for bodily integrity are outmoded in
light of contemporary biology. 381
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Advocates of the substance view may respond in two ways to this sort
of objection. First, they might respond by claiming that it is a mistake to assume
that scientific descriptions of biological processes constitute a complete
explanatory account of life. While the sciences can describe to us which
arrangements are associated with certain functions, they are nonetheless inept to
explain why the mere arrangement of material parts generates the kinds of effects
observed in various organisms (much more why these parts should arrange in the
way they do in the first place.) Rich Machuga explains: “There is absolutely no
good reason why nerve cells attached to a central nervous system should be able
to feel, whereas cambium layers attached to roots and leaves should not be able to
feel. It is no use saying that nerve cells are necessary conditions for the ability to
feel and since trees lack nerve cells they can’t feel. The problem is that “nervous
system” means a system which is able to feel. Or as a mocking Moliere might
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Other dualists, particularly those of a materialistic bent, consider the
notion of a substantial form (or soul) an obstacle for the intelligibility of the

say, the reason animals are able to feel is because of their sentient powers!” See:
Machuga.
Applied to other bodily functions, including digestion and growth,
organization and causation are irreducible to physics and chemistry. Indeed, these
functions are only properly understood with respect to their functional roles in the
organism as a whole. Meaning, therefore, resides in the parts only in terms of
their relation to the whole.
A second, though related point, concerns the need for a unifying principle
to account for holistic integration. One view, sometimes called the genocentric
view, attempts to explain organizational unity and causation through the encoded
DNA, which serves as the ordering principle of aggregated parts into a whole.
This view depicts a mechanistic and hence, a property-thing view of human
organisms in which a single aggregate part orders and directs other aggregate
parts to form a living whole. Problematic to this view is that it assumes DNA
molecules are self-actualizing. That is, it assumes that since DNA contains the
fundamental building blocks of life, which constitute the core elements of human
persons, then DNA must also possess the capacity “to initiate the complex set of
chemical reactions necessary for cellular growth and development.” See:
Moreland and Rae. However, current genetic science reveals that this form of
genetic reductionism lacks explanatory power to account for how the genetic
program can carry out its plans. Geneticist Francois Jacob comments: “[O]utside
the cell, without the means to carry out the plans, without the apparatus necessary
for copying or transmitting, [the DNA program] remains inert. No more than
memory of a computer can the memory of heredity act in isolation. Able to
function only within the cell, the genetic message can do nothing by itself. It can
only guide what is being done.” See: Evelyne Shuster, “Determinism and
Reductionism,” in Gene Mapping: Using Law and Ethics as Guides, ed. George J.
& Sherman Elias Annas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Additionally, Barbara McClintock realizes the shortcomings of the
reductionist view when she writes: “[T]he genome is a highly sensitive organ of
the cell that monitors genomic activities and corrects common errors, senses
unusual and unexpected events, and responds to them often by restructuring the
genome. We know about the components of genomes that could be made
available for such restructuring. We know nothing, however, about how the cell
senses danger and instigates responses to it that often are truly remarkable.” See:
Barbara McClintock, "The Significance of the Genome to Challenge," Science
226 (1984).
In other words, the mechanistic/reductionist view is unable to provide an
account for how DNA is able to accomplish its organizational role. Put simply,
DNA needs a driver.
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organism view. John Lizza, for example, criticises Alan Shewmon’s position
along these lines. Recognizing that Shewmon evokes the notion of “a spiritual
soul as what gives life to a body,” Lizza suggests that the idea of a soul containing
in itself the capacities for intellect and will is conceptually problematic. For
Lizza, intellect and will are the defining features of human persons and in the
absence of any physical conditions there is “no rational basis for determining
when such a radical power or potency for intellect and will is present in a
thing.” 382 He suggests further why mere membership in the human species is
insufficient to signify the presence of a human person. For example, if all
members of the human species have the potential for intellect and will, then it
follows that one would be committed to count “Jeremy Bentham and the pharaohs
(perhaps more completely preserved) as human beings with the potential for
intellect and will.” 383 These inadequacies, according to Lizza, render the
organism/substance view lacking in its intelligibility. 384
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A thorough critique of Lizza’s view, along with other consciousnessbased definitions of death, will be provided in Chapter Five. Nonetheless, two
responses are in order. First, the proponent of the substance view could agree with
Lizza that intellect and will represent defining features of human persons.
However, where they part company is with regard to what grounds a certain
organism as presently having these person-making capacities. Under the
substance view, as presented above, the physical conditions in the organism (a
properly functioning brain) are a necessary condition only regarding the present
exhibition of certain higher-order capacities, such as consciousness. Since
substantial form is the organizing principle of the material components of body, it
is also the locus of the ultimate capacities of personhood. Thus, PVS and braindead patients may lack the necessary lower-order capacities for the actualization
156

Two other arguments employed by J. McMahan demonstrate the difficulty
of postulating organizational numerical identity as intuitively preferred to
psychological continuity. 385 The first involves cases of diacephalus (two-headed)
twinning, in which the zygote does not divide completely resulting in twins
conjoined below the neck. McMahan employs the case of Abigail and Brittany
Hensel, each having “her own private mental life and her own character, each
[feeling] sensations only on her own side of the body, and each [having] exclusive
control over the limbs on her side.” 386 Although there are two distinct persons,
McMahan argues, there seems to be only one organism shared between them.
This suggests that, since the two persons, Abigail and Brittany, share the same
organism, then there can be no numerical identity between them and the
organism. Additionally, since there seems to be no reason to think that

of higher-order capacities, but by virtue of their continued organic functional
unity, higher-order capacities remain intact due to the continued presence of their
inner nature, which is what makes them persons. Contrary to Lizza, the rational
basis for determining personhood under the substance view rests on the
persistence of organizational unity.
The second response segues from the claim that mere membership in the
human species is sufficient reason to ascribe personhood under the substance
view. The implication given by Lizza is that dead specimens would also have to
be considered belonging to the natural kind, hence possessing the real potential
for intellect and will. But clearly this is a straw man. Recall that for Aristotle, a
dead body is no longer a human organism, since it lacks substantial soul to inform
its parts into an organized whole. Hence, a dead organism is no organism at all,
but merely the remains of parts, which naturally disintegrate into smaller
compounds because they lack the organizing principle that once gave them
direction and identity.
385
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diacephalus twins are different types of beings from persons in general, then this
suggests that no person is essentially an organism.
A second argument employed by McMahan is derived from the example
of hemispheric commissurotomy. Hemispheric commissurotomy is a procedure
in which the corpus callosum, which is responsible for communication between
the two cerebral hemispheres of the brain, is severed usually to alleviate epileptic
seizures. Some studies on hemispheric commissurotomy indicate that when each
hemisphere is presented with different stimuli, each can be unaware of what the
other is experiencing. 387 This suggests that a person’s consciousness could be
divided. 388
Based on this idea, McMahan suggests that if hemispheric
commissurotomy were performed on an individual at birth with each hemisphere
presented with different stimuli over the course of many years, this procedure
would produce two different minds with different sets of experiences, memories,
dispositions and beliefs. 389 If this happens, McMahan argues, there would be two
persons co-existing in the same organism. As in the first example, since there is
no fundamental reason to think these two individuals would be any different from
any other human person, then there is good reason to think human persons are not
essentially organisms.
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It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a thorough critique of these
arguments. 390 Most of these objections are given by those who advocate
alternative definitions of death to the standard paradigm as advanced by the
President’s Commission. In the chapter that follows, attention will be given to
some of these alternatives.

4.6 Summary and Assessment
The focus of Chapter Four was on the definitional challenge to brain
death. Specifically, the overall challenge concerned the relation between the
implications of the definition of death advanced by the President’s Commission
and the brain-death criterion. This chapter began by disclosing that both Bernat
and the President’s Commission opted for a definition that centers on an
organism-oriented view of human persons. For them, loss of integrated
functioning of the organism as a whole constitutes the death of the person. The
line of reasoning employed by brain-death advocates who focus on organizational
unity typically represents a traditional, substance metaphysics. The substance
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Specific to McMahan’s arguments, several critiques appear in the
literature. See, for example: Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen,
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commissurotomy case, in somewhat parallel cases, such as Dissociative Identity
Disorder (DID), just because someone has two sets of experiences does not mean
that there are two distinct persons.
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view represents a long and respected tradition that can be traced back to the
philosophical anthropology of Aristotle and Aquinas. It provides an account of
the human person based on the notion that humans are valuable because of the
sort of things they are, (i.e., organisms of a substantial kind).
Further analysis suggests a lack of conceptual consistency of brain death
with the substance view. If humans are by nature, as substance advocates suggest,
“rational moral agents” associated with a particular sort of organism, then as long
as this organism exists, it remains identical to itself, despite its failure to fully
express functions and activities normally associated with fully developed, healthy
adult humans. Rather than discriminate the self from the organism based on the
present exhibition of certain favorable functions or activities, the substance view
advocate asks, “What sort of thing is it that exists?” Once that question can be
answered, it is argued, one has sufficient grounds for establishing whether the
thing in question is deserving of the respect due to persons. In other words, even
if a person lacks the ability to think rationally, due to lack of development or a
disability, a person remains a person because of his or her inner nature. It is the
inner nature, or the substantial form, that constitutes the continued presence of its
ultimate capacities.
If, as substance advocates suggest, a distinct human organism comes to be
at conception, the substantial person comes to be, and through an internally
structured unity develops herself to be the thing she is by virtue of her inner
essence. In other words, persons are what they are prior to the expression of all
their ultimate capacities. The process by which these capacities are actualized is
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characterized by an internally driven orientation toward self-organization, selfexpression, and self-communication with others.
The substance view represents a claim of broad inclusiveness for the
human community 391 and achieves symmetry when carefully applied to braindead persons by virtue of their continued organizational unity despite medical
interventions to supplement functional loss. Mechanical ventilation, the
administration of vassopressors, and a host of other life-sustaining interventions,
may portray dependency for life, but if the life of the organism as a whole is
sustained, then dependency becomes irrelevant. As Potts notes, “[A] ‘whole brain
dead’ individual can continue to function as a unified organism, although she is
dependent on machines…The brain dead patient’s dependence on machines, even
permanent dependence on machines, for continued organic functioning is
irrelevant to whether or not he or she is alive.” 392
Advocates argue that the explanatory power of the substance view lies in
its ability to account for the continued life and existence of the organism when
technological support seemingly blurs access to the status of the life of the
organism through the window of traditional life signs. Because the substance
view recognizes a distinction between lower-order and higher-order capacities,
supplementation of lower-order capacities fails to constitute loss of organizational
unity. As long as higher-order capacities for organizational life continue, the
organism remains the same thing it was prior to lower functional loss. Since the
391
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substantial person is identical to a physical organism belonging to a natural kind,
as long as that organism continues to exist, the substance-view advocate has
sufficient grounds for maintaining the continued existence of the person under the
brain-death criterion. Thus, substance advocates who embrace brain death do so
on grounds inconsistent with their own metaphysical categories.
Critics of the substance/organism view approach the issue from an entirely
different metaphysical viewpoint. Based on a body-self dualism, Hasker, Lizza,
and McMahan maintain that the organism view fails to correspond to basic
intuitions about what it means to be a person. Whether these criticisms are
successful remains to be seen, as there is considerable ongoing debate on these
issues. What is clear, however, is that the definition of death, along with the
metaphysical foundation upon which it is based, is inconsistent with the braindeath criterion.
This analysis falls short in assessing various alternatives to the standard
paradigm dominating the discussion over the past thirty or so years. The
following chapter will consider alternatives to, as well as modifications of brain
death. Particular attention will be given to the higher-brain model of death
proposed by various prominent thinkers. These models will be evaluated for their
conceptual coherence. In addition, attention will be devoted to suggestions
regarding donation apart from the dead-donor rule, particularly their potential
effects on the medical community and society in general. Other proposals
involving the adoption of conscience clauses for those who oppose the legal
standard of death will be examined as well.
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Chapter 5
Advancing Alternatives to Brain Death
5.1 Introduction
The well-publicized “acute shortage of organs for transplantation” 393 has
led to numerous suggestions designed to increase the pool of organ donors. At
the heart of these suggestions is the idea that the current standard of death is in
need of refinement either by way of extension or modification. The fact that
advances in technology have allowed for the creation of patients in suspended
states has given rise to questions about previous conceptions of life and death. At
the same time, some thinkers recognize that certain of these patients are ideal
candidates for organ procurement, given their greatly diminished physiological
and cognitive capacities. They suggest that an expansion of death criteria to
include higher-brain death is better capable of meeting the challenges presented
by patients in these slippery states, while at the same time furthering the prospects
for increasing organ supply.
Others have gone further suggesting that death is indefinable on a social
level and that social policy should allow for reasoned diversity on issues as
393
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personal as death and donation. Although varying in detail, the common thread
among these proposals, whether a motivating factor or logical corollary, is the
idea that organ procurement ought to proceed apart from the dead donor rule,
which according to the standard paradigm is necessarily connected to the
definition of death.
However, some thinkers argue that society can better tolerate individual
freedom at the definitional level. They suggest the implementation of conscience
clauses allowing for personal choice with regard to death criteria.
This chapter assesses various alternatives and modifications to death
criteria put forward for the purpose of expanding the pool of potential organ
donors. In section 5.2, particular attention is given to higher-brain models of
death. These models will be evaluated for their philosophical coherence and with
current neurological evidence. Section 5.3 explores suggestions regarding
donation apart from the dead donor rule, particularly with respect to their
potential effects on the medical community and society in general. Section 5.4
considers proposals involving the adoption of conscience clauses for those who
oppose the legal standard of death. Finally, an overall assessment and summary
will be provided.
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5.2 Higher-Brain Models
Higher-brain models of death began to gain support following a
landmark Lancet article published in 1971. 394 J.D. Brierly and colleagues
affirmed that neocortical death could be accurately diagnosed, and that
neocortical death represents a sufficient condition for diagnosing permanent
unconsciousness. Since that time, several theorists have attempted to justify a
conceptual basis for human death that centers on the permanent loss of certain
functions associated with the higher regions of the brain. 395 Though there is
considerable debate as to what those functions are, higher brain advocates are, as
Michael B. Green and Daniel Wikler note:
“…united on the point that our decision about what constitutes the
death of the human being must reflect what is essentially
significant to human nature, and that the permanent cessation of
(embodied) consciousness qualifies, since it is a necessary
condition for any of the uniquely human capacities individuals
possess in different measure.” 396
Since humans have much in common with other species, particularly with regard
to organismic functions, the focus should be placed on functions pertaining to our
ontological distinctiveness, including the capacity for consciousness, thinking,
reasoning, feeling, and awareness. And since these capacities are attributable to
394
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the higher portions of the brain, it is argued, one need not assess the integrative
lower functions of the brain stem.
Though higher-brain advocates insist that the mind must be present for
the human person to be considered alive, they vary in focus on the required
conditions necessary for personhood. Some thinkers, such as Green and
Wikler, 397 focus on personal identity, which is sustained only in virtue of
psychological continuity. For them, the central issue is whether the conscious
self, which includes a set of mental qualities such as consciousness, memory,
character, and intentions, is sufficiently intact that one is justified in saying that
the same person exists over time. It is important to note that for Green and
Wikler, it is not the brain tissue per se that is sufficient in establishing personal
identity, but rather the “brain processes, carried out through microstructural and
microfunctional registrations in the brain tissue.” 398 Patients suffering from
neocortical death have suffered permanent loss of personal identity since they
lack the necessary qualities or functions to sustain their psychological identity.
Hence, such patients are properly considered dead.
Respondents to this position cite numerous counter-intuitive arguments
demonstrating its insufficiency for grounding personal identity. The problem
seems to be the difficulty of defining death in terms of the loss of personal
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identity. 399 Francis Beckwith provides a counter example to illustrate the
problem. 400 Beckwith suggests imagining that one’s uncle, call him Uncle Jed, is
in a terrible care accident that results in him being in a coma from which he may
or may not awake. Suppose, however, that after two years he awakens. Beckwith
queries, “Could the physicians have killed Uncle Jed—the living organism we
refer to as ‘Uncle Jed’—during that time because he did not exhibit certain
functions or have certain present capacities?” 401 If one holds that personal
identity is contingent upon certain mental qualities or functions, then it is difficult
to say why it would be wrong to end the life of Uncle Jed while he was in a coma.
Since Uncle Jed, while in a coma, lacked the necessary functions for personal
identity, ending the life of the organism associated with Uncle Jed constitutes no
harm to him. But suppose the personal identity advocate claims that what makes
it wrong to kill Uncle Jed while in a coma is the psychological continuity between
his past functioning and the probability that he will do so in the future. However,
pushing the illustration further reveals a difficulty. Beckwith writes:
For imagine that while in the coma Uncle Jed’s physician tells you
that your uncle will come out of the coma, but when he comes out
he will not have any of the memories, beliefs, or knowledge that he
once possessed, though he will be able to regain his prior abilities
and accumulate new memories and experiences over the years
399
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following his recovery through the normal process of learning and
development. 402
Now it is obvious that the psychological disconnect between Uncle Jed’s precoma, coma, and post-coma conditions forces the personal identity advocate to
accept the permissibility of ending the life of the organism associated with Uncle
Jed despite the fact that he will retain his basic capacities as a human being.
Robert M. Veatch 403 and Karen Grandstrand Gervais 404 also criticize the
view of Green and Wikler as insufficient to conceptualize human death. Veatch
suggests that some cases of dementia and amnesia pose serious problems for the
personal identity view of Green and Wikler. Under their view, psychological
continuity would cease to exist in patients who suffered from these conditions,
and by implication such patients have died. Gervais agrees, arguing that as long
as the biological substrate for conscious experience remains intact, despite the
loss of past experiences in the form of memories, death has not occurred. Veatch
and Gervais both propose that designating such individuals as dead poses counterintuitive problems for the personal identity proponent thereby suggesting that the
conceptual criteria for determining human death lies elsewhere.
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Veatch is well known for his advocacy of a consciousness related model
of death. As early as 1975 405 , he challenged the whole brain concept of death
advocating in its place a form of higher brain death consistent, in his view, with
the Judeo-Christian tradition. For Veatch, human life, in the morally significant
sense, is characteristic of “humans with ‘embodied capacity for
consciousness.’” 406 A human being, therefore, is an essential union of body and
mind. When the capacity for consciousness is permanently lost, as in cases of
patients in a permanent vegetative state, the essential union is lost. Veatch
contends, “[A] functional body without any capacity for mental function lacks the
essential integration of body and mind.” 407 Hence, death in the morally
significant sense has occurred.
Veatch’s model stands out as one that is less concerned about the loss of
some mental function, such as consciousness or personhood, and more concerned
about the integration of bodily and mental function, which he considers the
critical feature of human life. Given the fact that the term personhood is so
ambiguous, disputes about personhood are irrelevant to the definition of death
debate. For some the term refers to all living humans, even if they have lost all
brain function. More controversial are those definitions that limit personhood to
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humans who possess some key mental capacity, such as the ability to have a selfconcept or possess self-awareness. Hence, some biologically integrating and even
some conscious humans, such as newborns and some of the senile, would be nonpersons by this conceptualization. Moreover, the term is sometimes applied to
non-embodied entities, “such as the being that would exist if one could download
an individual’s memories into a sophisticated computer.” 408 Still others apply it
to departed human souls, angels, and divine persons. To the extent that the term
can be applied in so many ways, analytically the question of whether one is a
person or not has nothing to do with whether one is a human being, at least in the
moral sense. Thus, “Being a living human,” writes Veatch, “is totally
independent of possessing either personhood or continuity of personal
identity.” 409
What this means, more concisely, is that for Veatch the definition of
death debate should be understood as a moral or policy controversy about when
certain death behaviors are appropriate. 410 These could include, stopping lifesupporting treatment, reading the will, initiating life insurance payment, procuring
organs for transplantation, etc., all of which were in the past triggered by an event
called death. Unbundling these death behaviors may be appropriate at certain
times prior to the moment of death. Indeed, as medicine advanced in its ability to
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slow down the dying process, society recognized that certain of these behaviors
are more appropriately triggered at different stages in a series of dying events.
What is at issue, then, is not merely whether all biological human life has
ceased; rather, whether one has lost the “full moral standing” society affords
equally to all members of the human moral community.411 Included in the
concept of possessing full moral standing is a set of rights designating the duties
certain other humans have toward these individuals. Death in this sense occurs
when an individual has lost his or her moral standing, and this is best
characterized when the essential union of mind and body is permanently severed.
Some have characterized Veatch’s model as a “functionalist” view, 412 a
charge that Veatch vehemently denies. 413 Unlike Veatch who eschews any
interest in the personhood debate, John Lizza argues that how one conceptualizes
persons and personal identity directly affects “the evaluation of issues in
bioethics, particularly the problem of defining death.” 414 For him, higher-brain
advocates like Veatch, Green, and Wikler rely on a problematic way of
understanding the relation between person and organism. Instead of focusing on
persons as substantive entities or subjects, these thinkers identify “the person with
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certain abilities and qualities of awareness.” 415 This “qualitative” or
“functionalist” approach treats the person as a set of mental qualities and has its
origins in the thinking of John Locke and David Hume. To illustrate this point,
Lizza recalls the hypothetical case presented by Locke of the prince and cobbler
who swap bodies. Since personal identity is constitutive of psychological states
and memories, if the bodies of the prince and cobbler woke up one day with the
psychological states and memories of each having been exchanged, Locke
concludes that the prince and cobbler would have swapped bodies. 416 Hence, for
Locke personal identity consists of psychological continuity over time
irrespective of the biological substrate underlying the psychological states at any
given time.
Locke’s view finds contemporary expression in functionalist theories of
mind. 417 For the functionalist, mind is a set of mental states defined “in terms of
causal relationships between a system’s external input, causal output, and internal
causal relations.” 418 In this sense, mind is similar to a computer program. And
since computer programs are capable of functioning in a variety of intrinsically
different hardware platforms, minds, at least in the functionalist sense, are also
415
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capable of being realized in multiple physical systems. It is not hard to imagine,
therefore, “downloading” the mind of an individual from one biological substrate,
into a new physical support system without losing the essential features of
consciousness that ground personal identity.
Although Veatch acknowledges that a “disembodied mind that has been
downloaded from a previous embodiment but remains capable of thinking,
feeling, remembering, and so forth, would surely have some important moral
standing,” 419 he denies that his view entails that one must say it is the same
human being as it was when embodied. According to Veatch, it is the functional
relation of mind and body that constitutes a human being. Thus, the suggestion
that a disembodied mind is just as much a living human being as an embodied
mind would be, is a conclusion that Veatch, “and most scholars within the JudeoChristian tradition, must reject.” 420 Moreover, since the hallmark of his view is
“embodied consciousness,” a “body-swap” would entail a recombination of the
two essential features of the previous people resulting in the creation of two new
individuals. Yet the creation of these new individuals would involve the killing of
the two previous individuals, which Veatch construes as a terrible immoral thing
to do. 421
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Attempting to frame the issue in personalistic terms, Lizza 422 contrasts the
views of Veatch with that of Gervais, the latter of whom he argues invokes a more
conceptually coherent substantive account of personhood. Gervais argues that an
intact biological substrate for consciousness is a sufficient condition for saying
that a person continues to exist, despite the loss of all memories. 423 In this way,
argues Lizza, Gervais rejects the functionalist view, which she attributes to Green
and Wikler, and embraces a substantive view that recognizes persons as the kind
of things that can literally die. Gervais reinterprets Veatch in such a way that
enables her to equate his notion of human being with her notion of person—a
substantial entity composed of mind and body. Under this conception, person
refers not to some qualitative or functional specification, but rather to “a primitive
substance that necessarily has psychological and corporeal characteristics.” 424
Individuals who lack the capacity or real potential for psychological functions,
e.g., corpses, anencephalics and individuals in a permanent vegetative state, are
no longer persons, and hence are dead. In cases of neocortical and brain death,
Lizza suggests that what remains is no longer a person, but rather a “humanoid”
or “biological artifact.” Lizza explains:

and perform certain functions, no one really worries about the moral status of
disembodied minds.
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By “humanoid” or “biological artifact,” I mean a living being that
has human characteristics but falls short of being human, a form of
life created by medical technology. Indeed, this may be the most
sensible thing to say about such a living being. Whereas a person
is normally transformed into a corpse at his or her death,
technology has intervened in this natural process and has made it
possible for a person to die in new ways. Instead of a person’s
death being followed by remains in the form of an inanimate
corpse, it is now possible for a person’s remains to take the form of
an artificially sustained, living organism devoid of the capacity for
consciousness and any other mental functions. 425
Lizza further suggests that this conceptual framework comports more closely with
the way many people would identify themselves. Rather than identifying persons
with their bodies, one’s common expressions and linguistic categories, such as
“people die every day,” indicate one means more than “just our bodies or qualities
of them.” 426 Moreover, many would find it unacceptable, argues Lizza, to
identify themselves with artificially sustained brain dead bodies. While people
would recognize the continuation of organizational life in these bodies, most
would not view this life as the continuation of the person. In the absence of a real
capacity for consciousness, one’s intuitions would incline one to view oneself as
having died.
Relying on an Aristotelian notion of potentiality, Lizza argues that the
sense in which potentiality is relevant to the definition of death debate concerns a
425
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more proximate and realistic meaning of potentiality. By this he means, “that the
potential will be actualized in the ‘natural or normal course of events,’ or that
unusual circumstances will not intervene to prevent the potential from being
realized.” 427 Not only will brain-dead humans certainly not regain consciousness
in the natural course of events, the brain-dead body is not disposed to regain
consciousness. And in the absence of a particular functioning biological
substrate, the potential for consciousness, argues Lizza, is extremely remote.
In an attempt to contribute to “a much more robust discussion within the
Catholic tradition,” Lizza suggests that the consciousness-related substantive
account given above finds consistency with the thinking of some Catholic
scholars. He cites William Wallace, O.P., 428 as well as an earlier work by
Shewmon 429 as examples of those holding to a view that embraces the necessity
of an intact biological substrate for the potential for consciousness. These
thinkers rely on Aquinas’s notion of “delayed hominization” which views the
infusion of the rational soul as occurring at some point in the body’s process of
development other than at conception. Wallace suggests that “little attention has
been paid to the obverse of that process” which might be termed “early

427

Lizza, Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death, 107.

428

W. A. Wallace, "St. Thomas on the Beginning and Ending of Human
Life.," Studi Tomistici: Sanctus Thomas de Aquino Doctor Hodiernae
Humanitatis 58 (1995), 58.
429

Alan D. Shewmon, "The Metaphysics of Brain Death, Persistent
Vegetative State, and Dementia," Thomist 49 (1985): 24-80.

176

dehominization” wherein the soul departs from the body prior to the cessation of
all bodily functions. 430 Quoting Aquinas, Wallace writes,
For it is obvious that in the generation of an individual human
being one finds in the material subject first existence, then the
living thing and after that a human; for it is an animal before it is a
man…And in the process of corruption, first [the individual] loses
the use of reason and remains alive and breathing, then it loses life
and remains a being, because it does not corrupt into
nothingness. 431
Lizza invites not only Catholic thinkers, but also members from all religious and
philosophical persuasions to examine their traditions in light of the challenges
posed by advancing medical technologies.
To briefly summarize thus far, higher-brain advocates consider
consciousness a necessary condition for a human to be considered alive. For
Veatch, the personhood question is moot, given the insurmountable difficulties of
defining personhood in any satisfactory way. Human beings are fundamentally a
unity of mind and body, and when that unity is lost, death in the morally relevant
sense has occurred. However, for Gervais and Lizza, the question “What is a
person?” is fundamental to answering many of the difficult questions in bioethics,
especially in the definition of death debate. For them, persons are human beings
who have the real capacity for consciousness, a necessary condition of which is an
intact cerebral cortex. In the permanent absence of consciousness, despite the
continuation of other integrative bodily functions through artificial means, the

430

Wallace, 394; 397.

431

Aquinas, Super librum de causis exposition cited in Ibid. , 397.
177

person has died. What is left is nothing more than a humanoid body, resembling
the person with which it was once associated.
Despite attempts to cast their position in substantive terms, Gervais and
Lizza present a model more in common with a property-thing view of persons
rather than a substance view. Recall that the substance view maintains that
substances are ontologically prior to and greater than the sum of their parts. And
while a substance can gain new parts and lose old ones, it maintains its absolute
identity through change by virtue of its substantial form. This is in contrast to a
thing that is not ontologically prior to or greater than the sum of its parts—
examples of which include an automobile, a sporting event, or a computer. None
of these things is capable of subsisting through time by virtue of gaining or losing
parts. This view is called mereological essentialism, derived from the Greek
meros, meaning “part.” As J. P. Moreland explains, “Mereological essentialism
means that the parts of a thing are essential to it as a whole; if the object gains or
loses parts, it is a different object.” 432 According to Lizza, when a human person
suffers irreparable damage to his or her cerebral cortex (loss of a part), the person
has lost the “realistic potential for psychological functions.” 433 All that remains is
a “humanoid” or “biological artifact.” In a similar way, when a computer suffers
irreparable damage to a component of its hardware, it can no longer carry out all
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the operations of its software. What remains is nothing more than the
disaggregated parts of what was once a functioning computer.
While Lizza attempts to offer a non-reductive substantive account of
human persons, a careful analysis of the terms he employs exhibits a position
much more consistent with a reductive/functionalist view. On the one hand, he
goes to great lengths to distance his approach from those faulty lines of reasoning
typical of functionalist and reductive views of personhood. On the other, he
continuously employs the same criteria typical of those functionalist views he
criticizes. For instance, to assert that those who have lost neo-cortical function
are “merely breathing bodies,” “not human but mere humanoids,” or are of the
status of “biological artifact” portends of the very sort of reductionism he
endeavors to avoid. As one commentator has observed, “The semantic
gymnastics that are employed in the argument…only seem plausible by the
recurrent resort to criteria of a functionist nature.” 434 This kind of “philosophical
sleight-of-hand” is indicative of an attempt to sneak through the back door what is
denied entrance in the front. If human persons are substances who are greater
than the sum of their parts, as Gervais and Lizza claim, their account falls short in
remaining conceptually consistent with this claim.
Another way to understand this problem is to consider the essential unity
belonging to substances. Recall that Veatch understands the essential unity of
human beings to be that of mind and body. In the event that no such unity
434
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obtains, as in cases of brain death, permanent vegetative state, and anencephaly, a
declaration of death is appropriate. He also asserts that this view comports
closely with the Judeo-Christian tradition. The problem with this view is that it
fails to appreciate the remaining unity, which is most evidently displayed in the
organisms’ capacity for internal self-direction. More consistent with the JudeoChristian tradition is the view that human organisms are substances by virtue of
the internal relation of the parts to the whole. Each part receives its identity by
virtue of its irreducible function and internal relatedness to the organism taken as
a whole. This is why the organism is said to be ontologically prior to its parts.
The functions of the parts reflect “the internal structure of capacities in the
essence of the soul.” 435 If one understands “soul” as the organizing life principle
of the body, then the soul is “the efficient cause of the characteristics of the
human body.” 436 Various bodily parts are best understood as instrumental causes
that the soul utilizes to actualize its various capacities and traits. It therefore
follows that as long as organizational unity obtains, despite physiological or
cognitive impairment attributable to a lack in some part, the organizational
principle, or soul, remains intact.
Lizza claims conceptual space for his view in the metaphysics of Aristotle
and Aquinas. Recall that the argument involves a reversal of the ‘succession of
souls’ in the Aristotelian/Thomistic notion of embryogenesis. A necessary
condition for the receiving of a rational soul (or ensoulment) is a sufficiently
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developed body to enable its proper operations. Similarly, when the body loses
necessary structural integrity to support the operations of the rational soul, a
substantial change has occurred. Hence, permanently unconscious patients
manifest only the operations (and presence) of either a sensitive or a vegetative
soul lacking any capacity indicative of the presence of a rational soul. The
remaining body is nothing more than a “humanoid animal” or a mere “vegetable.”
However, this view rests on dubious interpretive grounds. First, the ancient and
medieval understanding of human embryology, which is the basis for this view,
was seriously lacking in development. As some Thomistic scholars contend, “If
Aquinas had known the facts of embryology he would have held that the human
soul is present from conception.” 437 Divorced from erroneous embryonic
assumptions, the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas, coupled with the facts of
modern embryology, simply fail to support the idea of de hominization. 438
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Haldane and Lee observe, “Modern embryology shows that the female
provides a gamete (the ovum) which is already a highly organized living cell,
containing highly complex, specific information, in the genetic structure of the
nuclear chromosomes. This information (together with that provided by the
genetic structure in the chromosomes of the male sperm) helps guide the
development of the new living organism formed by the fusion of the sperm and
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A second interpretive problem lies in the failure to recognize logical
distinctions from ontological ones. Jason Eberl notes that while Aquinas [and by
implication, Aristotle] observe that when one “mentally abstracts the concept of
rationality from the definition of a human being, the concept of animality will yet
remain,” he in no way implies “that this is what happens in the process of human
death.” 439 A careful assessment of Aquinas’s entire treatment of the issue reveals
a strong contention for the unicity of a human being’s vegetative, sensitive, and
rational capacities residing in one substantial form; namely, a rational soul. Thus
the higher brain interpretation invokes an unnecessarily complex metaphysical
explanation. As Eberl explains:
Accepting the higher-brain interpretation entails the following
metaphysical description of how human death occurs: there exists
first a rational substance informed by a rational soul, and then
possibly a non-rational animal substance informed by a sensitive
soul, and finally a merely living substance informed by a
vegetative soul before its final transformation into a lifeless corpse.
This description violates Ockham’s Razor, which states that ceteris
paribus the simplest explanation of a given phenomenon – i.e., the
explanation that is the least metaphysically complex by requiring
the postulation of the least number of entities – is the explanation
to which one ought to give assent. 440
the ovum. Hence the ovum is actually very close to readiness for rapid
embryological development; it only requires fusion with the sperm and the
activation that occurs with that fusion. To a certain extent the gradual transition
from the simple to the complex that Aquinas sought actually occurs during
gametogenesis (of which, of course, he was unaware). Thus, applying Aquinas’s
metaphysical principles to the embryological facts uncovered since his time leads
to the conclusion that the human being is present from fertilisation on. Haldane
and Lee.
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It is worth observing that higher-brain models of death depend on a body-self (or
body-person) dualism that supposes the human person ceasing to be at one time
and the human organism at another. According to this view, permanent loss of
consciousness renders the person dead, and the relevance of the remaining
organism is contingent on the prior wishes of the person with which it was
formerly associated. A logical corollary of this dualistic view is the problem of
accounting for the wrongness of intentionally creating unconscious cloned
humans whose healthy organs can be used for transplant purposes or spare parts
for the person from which the organism was cloned.441 Given that these
organisms lack the potential for consciousness, and hence the usual rights
afforded persons, it is not clear how the creation and use of such organisms for
morally good reasons is morally wrong. Dan Brock acknowledges this reality and
argues that these body-clones could not be harmed since they “lack the capacity
for consciousness.” 442 Yet, he acknowledges, “most people would likely find”
the intentional creation of permanently unconscious cloned humans “appalling
and immoral.” It is not clear, on Lizza’s account, how the moral repugnance
many people would feel about this could be accounted for, given that his view is
open to the moral warrant for these gruesome activities. Alternatively, under the
traditional substance view, not only is the moral warrant for the creation and use
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of these organisms removed, but also an explanation for the moral repugnance felt
by most people is more easily identified (see Chapter Four.) 443
Finally, notwithstanding the metaphysical problems of determining when
death occurs, higher brain death also engenders epistemic uncertainties.
Typically, higher brain death relies on the accuracy of diagnosis of the condition
known as persistent vegetative state. The persistent vegetative state (PVS)
diagnosis predicts a relatively poor prognosis for most patients. However, there is
a small fraction of PVS patients who do make subsequent cognitive gains over
time. In an effort to avoid prognostic error, some physicians make a distinction
between a persistent vegetative state and a permanent vegetative state, a condition
much more tricky to diagnose. 444 It is described as a probabilistic diagnosis
regarding the future and requires a substantially longer period of time to diagnose,
depending on patient age and the nature of brain damage.
Recent reports of some PVS patients awakening years after diagnosis
raises questions about whether society would be willing to accept a higher-brain
death criterion. 445 A report in the journal Neurorehabilitation, which documents
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the arousal of PVS patients through medication, proposes further complexities
surrounding the potential cognitive status of these patients. 446 Moreover,
neuroscience is changing previous conceptions that the grounding of
consciousness is exclusively in the neocortex. As Stephen Miles points out,
“Consciousness requires neocortical activation by lower brain structures, although
there is no clear understanding of the status of consciousness when the activation
of the neocortex is destroyed but neocortical activity remains, as is evidenced by
neurophysiological studies.” 447 Indeed, some cases of persistent vegetative state
may be a higher form of the condition known as “locked-in state” in which the
neocortex is completely isolated.
Complicating matters further is the cognitive state of patients with severe
brain injury resulting in a minimally conscious state (MCS). Distinguished from
PVS and coma, the MCS “is characterized by inconsistent but clearly discernable
behavioral evidence of consciousness” clearly differentiated from reflex
behavior. 448 Recently published data in the journal Neurology indicates that
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can be a very powerful tool in the
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evaluation of “awareness” of patients in this state. The findings were so
remarkable that Dr. Joy Hirsch, director of the Functional MRI Research Center at
Columbia University Medical School and an author of the study, said,
The most consequential thing about this is that we have opened a
door, we have found an objective voice for these patients, which
tells us they have some cognitive ability in a way they cannot tell
us themselves. The patients are more human than we imagined in
the past, and it is unconscionable not to aggressively pursue
research efforts to evaluate them and develop therapeutic
techniques. 449
One therapeutic technique, still in its experimental stage, is deep brain stimulation
(DBS). 450 Although some patients may emerge from a MCS and regain a greater
degree of consciousness without intervention, others may regain cognitive and
physical abilities through DBS, which involves the electrical stimulation of the
thalamus. Because of the extensive connections between the thalamus and the
cortex, activating the thalamus may in turn reactivate the cortical functions
resulting in an increased awareness of self, others, and the environment for these
patients. Though multiple questions remain as to the therapeutic potential of
DBS, recent findings “suggest that patients in MCS retain the physiological
substrate necessary for cognitive tasks at much higher levels than might be
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demonstrated by overt behaviors on clinical examination.” 451

DBS provides

these patients with an expressive vector to the outside world that otherwise would
render them cognitively isolated. These new technologies are challenging the
degree to which our ability in the past to detect consciousness in many cognitively
impaired patients is definitive.
Recognizing the uncertainty of the capacity for consciousness in many of
these patients, some higher brain proponents recommend that organ donation
from the “permanently unconscious” be limited to those patients declared brain
dead under the current standard. 452 Since the likelihood of these patients
regaining consciousness is nil, brain death is the minimal threshold under which
donation should be permitted for the permanently unconscious.
Despite attempts to maintain a consciousness-based definition of death
mediated through brain death, the epistemic quandary remains a serious challenge
for all neurologically based criteria. Sometimes overlooked in the West, the
public debate about brain death in the country of Japan evidences the relevance of
the phenomenological perspective of family members. Several reflective reports
by writers who witnessed the brain death of their relatives document the personal
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experiences between family members and their brain-dead loved ones. 453 These
reports evidence a kind of intercorporeal communication, in the form of
stabilization of heart rate and blood pressure, suggesting the felt presence of
relatives by brain-dead patients. Another overlooked area relevant to the issue
concerns the growing body of literature documenting the extraordinary reports of
near-death experiences among patients in critical medical situations. Reports of
heightened, lucid conscious experiences of patients with flat EEG readings, lack
of cerebral blood flow, and no clinical life signs are suggestive of an
epistemological gap in the understanding of the nature of consciousness. 454
Indeed, to conclude that a certain capacity, X, is present through the observation
of its corresponding activity, Y, does not entail that in the absence of activity Y,
capacity X is no longer present. It is therefore fallacious to infer that a PVS or
brain-dead patient lacks any rational capacity on the sole basis of not having
observed any rational or neural activity. 455 To illustrate the problem further, a
recent article in the magazine Wired reports that, despite advancements in
neuroscience, “Almost nothing is known about how the brain produces awareness,

453

Tateo Sugimoto, Yuko and Chihior, Kita Kamoshirenai Seifuko (Tokyo:
Nami Shobo, 1986). Kunio Yanagida, "Sakurifaisu: Waga Musuko Noshi No 11
Nichi," Bungei shuniju 72 (1994). Cited in, Christian Steineck, ""Brain Death,"
Death, and Personal Identity," KronoScope 3, no. 2 (2003).
454

The literature in this area is vast and diverse. However, for an excellent
work detailing the implications of NDEs to brain death, see: Pim van Lommel,
“About the Continuity of Our Consciousness,” in Brain Death and Disorders of
Consciousness, ed. Calixto & D. Alan Shewmon Machado (New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004).
455

Eberl.

188

and current models of brain function don't accord with the little that is known.” 456
The article goes on to highlight five major problems that are yet to be overcome
before any model can begin to be constructed for explaining consciousness. 457
These problems are so acute that the prospects of constructing a coherent model
of consciousness based on the classic physics governing neuroscience today seem
unlikely.
In light of these shortcomings, some commentators maintain that the focus
on defining death is ill conceived. They contend that a social consensus at the
definitional level is an unlikely goal, given the various perplexities surrounding
death and donation. Rather, it is suggested that social policy should be sensitive
to reasoned diversity on issues as personal as death and donation. In the next
section consideration is given to the proposal that organ procurement ought to
proceed apart from the dead donor rule, which is necessarily connected to the
definition of death.

5.3 Changing the Dead Donor Rule
An important goal of the transplant community is to discover ways to
increase the pool of organ donors in a manner that respects donor choice. Given
456
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that the number of patients waiting for transplants continues to rise while the
number of donors remains unchanged, it is becoming difficult to realize such a
goal without offering alternatives that challenge current standards governing
organ donation. Currently, decisions about organ donation are made in
accordance with the dead donor rule. Simply stated, the dead donor rule says that
a patient must be dead before vital organs can be removed for transplantation.
The purpose of the rule is to temper the utilitarian goal of increasing organ supply
with the deontological concern of respecting persons. In this way, two key
protections for patients are supported: 1) patient choice, and 2) protection from
“futile and callous medical intervention.” 458 Moreover, the dead donor rule
provides protection for the medical community in general and the moral ethos of
the physician in particular by limiting the scope of intrusion into the lives of
patients. The practice of medicine is built upon public trust. If the public
perceives that medical practitioners are overstepping their boundaries to the point
of hastening or prematurely ending the lives of patients, this trust is seriously
compromised.
Recently, there has been some discussion about whether the dead donor
rule remains capable of mediating these utilitarian and deontological goals. Elysa
R. Koppelman argues that given the lack of consensus on a definition of death, the
dead donor rule can no longer arbitrate between these moral goals, and in some
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cases we are right to “sever the connection between determinations of death and
organ procurement.” 459 For those who advocate the dead donor rule, a consensus
definition of death is necessary in order to determine the moral status of taking
organs from patients. However, since the concept of death is elusive, the
establishment of a consensus turns out to be nothing more than a legal fiction
created to resolve pragmatic concerns. Koppelman writes: “The attempt to
develop a consensus definition of death was unsuccessful largely because this
effort was entangled with other social and moral agendas.” 460 As a result, the
moral status of removing organs in many cases remains unresolved.
Accepting the premise that death is an ambiguous concept, Koppelman
suggests two possible approaches to resolving the policy problem. First, continue
to adhere to the dead donor rule, “with its focus on the distinction between life
and death,” and address how social policy should handle the lack of consensus.
Second, eliminate the dead donor rule thus severing the connection between
definitions of death and organ procurement. Koppelman opts for the second
approach suggesting that a focus on patient history provides for truer patient
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respect without undermining efforts to at least sustain the current pool of organ
donors. 461
Contrasting her view with Veatch’s, who attempts to embrace ambiguity
and establish social policy respecting pluralism, Koppelman begins by
maintaining that the rationale of the dead donor rule is to protect potential organ
donors from a kind of harm, (i.e., the harm of being disrespected). However,
respect for persons is not necessarily achieved by distinguishing between life and
death. She remarks, “The point of death does not mark the point at which a
person can no longer be harmed.” 462 It is something other than life itself which
entitles one to respect. Thus, to focus merely on the line of demarcation between
life and death fails to adequately ground respect for persons—it must be found
elsewhere.
Relying on the Kantian maxim, “Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, never simply
as a means but always at the same time as an end,” 463 Koppelman argues that to
treat people as a means is to fail to regard them as subjects, i.e., as persons with
reason who have established ends or interests. Disrespecting persons, therefore,
constitutes violating their abilities to set ends.
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Some theorists contend that many patients who are not dead would suffer
no violation of interests “by allowing removal of vital organs before death.” 464 In
particular, patients in a permanent vegetative state, with no prospect of cognitive
recovery, and patients whose planned death through withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment has been chosen as the morally preferred choice are ideal examples.
Robert Truog and Walter Robinson 465 “propose that the ethics of organ
donation be based on the ethical principles of non-maleficence and respect for
persons rather than on brain death and the dead donor rule.” They suggest “that
sometimes the harm of dying is sufficiently small that patients should be allowed
to voluntarily accept that harm if it makes organ donation possible.” To advance
the case for organ retrieval from still living patients, Truog and Robinson further
suggest the necessity of “shifting the key ethical question from ‘Is the patient
dead’ to ‘Are the harms of removing life sustaining organs sufficiently small that
patients or surrogates should be allowed to consent to donation?’” 466 By doing
so, the prospects of overcoming the problems surrounding the orchestration of
death in NHBD protocols would be achieved, in addition to “optimizing both the
number and viability of the organs obtained.” 467 In the event that society
recognizes that the dead donor rule is no longer morally necessary for the
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procurement of organs, Truog and Robinson contend that the “concept of brain
death will then disappear from textbooks, illustrating the degree to which the
concept was never more than a social construction, developed to meet the needs
of the transplantation enterprise during a crucial phase of its development.” 468
Some theorists have taken this line of reasoning further. They argue that
certain patients lack the ability to have any interests, and in such cases the dead
donor rule need not apply to them. 469 Lacking these interests removes not only
the ethical harm of treating them as a means to an end, but also the ethical or legal
obligations to continue aggressive care.
Koppelman finds this line of reasoning misguided. Relying on Thomas
Nagel’s analysis, she argues that persons do not lose interests merely by virtue of
their categorical position. She writes, “The fact that a patient is brain-dead or in
PVS does not mean that she has no interests or ends. Clearly there is a sense in
which there are still ends in such situations; what is absent is the person’s
awareness of her own ends.” 470 An example by Nagel is helpful here. He argues
that a man betrayed and ridiculed by his friends suffers harm even if he never
finds out about the betrayal. What makes betrayal bad is not that upon discovery
it makes one unhappy, but rather it makes one unhappy because it is bad. The fact
that one may be unaware of the harm being done to him or her has no bearing on
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our obligation to treat an individual as an end. Indeed, argues Nagel, one often
considers a person whose reputation has been ruined or whose will is ignored
after he or she has died a victim of harm. 471 He concludes, “And if people who
have already died can be harmed, then people who are unaware of having any
ends can be harmed too.” 472
Transferring this to the issue at hand, society’s obligation to treat someone
as a subject of respect, as an end and not merely as a means to an end, is achieved
neither by a focus on life and death distinctions nor by focusing on a particular
moment in time. Rather, the focus should be on a patient’s history in which
personal ends in the form of interests and values are discoverable. A person who
has expressed the desire to donate organs and has an advance directive indicating
the desire to forego life-sustaining treatment while in a PVS or if brain dead is
harmed when he or she is denied “the opportunity to donate in a way that has the
best chance for success.” 473 In such cases, the application of the dead donor rule
fails to help the patient achieve the fate he or she has chosen.
For Truog and Robinson, the issue is framed a bit differently.
Recognizing that brain-dead individuals are alive, in the interest of patient
respect, they find it morally acceptable to remove their organs for transplantation,
provided prior consent has been obtained. To avoid the charge of promoting
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homicide in order to obtain organs, they attempt to collapse the distinction
between killing and allowing to die, a distinction well established in legal
precedence and traditional morality. They argue:
In both ventilator withdrawal and organ procurement, the
physician acts, and this act is the most proximate cause of the
patient’s death. In both cases, the physician is not morally
responsible for the patient’s death—the morally relevant cause of
death is the patient’s disease. In both cases, the physician is acting
with the patient’s consent in ways that respect the wishes of the
patient and that are in the pursuit of morally worthwhile ends. 474
One might claim that the position advocated above would lead us down a slippery
slope. Once we accept that patients in these states can donate organs apart from a
declaration of death, what’s to stop individuals who are perfectly healthy from
donating vital organs? Koppelman believes the answer to this question lies with
Kant. She writes, “Kant holds that treating people as ends is an obligation only if
their goals or projects are rational or moral.” 475 Hence, donating one’s organs
when not in a suspended state is an end that is almost always irrational and
immoral, while donating one’s organs in a suspended state is not. Although Kant
thought suicide to relieve one’s sufferings was wrong, he left open the question
whether suicide to save one’s country or to escape impending madness was
immoral. Koppelman suggests that “ending one’s life in a suspended state by
donating organs seems to be more analogous to committing suicide to save one’s
country.” While there seems to be nothing immoral about donating organs in a
suspended state, donating them when one is not in such a state seems immoral.
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“Doing so,” she writes, “violates the categorical imperative as it fails to celebrate
or recognize one’s humanity.” 476
Respondents to the above proposal vary in their criticism. Mark D. Fox,
for example, suggests there is less ambiguity surrounding brain death than
Koppelman suggests. For him, the ambiguity concerning the criteria for brain
death is less certain than the manner in which “we talk about states of neurologic
devastation.” 477 People often speak of brain-dead individuals as being “kept
alive” by machines. Although life-support machines may maintain their
physiology, since they lack vital respiratory function, which is a necessary
criterion for a declaration of brain death, these individuals are easily
distinguishable from patients in a persistent vegetative state. “Thus,” writes Fox,
“our verbiage is more ambiguous than our criteria.” 478
As important as respect for autonomy is, the social context of
transplantation often goes unrecognized. The unique nature of the “gift
exchange” aspect of transplantation cannot be viewed as simply a private act
between two people. It involves the entire transplant community, at a minimum,
whose values matter. Moreover, because transplantation “requires active societal
involvement to be complete,” mediation between donor preference and communal
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values is necessary for its continued success. 479 Thus, given that the entire
transplantation enterprise is dependent upon public trust, Laura A. Siminoff
suggests the necessity of establishing a stronger societal consensus with regard to
both the definition of death and the circumstances for organ donation—something
that the above proposal fails to accomplish. 480
Robert Veatch, who is sympathetic to Koppelman’s (and by default, Truog
and Robinson’s) proposal that “it is acceptable to take critical organs…from those
who have irreversibly lost higher-brain function,” wonders why it is necessary to
abandon the dead donor rule rather than simply defining “the persistently
vegetative as dead.” 481 If the dead donor rule is abandoned, he argues, not only
would almost every state in the US and most jurisdictions in the world have to
amend current statutes in order to declassify brain death as death, but “homicide
laws would also have to be amended to make clear that procuring organs and
causing death in these humans was not murder.” 482 Speaking for the bioethics
community in general, Veatch asks whether it makes sense after having
persuaded, with great effort, “many legislators, judges, transplant professionals,
clergy, and philosophers that these beings are dead…to do an immediate about
face and retrain these professionals to once again refer to these people as
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living.” 483 And even if one were to retain the brain-death standard, legislatures
would still have to address the legal status of the physicians who procure organs
from still living, though permanently unconscious humans beings.
Michael Potts and David W. Evans, in their response to Truog and
Robinson’s proposal, offer two criticisms worth noting. For one thing, the
argument that organ removal from mechanically ventilated apnoeic comatose
patients is seriously flawed. They write, “When a ventilator is removed from an
apnoeic comatose patient, it is the disease or injury that causes the loss of the
patient’s ability to breathe spontaneously….The situation is different when vital
organs are removed from a patient.” When unpaired vital organs are removed
from these patients, it directly causes the death of these individuals. Hence, it is
the surgery itself that kills the patient, not the illness or disease. Second, Potts
and Evans register their concern with the idea of doctors being involved in killing
patients. Since abandoning the dead donor rule involves a form of justified
killing, they charge that such a proposal “fundamentally distorts the nature of
medicine itself.” 484 Given the fact that the practice of medicine primarily
involves an imbalanced relationship between the health-care provider, empowered
with knowledge and skill, and the patient, whose characteristic vulnerability is
exacerbated when ill, the idea of physicians directly ending the lives of patients
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“involves a dangerous use of medical power.” 485 The danger lies in the potential
for misuse of power, particularly regarding the weakest members of society, who
depend upon the virtues of medicine for protection. Additionally, despite
Koppelman’s reliance upon Kantian rationality as a safeguard, as Fox notes,
“Taking Koppleman’s proposal to its logical extreme offers no solid basis for
denying an individual with decision-making capacity the opportunity to commit
suicide by donation of vital organs.” 486
If abandoning the dead donor rule fails to conceptually satisfy the goals of
organ procurement and patient respect, further exploration is necessary. One
particular avenue of thought suggests that balance is better obtained when patient
choice is placed at the level of defining death rather than at overturning the dead
donor rule. Given the social values of autonomy and pluralism, some thinkers,
such as Robert Veatch, have suggested social policy “that would permit
individuals, while competent, to execute documents choosing alternative
definitions of death that are, within reason, not threatening to significant interests
of others.” 487 Veatch’s policy invites a larger menu of death criteria that includes
higher-brain death (or neo-cortical death) and cardiopulmonary death with the
current brain-death criterion serving as the “default definition of death.” This
policy purports to protect autonomy in a pluralistic society and expand the pool of
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possible organ donors under the current dead donor rule. This approach is the
subject of discussion in the section that follows.

5.4 Conscience Clauses
Recognizing the ongoing controversy over the definition of death is
primarily a religious and philosophical matter, some commentators have
attempted to restructure the debate by proposing new ideas concerning human
death and organ donation—ideas that potentially may affect how future social
policy will be shaped. At the heart of these ideas is the concern for respect with
regard to diverse conscientious positions about death, dying, and organ donation
that conflict with present social policy. This concern has already found
expression in New Jersey’s religious exemption “claim” enacted in 1991 488
allowing for religious persons to choose cardiopulmonary death, as opposed to
brain death, as their personal bottom line standard. The Act seeks to protect the
religious convictions of its Orthodox Jewish community which opposes a
neurological criterion for determination of death. The state of New York also
provides for some discretion, based on family objections to brain death. 489
However, the discretion is primarily given to the physician contemplating a brain
death declaration, and dissenting family members are dependent on whether their
physician will accommodate their wishes. Until recently, the country of Japan
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rejected brain death as a legal standard. After much open public debate, Japanese
law now permits the use of the brain death criterion, provided that the individual,
while alive, has clearly expressed consent for both brain death and organ
procurement, and this only after the family also consents. 490
Given the social values of autonomy and pluralism, some higher brain
advocates, such as Robert Veatch and John Lizza, have suggested social policy
conscientious exemptions similar to New Jersey’s religious exemption Act.
Robert Veatch suggests an inclusion “that would permit individuals, while
competent, to execute documents choosing alternative definitions of death that
are, within reason, not threatening to significant interests of others.” 491

By way

of a statutory model, Veatch proposes a policy that allows individuals to select a
definition of death, provided they choose, based on reasons of personal
conscience, from a menu of “acceptable” definitions set forth in the policy. As
the default definition, Veatch elects brain death. The policy begins by stating:
An individual who has sustained irreversible loss of all functions
of the entire brain (excluding cellular level and hormonal
regulatory functions) is dead. This shall be referred to as the
“default” definition of death. A determination of death must be
made in accordance with accepted medical standards. 492
In order to respect individuals who may conscientiously object to brain death,
Veatch’s policy allows competent individuals to choose from two other
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acceptable definitions. The first is higher brain death, which the policy describes
as “sustained irreversible cessation of all consciousness.” 493 The second is the
traditional cardiopulmonary, which occurs when an individual “has irreversibly
lost all circulatory and respiratory functions.” 494 If an individual, while
competent, chooses one of the alternative definitions, that definition “shall serve
as the definition of death for all legal purposes.” 495 The policy continues that,
“unless an individual has, while competent, selected a definition of death to be
used for his or her own death pronouncement, the legal guardian or next of kin (in
that order) may so do relying on substituted judgment in so far as that information
is available about the patient’s wishes.” 496 However, when no such information is
available, decision makers must rely on a “best-interest standard”; otherwise, the
default definition will be used.
Veatch’s proposal differs from the New Jersey conscience clause in two
ways. First, Veatch expands the choices to include higher brain death, a
conscious-based definition. Under this definition, individuals in a persistent
vegetative state, as well as anencephalic children, could be declared dead, since
the capacity for consciousness for these individuals is virtually non-existent.
Second, Veatch expands the conscience clause beyond religious preference. The
New Jersey conscience clause was originally crafted for Orthodox Jews who
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preferred the traditional cardiopulmonary standard for religious reasons. Veatch’s
policy favors “variation based on any conscientiously formulated position.” 497 In
other words, individuals may choose alternative definitions of death for reasons
other than religious. Hence, the policy recognizes that individuals capable of
formulating a conscience-based conception of death, for either religious or nonreligious reasons, should be given the opportunity to choose the definition that
best fits their ideas about death.
Veatch’s policy recommendation is commendable in its attempt to respect
personal autonomy through the respect of diverse values as they affect personal
choices concerning death and organ donation. Public policy should be crafted in
the broadest terms possible to respect freedom of choice in a pluralistic society.
A favorable aspect of his policy is, to be sure, that it allows individuals who
conscientiously object to brain death to opt out of the standard. Nevertheless,
there are several problems with Veatch’s proposal that, on balance, outweigh its
favorable aspects. First, Veatch’s proposal includes higher brain death as a viable
option. This is unacceptable for medical reasons (See section 5.2). For instance,
there are reported cases of PVS patients who recover under exceptional conditions
and develop the capacity to write and speak. 498 Moreover, neuroscience is also
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finding that consciousness may not be entirely dependent on the neo-cortex,
which suggests the possibility that PVS is “the highest form of locked-in state in
which the cranial nerve communication that remains possible (e.g. as eye
blinking) when the brain stem is intact is lost because the neo-cortex is
completely isolated.” 499 Finally, the clinical tests to determine irreversible loss of
consciousness are not as definitive as those for other death criteria. 500 These
medical facts pose difficult problems for the acceptability of higher brain death
that by far exceed those of brain death. In light of these concerns, it would seem
that even personal autonomy fails to justify its acceptability.
Second, Veatch’s policy fails to correct the misgivings concerning the
acceptability of brain death by reducing it to the default presumption. Veatch
attempts to dismiss the inconsistencies of brain death by relegating them to a
simple exclusionary clause (e.g. “excluding cellular level and hormonal
regulatory functions”). However, the degree to which these remaining functions
contribute to the body as a whole suggests that they ought not be so easily
dismissed. As previously noted, there is growing unease from both the medical
community as well as the general public with respect to brain death as an accurate
diagnosis concerning the body’s lack of organic integration. Evident from the
analysis of brain death in previous chapters of this paper is that the loss of brain
function is not necessarily indicative of the loss of integrative organic functioning
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of the organism as a whole. Indeed, few seem willing to dispute this. 501 Yet,
Veatch’s policy not only catalogues it as an acceptable option, but also places it as
the default definition of death. With a growing number of commentators and
medical practitioners calling into question the legitimacy of brain death, it is
difficult to imagine how any proposed policy that regards brain death as the
default definition ought to be considered good social policy.
Third, Veatch’s policy implicitly promotes a utilitarian drive to increase
the pool of potential organ donors. As previously noted, the primary impetus
behind the Harvard Committee’s recommendation of brain death was to make it
possible for physicians to procure organs under the dead donor rule. Youngner
and Arnold note that utilitarian appeals “were the only justification given by the
Harvard Committee for their new definition of death” and “were being accepted
into law and clinical practice years before Bernat and the President’s Commission
came up with the first widely circulated, coherent philosophical justification that
these patients were indeed dead.” 502 Now that the conception seems seriously
flawed, the means for procuring organs for transplantation is equally questionable.
What is needed is policy that works to correct this problem. Veatch’s policy
recommendation fails to offer a corrective alternative, but instead continues to
advance the problems that many commentators suggest demonstrate the need for
abandoning brain death.
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5.5 Summary and Assessment
A common recognition among those who propose alternatives to the
standard paradigm is the failure of brain death’s conceptual basis. Nevertheless,
as a means of retaining brain death as a feasible criterion, two general suggestions
are proposed. First, some higher-brain advocates, working from a consciousnessbased definition of death, suggest amending the dual standard to include a higherbrain criterion. The resulting triad (cardiopulmonary, whole-brain, and higherbrain criteria) is meant to assure the permanent loss of consciousness and thereby
increase the pool of organ donors. Second, recognizing the uncertainties about
the capacity for consciousness under the higher-brain criterion, others suggest a
more certain way to guarantee that a patient has suffered permanent loss of
consciousness exists in the current dual standard. This, it is argued, removes the
moral hazard of prematurely ending the lives of patients whose cognitive
capacities are in question.
Endemic to these proposals are questions regarding the ontological and
moral status of the permanently unconscious. Philosophically, consciousnessbased definitions of human life and death lack adequate explanatory power to
account for society’s moral offence concerning the logical consequences entailed
by higher-brain conceptions. There seems to be no reason in principle to object to
the creation and use of “humanoid bodies” for the purposes of medical
experimentation or organ harvesting. The logical entailments of focusing on
cognitive capacity as a means for determining personhood status are at best,
disturbing, striking at the heart of our moral intuitions about the value of human
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life. Indeed, one embarks on an uncertain path when society accepts certain
groups of humans as non-persons, partially informed by the need for
transplantable organs and the cost of continued treatment and care.
But there remains sufficient warrant for questioning the acceptability of
any neurologically based criterion for death. Epistemological gaps regarding the
status of awareness remains uncertain given the personal experiences reported by
family members regarding brain-dead loved ones. Working from a highly
formalized, impersonal method of ascertaining the presence of a person, modern
science tends to dismiss as invalid the content of phenomenal cognition family
members experience with brain dead loved ones as well as the personal
experiences of those near-death. The dominant assumption driving most higherbrain proponents is that consciousness is identical to brain processes, the activity
of which can be correlated with neural events. A closer look at recent findings in
cognitive science, however, suggests that consciousness is not wholly identifiable
with brain processes and that reductionism lacks the necessary empirical
moorings many assume it has. 503
Due to the inconsistencies and epistemic problems of neurologically based
definitions of death, it seems more plausible that death does not occur until the
human body ceases to function as a unified integrated organism. More consistent
is the traditional substance view which maintains that the rational soul is not only
the seat of a human being’s cognitive and rational capacities, but is also the
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substantial form of the body and hence the source of its vegetative and sensitive
capacities.
Other strategies that emphasize defining death as a purely private matter
out of respect for autonomy and pluralism must be measured by their potential
effects upon society as a whole. While public policy should be crafted in the
broadest terms possible to respect freedom of choice, the question of whether
exceptional cases translate into good social policy must not be shortsighted in
deliberation. For example, important consideration must be given to the longterm pedagogical affects of law. It might be worth asking how sanctioning a
medical procedure (organ procurement) that directly ends the lives of patients, no
matter how altruistically conceived, will affect the moral sensibilities of both the
public and medical community with regard to the value of human life. More
specifically, if power is given to medical practitioners to directly end the lives of
the permanently comatose, how might such a policy affect public trust with regard
to the practice of medicine? Or more importantly, would public policy of this sort
unwittingly desensitize the populace resulting in greater intrusions into the
prohibitions against killing? These important considerations reflect the issues
addressed in the remaining chapters.
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Chapter Six
An Ethical Analysis of Brain Death
6.1 Introduction
To this point in this dissertation the analysis has been more descriptive
than normative. The task has been to identify the major areas in which
discussions about brain death have taken place. These include the historical,
medical, social, and philosophical domains of inquiry all of which contribute to
the overall framework and content necessary for an ethical assessment. It is
tempting to conclude that the development of medical and social consensus over
the last thirty years is sufficient to establish the ethical acceptability of brain
death. However, this fact alone does not make brain death right from an ethical
perspective. What is needed is a careful ethical analysis that takes all the domains
of ethical assessment into consideration prior to an evaluative deliberation.
In many ways, this chapter is the most important, in that it attempts to bring all
the relevant data from the previous chapters together in order to assess the ethical
viability of brain death as it relates to organ donation.
The procedure for this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 deals with the
application of traditional medical ethics to problems revealed in previous chapters
concerning brain death. In section 6.3, the principles of biomedical ethics and
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relevant case law are applied to the issue of informed consent for organ donors
under the brain-death standard. Section 6.4 considers the ethical feasibility of
grounding brain death on pragmatism as a sufficient reason for its continued use.

6.2 Traditional Medical Ethics and Brain Death
It is important to begin by laying out the basic principles and concepts that
have largely influenced moral reasoning relating to end of life issues. While a
thorough discussion of these principles is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a
synopsis will suffice for the purposes of this ethical analysis. In American
bioethics the ethical treatment of patients at the end of life has been informed and
shaped by two traditions. The oldest of these is the Hippocratic tradition. This
tradition maintains that the primary duty of the physician is to do no harm. 504
This precludes the administration of poisons in order to prematurely end the lives
of patients. The Hippocratic ethos conceives the primary practice of medicine as
the relief of suffering wrought by disease. When medicine can no longer
accomplish this end, the physician and patient ought to recognize the futility of
medicine and withdraw or withhold its use as evidenced in the following two
passages from Hippocrates:
First, I will define what I conceive medicine to be. In general
terms it is to do away with the sufferings of the sick, to lesson the
violence of their diseases, and to refuse to treat those who are
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overmastered by their diseases realizing that in such cases
medicine is powerless.
Whenever therefore when a man suffers from an ill that is too
strong for the means at the disposal of medicine he surely must not
expect that it can be overcome by medicine. 505
Thus, this tradition asserts that the purpose of medicine is to relieve suffering
associated with sickness and disease and that when medicine can no longer
achieve this goal, the physician should no longer employ medicine. The
implication is that the extension of medicine beyond its purpose could potentially
cause greater harm to patients in hopeless medical conditions.
Another important influence on American medical ethics is the Roman
Catholic moral tradition. 506 In conjunction with the Hippocratic tradition, Roman
Catholic medical ethics draws out two important distinctions that remain well
embedded in American law and ethics. While recognizing an obligation to heal,
there exists no moral obligation to extend life at all costs. As the Catechism of the
Catholic Church says: “Discontinuing medical procedures that are burdensome,
dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome can be
legitimate.” 507 The traditional means for determining whether care is beneficial
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or not is found in the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care. 508
Ordinary care refers to any treatment modality that has reasonable benefit for the
patient, as determined by the patient. According to the Roman Catholic moral
tradition, foregoing these sorts of treatments is morally prohibited. Extraordinary
care refers to any treatment modality that does not provide reasonable benefit to
the patient, as determined by the patient. These sorts of treatments may be
foregone.
There is also the distinction between killing and allowing to die. 509 While
the Catholic tradition prohibits the direct killing of an innocent human person,
allowing someone to die is sometimes morally right. 510 For instance, a patient
may decide not to employ certain medical treatments to prolong his or her life.
Withholding such treatment, if the treatment is deemed extraordinary by the
patient, is morally acceptable even though it will result in the death of the patient.
In another case a patient may decide to stop a medical treatment or procedure that
has already begun. In cases of this sort, withdrawing treatment is considered
morally permissible if such treatment is considered extraordinary by the patient.
Finally, when the administration of pain medication contributes to a patient's
death, the general consensus is that in such cases the intention to relieve pain
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qualifies the act as an indirect cause or hastening of death. In these cases, the
consensus views the underlying condition as the direct cause of death. This
distinction has a thorough basis in medical ethics and American jurisprudence.
Consider, for example, the line of reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Vacco v. Quill. 511 The question before the Court concerned whether New York’s
prohibition on assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Quill, et al argued that the refusal of life-sustaining
treatment is the same thing as physician-assisted suicide, since the effects are
identical. Thus, cases in which patients desire to end their lives due to the
prospects of progressive loss of bodily integrity and increased pain and suffering,
constitute an equivalency with those cases in which patients refuse treatment in
order to end their lives. The Court argued, contrary to the respondents, that the
distinction between letting a patient die and making a patient die concerns the
legal principle of causation and intent. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
William H. Rehnquist cited a plethora of legal cases and medical sources
recognizing that “when a patient refuses life-sustaining treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication
prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.” Furthermore, he
argued, “A physician who withdraws, or honors a patient’s refusal to begin lifesustaining medical treatment purposefully intents, or may so intend, only to
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respect his patient’s wishes” 512 to cease from futile and degrading treatment that
no longer benefits the patient. Thus, the Court maintained a patient’s right to
refuse medical treatment and rejected its equivalency with a right to hasten
death. 513
The application of these principles to brain death is further elucidated by
the conclusions reached in previous chapters in which a careful consideration of
the justifications and weaknesses of the brain-death criterion were considered. In
the analysis that follows, the basic thrust of these conclusions will be highlighted,
although the chapters that address the various issues should be consulted for the
full range of analysis leading to the conclusions.
Any ethical analysis offered at this point must be based upon the
consensus governing current practice. Representative of the consensus, though by
no means universal, is the current paradigm that includes the brain-death criterion,
the tests for diagnosing the criterion, and the definition of death as the death of the
organism as a whole. The relation between the parts of the paradigm must be
consistent. If not, then certain ethical consequences will follow. For instance, if
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the criterion fails to furnish evidence of correspondence with the definition, then
it follows that brain-dead patients are not dead and organ procurement under this
criterion is the direct cause of death for these patients. The argument may be
summarized as follows:
1. If brain-dead patients are not dead (i.e., the criterion fails to
correspond to the definition), then the procurement of their vital
organs for transplantation is the direct cause of their deaths.
2. Brain-dead patients are not dead.
Therefore,
3. The procurement of their vital organs is the direct cause of their
deaths.
The second premise is supported by the medical data gathered in Chapter
2 as follows. First, it may be noted that the tests do not match the criterion
(Chapter Two, Sections 2.3 & 2.4). This is due to the fact that although patients
may pass the clinical tests for brain death, a litany of non-brain integrative
functions continues in many of these patients. Hence, the tests have no
correspondence to the permanent cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem. Second, the criterion lacks correspondence with the
definition (Chapter Two, Section 2.3). There is substantial evidence that somatic
integrative life continues in brain-dead patients. Although the length of time
varies, some brain-dead patients have been shown to survive for extended periods
of time, seriously challenging the somatic integration hypothesis which seats the
brain as the organ of integration. As D. Alan Shewmon notes, “Under ordinary
circumstances the brain participates intimately and importantly in this mutual
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interaction, but it is not a sine qua non; the body without brain function is surely
very sick and disabled, but not dead.” 514 Thus, it would seem that brain-dead
individuals are alive since they continue to exhibit at least one integrative bodily
system (the circulatory system being the key). 515
Ultimately then, the procurement of vital organs from brain-dead patients
is the direct cause of their deaths. With regard to the ethical and legal consensus
detailed at the beginning of this section, it is clear that the procurement process
constitutes a direct killing. Since brain-dead patients are mechanically sustained
for the purpose of organ donation, the surgical procedure is what ends their lives.
If discontinuing life-support preceded the surgical removal of vital organs, then
perhaps a different outcome would emerge. 516
Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Chapter One, in medical conditions
commonly referred to as brain death, many life-sustaining interventions would
represent extraordinary means. Patients who have been diagnosed as brain dead,
although still very much alive, will not long survive in most cases. This is due
primarily to damage to other bodily organs and systems prior to the onset of brain

514

As Shewmon writes: “Under ordinary circumstances the brain
participates intimately and importantly in this mutual interaction, but it is not a
sine qua non; the body without brain function is surely very sick and disabled, but
not dead.” D. Alan Shewmon, "The Brain and Somatic Integration," Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001): 473.
515

Michael Potts, "A Requiem for Whole Brain Death: A Response to D.
Alan Shewmon's 'the Brain and Somatic Integration'," Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 26, no. 5 (2001).
516

I will address this possibility in Chapter Seven as an alternative to
current practice.

217

death. As Shewmon once again notes, “The process of brain damage leading up
to ‘brain death’ frequently induces secondary damage to heart and lungs.
Therefore, the tendency to early cardiac arrest in the majority of patients is
attributable more to somatic factors than to mere absence of brain activity per
se.” 517 In Chapter One, Josef Seifert argued that there is no moral obligation to
continue life-sustaining treatment in such cases, although some may choose to do
so. Medicine, in most of these cases, simply prolongs life that may be less than
meaningful to many patients. The proposal of the Harvard Committee to expand
death criteria based partly on the extraordinary and costly care needed to sustain
brain-dead patients is thus both unnecessary and ethically questionable. As early
as 1957 recognition was made regarding the moral permissibility of withdrawing
extraordinary care measures. 518 Since then, legal guidance has been much
clearer, specifically as exemplified in two landmark cases.
The first of these involved a 1975 New Jersey Supreme Court case. 519 In
1975, twenty-one-year-old, Karen Ann Quinlan slipped into a coma and was later
diagnosed as PVS. Karen was admitted to an ICU and placed on a vent because
of her inability to breathe properly. Her parents were Roman Catholic and
remained hopeful until a meeting in which Karen’s physicians informed them that
Karen would not recover. They understood the Catholic teaching as not requiring
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extraordinary means to prolong life and felt they knew their daughter’s wishes.
With this in mind Karen’s parents asked the physicians to remove the ventilator
and after signing a release form the physicians at the hospital agreed. However,
the next day one of the physicians informed the Quinlans he could not remove the
vent unless they obtained a court order allowing the action. Mr. Quinlan then
launched the battle for guardianship of Karen and the right to remove his daughter
from the ventilator. The Quinlans lost their first round in the New Jersey Superior
Court but they prevailed in the New Jersey Supreme Court and Mr. Quinlan was
granted guardianship. The Quinlan’s attorney filed for removal of the ventilator
under: 1. The First amendment: Freedom of Religious Beliefs 2. The Eighth
amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 3. The Fourteenth amendment:
liberty principle. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed that the case involved
the liberty principle concerning intimate personal decision-making and the
ventilator was removed. To the surprise of many, Karen was able to breathe on
her own and lived for another nine years. During the interval, Karen’s father did
not want to remove her feeding tube, without which Karen would have died in a
few weeks.
The second case involved a U.S. Supreme Court case. 520 In 1983 a motor
vehicle crash left twenty-five-year-old Nancy Cruzan in a persistent vegetative
state, permanently unconscious and without any higher-brain functioning. She
was kept alive with a feeding tube. After seven years in this state, Nancy’s
parents went to the circuit court on her behalf to ask that the feeding tube be
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removed. Nancy’s parents argued that if it was not for the feeding tube she would
die of her head injury and the circuit court judge agreed. However, the Missouri
attorney general appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court and the decision was
reversed. The court ruled that ‘the state’s interest in life is unqualified’ and that
clear and convincing evidence was needed when life was hanging in the balance.
The Cruzans appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and with a 5 to 4 vote the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the Cruzans needed to meet that state’s clear and
convincing evidence standard. Later, due to the publicity of the case, new
evidence emerged from some of Nancy’s friends who testified that she had
mentioned how she would not want useless treatment. The family then went back
to the Missouri courts and the courts ruled to remove the feeding tube based on
the new evidence, since it now rose to the level of “clear and convincing.”
Nancy died within a few days of having the tube removed. The case was
influential in three ways: 1) State courts can decide to require clear and
convincing evidence when life is hanging in the balance. 2) There is no “right to
die” but instead a right to liberty, which recognizes the right to refuse any
treatment, including life-sustaining treatment. 3) The case was instrumental in
Congress passing the “Patient Self Determination Act.”
In both cases, the recognition of the right to refuse any treatment was
upheld as a liberty right based on the Fourteenth Amendment. While recognizing
states interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, third party
interests, and the furtherance of ethics in the medical profession, these cases
demonstrate how these interests must be tailored to the unqualified right to refuse
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treatment. Moreover, these cases ensure that this right does not diminish when
patients become incompetent. When applied to patients in a condition such as
brain death, the right to refuse treatment allows patients or their surrogates to
withdraw or refuse life-sustaining treatment they deem extraordinary. This
constitutional right also protects physicians from legal reprisals when acting on
behalf of their patients who want to discontinue life-support. Thus, it is
unnecessary to employ the medical and legal fiction of brain death to justify the
removal of life measures when patients or their surrogates choose to discontinue.
The preceding discussion suggests several implications. Specifically, the
ethical and legal concepts governing end of life matters distinguish between a
direct killing and the refusal of medical treatment, even when it is life sustaining.
Regarding the status of brain-dead patients, since the criterion fails to comport
with the definition, then brain death is not the death of the organism as a whole.
Thus, to remove organs from brain-dead patients is the direct cause of their deaths
and is unethical and illegal under the current paradigm. Moreover, brain death is
also unnecessary as a means for discontinuing life-support. The ethical and legal
parameters discussed above allow for the removal of life-sustaining treatment
when patients or their surrogates make the decision. Since in practically all
cases, brain death is a condition out of which no one recovers, the withdrawal of
life-support is consistent with the Hippocratic and Catholic moral traditions as
well as with the ethical and legal principles set forth in court cases concerning end
of life decision-making. Nevertheless, the ethical and legal problems surrounding
brain death do not end here. They include the difficulty of honoring the informed
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consent process, which is a hallmark of patient autonomy in medical ethics as set
forth in American law. The extent of this difficulty will be discussed in the
following section.

6.3 Principles of Bioethics and Brain Death
The current approach in American medical ethics, which in some respects
is beholding to the Hippocratic and Catholic traditions, is the “principle-toproblems” approach as represented by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F.
Childress. In Principles of Biomedical Ethics 521 , Beauchamp and Childress
propose a four-tiered principled bioethics aimed at providing a practical
methodology for shared decision-making among a diverse people with varying
views on place of values in medicine, religion, and philosophy. The proposed
four-tiered approach sets forth a hierarchy of principle-based rules founded upon
ethical theories for the purpose of justifying medical decisions. The theory as a
whole promises to extend to all people and is not limited to any particular
community.
The approach of Beauchamp and Childress yields the following principles:
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. The principle of respect for
autonomy includes respecting the values and actions of patients. It involves
disclosing information to competent individuals to enable them to act
autonomously. Disrespecting autonomy involves “attitudes and actions that
ignore, insult or demean others’ autonomy” thus denying “a minimal equality to
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persons.” 522 Therefore, in the context of organ donation, respect for autonomy
requires that individuals receive accurate information about the procedure prior to
signing organ donor cards. Since the dead donor rule requires that patients must
neither be alive during organ procurement nor killed by the procedure, relevant
information pertaining to the current practice of organ procurement is required.
In the absence of prior consent, it is ethically imperative that next of kin be fully
informed about the procedure as well.
According to the second principle of biomedical ethics, the principle of
non-maleficence, there is an obligation not to inflict harm intentionally. The
concept of harm refers to “thwarting, defeating, or setting back some party’s
interests.” 523 More specifically, the concept of harm includes “physical harms,
including pain, disability, and death” as well as “mental harms and setbacks to
one’s interests.” 524 While some harmful actions may be justifiable in certain
social circumstances, the particular emphasis is on “intending, causing, and
permitting death or risk of death.” 525 Thus, if the diagnostic procedure to
determine brain death, or the process of organ procurement under the brain-death
criterion causes harm in the above-prescribed manner, an ethical violation occurs.
While non-maleficence requires the non-infliction of harm, the principle
of beneficence requires taking positive steps to protect and defend the rights of
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others. 526 There is little doubt that protecting physicians, who act for the good of
their patients, from undue prosecution and advancing life-saving organ
transplantation enhances the good of society in general. Nonetheless, it is still
necessary to require positive acts that respect the informed consent of the dying or
newly dead. By taking steps to ensure disclosure of the relevant details of
diagnosis, process, and controversy regarding a medical modality is to act in
accordance with the principle of beneficence. When beneficence is pursued in
this way, not only do patients benefit, but the practice of medicine benefits as
well.
Finally, the last principle to be considered is justice. Justice is generally
understood as “fair, equitable, and appropriate treatment in light of what is due or
owed to persons.” 527 In the interest of justice thus construed, failure to disclose
information necessary for informed decision-making is an omission of respect,
which is owed to persons. Equitable treatment requires that respect for patients
and their families include the obligations of veracity, fidelity, and
confidentiality. 528 To dismiss the responsibility to disclose information for fear of
an undesirable outcome is to fail to act with respect. Furthermore, to deny
vulnerable individuals respectful treatment just because they hold the potential
means to alleviate other burdens is to act unjustly.
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The way in which these principles apply to the issue at hand will be the
subject matter for the discussion that follows. Since law, medicine, and ethics
play significant roles in shaping social perspectives, it will be necessary to
disclose how each has contributed to society’s understanding of values, rights,
and justice as it pertains to healthcare in general and death and donation in
particular.
The place where these four principles coalesce, at least for the purposes of
this ethical analysis, is in the area of informed consent. The doctrine of informed
consent has assumed a prominent place in healthcare due to several factors.
Among these are the growing emphases on personal autonomy, the importance of
biomedicine in people’s lives, and skepticism over “expertise” in many
spheres. 529 Medical ethics today has been largely shaped by the influence of
these concerns.
Over the last thirty years, a patient’s right to give informed consent to
medical treatment has been well established in law and medical ethics. In
particular, the courts have come to recognize the following: the unequal
relationship between doctor and patient, that patients have autonomous rights, and
that it is incumbent upon physicians not to deal with patients at arms length. An
important case that was instrumental in bringing out the legal concepts for the
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doctrine is Canterbury v. Spence. 530 In this case a physician failed to disclose a
one percent risk of paralysis to his patient, Jerry Canterbury, following back
surgery. A day after the surgery, Canterbury fell from his bed and the lower half
of his body was paralyzed. This court set precedence regarding a physician’s duty
of care to inform his or her patient “of any risks to his well being” of material
consequence (would make a difference) to the decision of the patient. The duty
itself is based upon the concept that “every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body…” 531 and
this includes the disclosure of information material to the decision-making
process. The court further reasoned that “True informed consent to what happens
to one’s self is the informed exercise of a choice….” 532 Failure on the part of
Canterbury’s physician to disclose a risk, no matter how small, or for fear that the
patient might forego a beneficial therapy, nonetheless constitutes a breach of duty
to inform.
Further development of the doctrine is exemplified in Moore v. Regents of
the University of California. 533 John Moore, who had been undergoing treatment
for leukemia, was unaware that his physician was using his cells for research and
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profit. The plaintiff attempted to state 13 causes of action against the
defendants. 534 The superior court only considered conversion as the cause of
action. However, the Supreme Court of California, while not applying conversion
liability, struck a balance between a competent patient’s right to make informed
autonomous decisions, based on the longstanding principles of fiduciary duty and
informed consent, and the need to avoid threatening potentially useful research
with civil liability. The court ruled in favor of Moore in regard to his complaint
stating a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed
consent.
From these two cases a framework consisting of a duty of care to inform
and a duty to obtain consent emerges. The duty to inform includes disclosing
risks (including side effects), benefits, and options. The duty to obtain consent
includes ensuring that patient choice is made competently, voluntarily and with
understanding. These duties necessitate a meaningful conversation between a
physician and his or her patient. Obtaining a quick signature or checking a box on
a form is no substitute for the dignity of a conversation necessary for true
informed consent.
There are several factors relevant to the ethical and legal principles
discussed above that allow for an ethical analysis of brain-dead organ donors. In
particular, organ donors in most cases simply check a box on a form or answer a
simple “yes” or “no” question given by an individual at a driver’s license office
who, more than likely, knows little about the extent of one’s anatomical gift or the
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retrieval procedures involved. As discussed in Chapter Three, ambiguities in
consent instruments concerning uncommon or controversial research on braindead “corpses” constitute insufficient disclosure, particularly when public trust in
the medical profession is at stake. 535 To make matters worse, if the brain-dead
are not dead, then how are potential donors consenting to post-mortem research?
Given that the medical profession potentially receives multiple benefits from
donors, disclosure is required under the legal concepts of fiduciary duty and
informed consent, consistent with the court’s reasoning in the Moore case. 536
In addition, material to the consent process is the fact that, should donation
occur under the brain-death criterion, donors’ vital organs will be procured while
their heart-beating bodies are still warm, pink, and pulsating with life to the extent
that muscle-paralyzing agents will have to be used in the surgical procedure. 537
Additionally, donors should be made aware of the controversy surrounding the
criterion, (i.e., that the criterion is based on an unproven theory). 538 Undoubtedly
this raises the related question of the extent to which donors are capable of
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understanding the theory behind brain death. As noted in Chapter Three, it is
questionable whether patients or their families can understand the complexity of
terms meant to convey various levels of cognitive impairment, the details of
which their own physicians may be uncertain. Statistically, there is great
confusion. In survey after survey misunderstanding and doubt exist in both the
general population, and medical profession, an indication of which implies
informed consent is seriously deficient.
A lack of universal testing criteria for brain death (see Chapter Two) and
statutory irregularities (see Chapter Three) highlight the problem further. The
degree to which there is no agreed upon testing criteria gives the impression that
the application of any set of testing criteria is arbitrary. 539 Advancing the
problem further are the statutory inconsistencies between jurisdictions, implying
that the difference between being alive and being dead is geographically
determined. If medical professionals and law makers vary in the way they
understand the criterion and its clinical application, how is it possible for potential
donors and their families to know that to which they are consenting?
Given these stark realities, it is unlikely that the principles of autonomy,
beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, can be followed with any consistency.
Although Chapter Seven will propose policy suggestions to attempt to rectify
these problems, some of the groundwork is already being laid. Respect for patient
autonomy requires that patients receive accurate information about the procedure
prior to signing organ donor cards. While there may be no intention to cause
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harm (nonmaleficence) in withholding such information, certain non-intentional
harms, such as the bodily interests of patients and the veracity of the medical
profession, both of which concern states’ interests, are compromised. Both
beneficence and justice require taking steps to ensure disclosure of the relevant
details of diagnosis, process, and controversy regarding a medical modality. To
fail to do so is to fail to act equitably for patients and their families in a way that
is reflective of the obligations of veracity, fidelity, and confidentiality. As is
evident from this discussion, it is questionable whether these principles can be
followed under the current system.
Some might argue that donation would be seriously compromised should
disclosure to the extent as suggested above is implemented—a legitimate concern
echoed in the Moore case regarding the need to avoid undermining potentially
useful research and life-saving therapy. Closer examination from previously
discussed case law is helpful here. As the court reasoned in Canterbury v.
Spence, a physician’s duty of care to inform his or her patient “of any risks to his
well being” is predicated on the well-established concept that all competent adult
persons have bodily rights determined solely by the individual, not the medical
profession. Withholding any information material to the decision-making
progress constitutes a breach of duty to inform, even if such disclosure may
diminish the willingness of a patient to consent. Thus, failure to inform, even
when a physician judges the information irrelevant or potentially threatening to a
patient’s consenting to a medical procedure is both unethical and illegal.
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As the preceding discussion demonstrates, it is unlikely that informed
consent for organ donors under the brain-death criterion is obtainable.
Consideration of the medical and social reality of brain death as applied to the
principles of biomedical ethics and case law renders the process of informed
consent practically impossible to achieve. This calls into question the ethical and
legal veracity of organ donation under the brain-death standard. Nonetheless,
some brain death advocates continue to support its application based primarily
upon its pragmatic benefits. Whether these justifications are ethically feasible
will be discussed in the section that follows.

6.4 Pragmatism and Brain Death
As the historical analysis in Chapter One discloses, it is evident that
supporters of brain death have assumed, either implicitly or explicitly, the
sufficiency of a pragmatic basis for justifying its use in medical practice.
Pragmatism is the idea that truth or value is determined by practical results that
further specific aims. It is an “empirically based philosophy that defines
knowledge and truth in terms of practical consequences.” 540 Although there are
differing forms of pragmatism, 541 the best known of the so-called neo-pragmatists
is Richard Rorty. According to Rorty, the longstanding traditional view (from
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Plato to present day) that truth is correspondence to reality is positively mistaken
and should be abandoned. Consequently, writes Rorty, “For the pragmatist, true
sentences are not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need
to worry what sort of reality, if any, a given sentence corresponds to—no need to
worry about what ‘makes’ it true.” 542 Pragmatism, therefore, is anti-essentialist
and anti-foundationalist. Notions of progress toward an objective reality or
internal coherence are illusory. Simply put, truth is not something to be
discovered, but rather is constructed by the vocabulary or concepts one brings to
the world in efforts to effect desired results. 543 Commenting along these lines,
Youngner and Arnold observe how the Harvard Committee justified its new
criterion on what it could accomplish for the medical field. They write: “First, it
allowed physicians to turn off respirators without fear of legal consequences, and,
second, it allowed organ procurement without violating the dead donor rule
(patients must neither be alive when organs are removed nor killed by the
process.)” 544 They further observe that these pragmatic and utilitarian appeals
“were the only justification given by the Harvard Committee for their new
definition of death” and “were being accepted into law and clinical practice years
before Bernat and the President’s Commission came up with the first widely
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circulated, coherent philosophical justification that these patients were indeed
dead.” 545
Those who maintain that the current legal standard on death has worked
and does not require that society should “rethink brain death,” do so largely on the
basis of its pragmatic success. The means for measuring success is determined
exclusively on its social acceptance, its avoidance of legal challenges and its
success in procuring organs for transplantation, not on whether it is theoretically
coherent and understandable for satisfying informed consent. 546
In arguing against the conceptual and medical coherence of brain death,
some critics nonetheless promote organ donation on pragmatic grounds.
Capitalizing on surveys of an (arguably) uninformed public, Truog suggests that
society no longer needs the legal fiction of brain death to retrieve organs for
donation. 547 Since both brain death and the dead donor rule no longer represent
the views of the public, then the door to organ retrieval from consenting patients
prior to a diagnosis of death becomes a viable alternative.
Along similar lines, other thinkers propose that “death is ultimately a
social construct” that can be altered in accordance with desired outcomes or
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goals. 548 Those who view death in this way often do so on the basis that notions
of personhood are socially constructed as well. Lizza, for example, suggests,
“Personhood is a dynamic concept that is subject to change in light of new
knowledge and possibilities.” 549 Thus, personhood and definitions of death are
subject to changing paradigms as “new knowledge and possibilities” construct
new social norms.
Several points can be made, however, that call into question the
sufficiency of such reasoning. One concerns the argument from consensus.
Although brain death is accepted by many religions and is legal in many
countries, there is something deceiving about the way in which such a consensus
has been achieved. As Ari R. Joffe remarks:
This general acceptance of BD [brain death] by non-medical
society suggests the concept is sound. However, this is a circular
argument. A primary reason law and religion have accepted BD is
that the medical profession informed the public that BD is the
irreversible loss of integration of the organism as a whole, and of
all brain (including brain stem) functions…these are now known to
be mistaken facts. 550
Added to this problem is the fact that the legal and social acceptance of brain
death is not a philosophical argument as much as a locus for philosophical
investigation. As Joseph Koterski remarks, “Neither legal nor social reception of
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a definition can make something to be the case if the reality is otherwise.” 551 To
suggest, as the pragmatist does, that our notions of death and personhood are
temporally relative to the changing paradigms of societal norms apart from any
objective standard invites the possibilities of gross injustices. Koterski notes how
the same culture that “tolerated slavery and allowed some human beings to be
treated as if they were property rather than persons with unalienable rights has
sometimes later come to recognize the gross injustice of such a practice.” 552 The
shift in understanding, however, if it is not one that is guided by a clearer picture
of the ontological status of the beings in question, can just as likely be reversed,
or worse, lead to a slippery slope in which other beings are devalued resulting in
further injustices. Koterski contends the central problem is that the pragmatist
“Confuses the cultural question of our social esteem for persons with the
ontological question of the presence or absence of personhood.” Continuing, he
writes, “…The shift that one witnesses in any such change in social awareness
and moral understanding ‘in light of new knowledge and possibilities’ in no way
changes the ontological status of the beings in question—either they were already
persons or they were not.” 553
Aside from the metaphysical problems this objection raises, the slippery
slope argument is worth exploring in some detail. There are those who fear that if
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concessions are made with regard to the moral or ontological status of certain
cognitively impaired human beings, the path to devaluing other less impaired
individuals becomes dangerously more probable. 554 In other words, even those
who are severely mentally ill and unable to interact with others or their
environment might be considered dead. However, others retort that the likelihood
of “a public that is quite accepting of whole-brain death would ever come to
believe that the profoundly retarded or senile are dead” is highly improbable. 555
But given the social realities of the past, the slippery slope argument cannot be
ignored. Edmund Pellegrino warns against ignoring the past with respect to the
potential of failing to appreciate the consequences of moral compromise
indicative of pragmatic concessions when he remarks:
In any case, the slippery slope is not a myth. Historically it has
been a reality in world affairs. Once a moral precept is breached a
psychological and logical process is set in motion which follows
what I would call the law of infinite regress of moral exceptions.
One exception leads logically and psychologically to another. In
small increments a moral norm eventually obliterates itself. The
process always begins with some putative reason, like compassion,
freedom of choice, or liberty. By small increments it overwhelms
its own justifications. The histories of the French Revolution, the
Holocaust, and partial birth abortion are representative
examples. 556
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In addition, the slippery slope may be aided by the use of euphemisms, which
have the potential to shape the way society thinks about issues in healthcare. 557
The steady use of reductive terminology of the brain dead such as, “humanoids,”
“merely breathing bodies,” “remains,” “biological artifacts”, and “biomorts” 558
has over time weakened previous resistance to accept that the brain-dead patient is
dead. 559 Furthering the slippery slope of social acceptance is the influence of
physicians on their patients and the influence of law on both. Law does have
pedagogical and psychological effects on behavior and opinion. 560 Once a
standard of behavior is either embraced or rejected by law, the potential for
societal desensitization (or sensitization) of certain behaviors and thought patterns
is present. Great care must be taken in contemplating the influence the change in
longstanding proscriptions might entail. While the pragmatist might intend to
satisfy an important goal, shortsightedness may entail non-intended consequences.
As the old adage reminds, “Before you tear down a fence, pause long enough to
find out why it was put up in the first place.”
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Perhaps the most fatal challenge to the sufficiency of a pragmatic moral
justification lies in its own self-stultification. In recent years several leading
philosophers are now endorsing their contentions that the prospects of a moral
system built upon pragmatic principles is bleak, if not impossible. 561 The
problem resides in the wholesale rejection of metaphysical realism without which
no standards of objectivity exist. In the course of denying any objective standard,
the pragmatist, in sense, has cut off the branch upon which he or she stands. In
his noteworthy volume entitled, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy,
Hilary Putnam takes Rorty to task for failing to inquire into the unintelligibility of
the sort of metaphysical realism he rejects. Such a failure is endemic to Rorty’s
consideration of other sorts of realism, and more importantly, undermines the
intelligibility of his own position. As Putnam remarks, “…if it is unintelligible to
say that we sometimes succeed in representing things as they are in themselves,
then it is equally unintelligible to say that we never succeed in representing things
as they are in themselves.” 562 More to the point, if, as the pragmatist contends, all
ideologies are nothing more than social constructions with no objective
correspondent, or if all values have only local and limited application, then
pragmatism itself is nothing more a social construct and is too limited in its
561
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application. Thus, pragmatism can offer no compelling reason as to why it should
be accepted as a viable theory.
All this is brought out more fully, however, in the deleterious logical
consequences of a society that embraces unstintingly the principles of
pragmatism. Commenting along these lines, Leszek Kolakowski notes that when
a real distinction between good and evil, independent of our decisions is
renounced, “then no moral boundary prevents us from engaging in any action for
no better reason than that it promotes the success of a tendency which, by
definition, will be legitimate if it succeeds, even if it carries the name of Hitler or
Stalin.” 563 Documenting the real-world consequences of a worldview divested of
any a priori moral principles, Edward A. Purcell in his noteworthy volume, The
Crisis of Democratic Theory 564 , traces the surrogation of traditional legal theory
with legal realism. Like pragmatism, legal realism divests the world of all
absolute structures thereby reducing all economic, political, ethical, and
theological systems to “symbols of government” conjured by men to “explain the
world in terms that pleased them.” 565 While useful, these symbols are false and
contradictory. Thus the only real laws were the completed actions of government
officials. Such notions remained unchallenged until the totalitarian regimes of the
Second World War posed a serious threat to neighboring nations. Yet the position
563
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of the legal realists not only deprived them of any standard by which to criticize
or condemn Nazi terror, but actually sanctioned as law the horrific acts of the
Nazis. In short, the denial of any referential standards outside, as it were, of all
cultures and systems of government undermines any inducements of avoidance or
condemnation. Once a system is criticized or condemned, it may be taken as an
explicit admission of an external order. Chantal Delsol poignantly expresses this
point on an individual level when she writes:
The identification of an absolute evil forces us to believe that an
order exists beyond our will, beyond our capacity as creators of
order. This identification puts into doubt not only the subjective
morality of our times, but the very possibility if its being. We
cannot decree that each individual has the sovereignty to invent his
own values and at the same time point our finger at an intolerable
and permanent universal. We cannot proclaim, “To each his own
morality,” and at the same time decry racism and apartheid. 566
The central point this discussion discloses is that of the inability of
pragmatism to provide a sufficient basis for moral justification. 567 Not only is
pragmatism self-refuting, it also is inept to foment any standard to safeguard
individuals from social injustices. While pragmatic appeals may be instructive
and perhaps necessary starting points in the deliberation process, by themselves
they reveal little beyond what is desirable. By relying solely on pragmatic
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justifications, the Harvard Committee, although seeking admirable goals opened
the door to many unaccountable circumstances, not the least of which are those
surrounding the issue of informed consent.

6.5 Summary and Assessment
The conclusions in this chapter build upon conclusions developed
throughout the dissertation. The ethical assessment provided in this chapter
discloses several important implications. Specifically, the ethical and legal
concepts governing end of life matters are unsustainable under the current
paradigm. If medical practice and statutory law continue to sanction the use of
the brain death criterion (which does not comport with the death of the organism
as a whole), then the removal of vital organs for transplantation violates the dead
donor rule. This net result constitutes a direct killing violating the traditional
distinction between killing and allowing to die. Consequently, the continued use
of brain death as a means to remove organs from brain-dead patients is the direct
cause of their deaths and is unethical and illegal under the current paradigm.
A related though distinct point is that despite the rationale of the Harvard
Committee, brain death is an unnecessary medical and legal construct for
discontinuing life-support in hopeless cases. Traditional ethics and case law
allow for the removal of life-support for patients who consent. Brain death is
representative of a condition many would consider requiring extraordinary care,
and hence not morally required. Additionally, the law recognizes the unqualified
right of patients to refuse medical treatment of any kind. No legal barriers exist
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for discontinuing treatment when requested by patients or their surrogates. Thus,
physicians who follow the directives of patients under these circumstances are
immune from legal reprisals.
It is also highly questionable that informed consent for organ donors under
the brain-death criterion is obtainable. When consideration of the medical and
social reality of brain death is applied to the principles of bioethics and case law,
the process of informed consent is seriously compromised. Confusion and
uncertainty of the meaning of diagnosis and testing for the condition exists
universally, and it is doubtful that under the current modus operandi any
resolution is possible.
Those who wish to justify the use of brain death on purely pragmatic
grounds also face difficult ethical obstacles. Pragmatism, in principle lacks the
facility to provide a sufficient basis for establishing ethical direction and thus is
open to abuse. In addition, pragmatism also lacks intellectual and practical
coherence. In the attempt to utilize brain death in medical practice on a pragmatic
basis, the Harvard Committee seemingly paved the way to the furtherance of
problems elucidated throughout this chapter.
In the chapter that follows, attention will be given to alternatives to the
way in which organ donation is conducted under the brain-death criterion.
Specifically, the chapter will highlight current research that promises to advance
organ transplantation apart from cadaver donation under the current system.
Moreover, attention will be given to how donation might proceed apart from the
brain-death criterion within the confines of law and ethics as currently conceived.
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Finally, some policy guidelines will be proposed as an attempt to encapsulate how
such a practice might be worked into social policy.
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Chapter Seven
Proposing a New Model for Death and Donation
7.1 Introduction
The scope of this investigation has come full circle. This dissertation
explored the major areas of discussion concerning the distinct though interrelated
issues of brain death and organ donation. Each chapter provided a detailed
disclosure and analysis of a segment of the ethical issues surrounding death and
donation as construed today, which taken together furnishes a sufficient basis for
assessing the central thesis of this dissertation.
This dissertation began with the proposal that brain death, under the
current paradigm is problematic to the point that it cannot be sustained on ethical
grounds as a means for procuring transplantable organs. In an effort to sustain
this notion, it was necessary to investigate the historical, medical, legal,
philosophical, and ethical spheres of influence that have contributed to the vast
complexity of the issues surrounding death and donation. Section 7.2 will
summarize the findings of previous chapters in order to demonstrate how this
investigation proffers support for the central thesis of this dissertation.
Consequently, sustaining this thesis leaves a significant gap in a longstanding lifesaving practice that could have enormous ramifications in both the medical
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community and society at large. For this reason, section 7.3 will investigate some
of the emerging technologies that may eliminate the need for heart-beating
cadaveric organ and tissue donors. Taking into consideration the fact that many
of these technologies are nascent in their development, section 7.4 will furnish a
possible means of organ procurement consistent with the general consensus
currently embraced in health care law and ethics. Specifically, this section will
provide a tentative suggestion for organ procurement apart from brain death that
is consistent with the ethical consensus governing the practice of health care
today. Finally, in conjunction with the provisionary evocation in section 7.4,
section 7.5 will propose a new standard of death and donation for policy
consideration.

7.2 Affirmation of the Thesis
As the analyses in the previous chapters illustrate, difficulties exist that
call into question the ethical sustainability of brain death as a means for organ
procurement. The summary that follows indicates the force of these problems as
discussed in detail in each chapter. The following summary statements are
offered in support of the thesis of this dissertation.
From its inception, some thinkers have criticized brain death as an
arbitrary and ad hoc criterion. It is ad hoc because it was created as a solution to
the problem of obtaining viable transplantable organs. Historically brain death
emerged in close proximity to organ transplantation (see Chapter One). Less than
a year after the first publicized heart transplant in 1967, an Ad Hoc Committee

245

from the Harvard Medical School recommended brain death as a criterion for
death for the purpose of turning off ventilators and retrieving organs for
transplantation. A closer look into the rationale of the committee indicates that
transplantation was the primary motive. The problem with the Harvard
Committee’s recommendation is that it provided no biological or philosophical
conceptual basis that supported the idea that brain death is death. Instead, the
Committee justified brain death on pragmatic grounds. As Chapter Six indicated,
pragmatic reasons alone are insufficient to justify its use.
It is arbitrary because there are no good reasons to think that the
diagnostic tests conform to the criterion. In the decade that followed the Harvard
Committee’s recommendation, numerous sets of diagnostic criteria and state
statutes were constructed in an attempt to advance brain death into policy and
practice. Lack of a conceptual foundation, however, resulted in confusion and
inconsistency in its application in law and medical practice. Attempting to solve
these problems, the President’s Commission issued a report in 1981 that provided
a conceptual basis and model statute in an effort to make death uniform. Despite
this attempt, the next two and a half decades proved to be challenging for the new
criterion as new physiologically enlightened research revealed that the conceptual
basis is flawed (see Chapters Two & Three). In short, since the diagnostic criteria
disregard certain neurological activity, the tests fail to conform to the criterion.
Presently, the data indicates that brain death cannot be confirmed prior to autopsy
following cardiopulmonary death. Furthermore, the diagnostic sets vary so
widely that the same individual who is declared brain dead in the emergency
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room could still be alive in the intensive care unit, depending on which diagnostic
set is chosen.
Compounding these problems is the fact that the brain-death criterion fails
to conform to the definition (see Chapter Four). If one maintains that human
persons are essentially physical organisms of a substantial kind, then as long as
the organism as a whole is functioning, despite mechanical ventilation, the
administration of vassopressors, and a host of other life-sustaining interventions
to supplement a diffused brain, then death has not occurred. Those who attempt
to either maintain brain death or further advance death criteria to increase the pool
of organ donors do so on dubious grounds (see Chapter Five). The
inconsistencies and epistemological gaps endemic to all neurologically based
criteria render them suspect in light of advancing cognitive science. Moreover,
given that death is not a purely private matter, the expansion of death criteria on
the basis of autonomy and pluralism needs to be carefully measured in light of the
unintended pedagogical effects on society a move of this sort might have.
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate brain death as a criterion of
death for the procurement of transplantable organs. Ultimately, an ethical
assessment informed by the historical, medical, legal, and philosophical data
renders brain death as a means for organ procurement so problematic that it ought
to be abandoned as a viable criterion for determining death (see Chapter Six).
Not only is informed consent unobtainable under the current paradigm, but the
rationale for its utilization is unsustainable as well. Thus, this investigation
confirms the thesis of this dissertation.
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The consequence of this conclusion suggests that the already short supply
of transplantable organs will further deteriorate. While it is not the primary focus
of this dissertation, in the sections that follow, consideration of various
alternatives to brain death will be briefly discussed as a means to suggest possible
ways to move forward in order to preserve the life-saving practice of organ
transplantation. It is not the purpose of these sections to provide a detailed
analysis of the alternatives presented, but rather to set the direction for further
exploration and development in the inseparable matters of death and donation.

7.3 Possible Alternatives to Brain Death
In recent years, discussion concerning alternatives to organ procurement
under the current paradigm has been on the increase. While some of these
discussions emanate from the reports of popular news agencies, not all do. For
this reason a degree of caution regarding the conclusions that can be drawn from
some of these reports should be maintained. Nevertheless, the most interesting
component of these potential alternatives pertains to the irrelevance of brain death
as a factor in their implementation. Specifically, not only do many of these
alternatives eliminate the need for brain death as a means for securing donatable
organs, they also purport to remove many of the ethical and medical hazards
concurrent in the bifurcated standard.
For example, advances in pharmacology and technology may eventually
supplement the current need for organ donors. Some reports suggest that
improved diagnostic and surgical procedures are beginning to show promise in
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reducing the need for many organ transplants. AV Magazine, published under the
auspices of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, reports that, “a simple
surgical technique, ventricular remodeling, has removed a significant number of
patients from heart transplant waiting lists.” 568 The article goes on to report that
physicians at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center have used positron emission
tomography (PET) machines to discover that approximately forty percent of
patients waiting for heart transplants needed only bypass surgery. Supporting
similar alternatives is Japanese cardiologist Yoshio Watanabe who suggests
concentrating on the development of “a more effective pharmacological regimen
and new therapeutic modalities.” 569 With newly devised drugs, he contends,
heart-patients on waiting lists “are now surviving as long as those who received
heart transplants.” 570 This is significant, given that under the current system
many recipients of donor hearts do not survive any longer than those left on
waiting lists. 571 This is due primarily to the fact that the pre-existing weakened
condition of heart patients is further compromised by the surgical procedure and
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the ensuing immune-suppressant diseases characteristic of organ recipients.
Watanabe suggests efforts be made to develop a totally transplantable heart as the
final solution to donor heart shortages.
As far back as 1982, cardiologist David Evans suggested, “The
development of the mechanical heart offers a much better prospect for the
future.” 572 Today, many patients who suffer from severe heart failure do benefit
from the use of artificial hearts. However, the limitations of these devices provide
impetus for further development. Nature Medicine reports on the prospects of a
new biologic heart in which blood is pumped by actual heart muscle rather than
by metal and plastic. 573 Though there are still many hurdles to overcome, one
such hurdle was breached when researchers demonstrated that a bioartificial heart
could be created using a matrix platform composed of immuno-compatible
cardiac cells.
Other high-tech solutions to donor organ "shortage" include the creation of
tissues and organs without donors. In August of 2005, a study funded by the UK
Government, and led by researchers from Kingston University’s School of Life
Sciences, disclosed that the research team had grown an artificial liver from
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umbilical cord stem cells. 574 Hailed as the first step in creating a fully artificial
liver for transplantation, researcher Dr. Colin McGuckin said, “The transplant of a
section of liver grown from cord blood could be possible within the next ten to
fifteen years.” 575
Other sources in the popular media report that a breakthrough in the
growth of transplantable human bladders from tissue taken from recipients’ own
defective bladders. 576 The bladder cells were cultured in a nutrient bath in a
laboratory, and after two months, new bladders were fully grown. Not only were
the transplants successful, but the recipients were free of side effects, including
tissue rejection. The Wake Forest University team of scientists is currently
working on ways to grow twenty different tissues and organs.
Additionally, another news source reports that, “US scientists have coaxed
recycled hearts taken from animal cadavers into beating in the laboratory after
reseeding them with live cells.” 577 If this procedure is extended to humans, the
potential “for almost limitless supply of hearts, and possibly other organs” could
diminish the need for heart-beating cadaver organ donors. The theory behind the

574

BBC News, Liver Cells Grown from Cord Blood
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6101420.stm, October 31, 2006, accessed
November 2, 2005).
575

Ibid.

576

BBC News, US Scientists Have Successfully Grown Fully Functioning
Bladders in the Lab, and Implanted Them into Patients with Bladder Disease
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4875244.stm, 2006, accessed May 22, 2006);
available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4875244.stm.
577

Ibid.

251

procedure involves developing “transplantable blood vessels or whole organs that
are made from your own cells” thus eliminating the need for immunosuppressive
drugs. Dr. Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet, the journal that reported the new
research, comments, “A lot more work needs to go into this, but over the next ten
years or so, we are going to see a revolution in transplantation.” 578 The prospects
of transplantable organs derived from recipients’ own cells are clearly preferable
to the current organ and tissue procurement system. Not only would it eliminate
much of the controversy that surrounds the means of procurement for
transplantation under the bifurcated standard, but it also would advance survival
rates for recipients. 579
Another approach that could significantly reduce the demand for organ
transplants would be the sustained, committed, long-term emphasis on disease and
injury prevention. 580 John McArdle suggests that if health-care industries,
government agencies, and individuals seriously enacted such measures, it would
not only “eliminate the need for all but a small fraction of current transplantation
procedures,” but also “provide additional benefits in all areas of medicine and
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public health.” 581 Wolfgang Bünnagel, a heart transplant survivor, notes how
many sufferers owe their conditions to unhealthy lifestyles due in large measure
to excessive consumption of fat, alcohol, and tobacco. 582 He suggests that
improved care of organs while still healthy is a better solution to organ disease
than transplants. Noting that the “majority of patients for liver transplants
are...suffering from liver disease due to alcohol consumption,” he advocates that,
“we change our ways of working, living and eating... and find daily routines that
better fit our bodies.” 583 Perhaps if incentives were offered to physicians and
patients, many people would be more prone to adopt healthier lifestyles. 584
However, while some human suffering is self-inflicted, one cannot wholly ascribe
all organ disease to lifestyle choices. Nonetheless, preventative medicine could
help reduce the need for organ donors.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, some experimental alternatives
to brain death may lie just over the horizon. Although most are in the beginning
stages of development, given the rapid advancement of recent biotechnologies in
medicine in the last decade, it is possible that some of these alternatives could be
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realized in the near future. On the whole, a multi-pronged approach to the organ
donor shortage, in which several possible alternatives to organ donation are
pursued, is advantageous for at least two significant reasons. First, these
alternatives promise to relieve many of the ethical concerns endemic to current
social policy and medical practice for procuring organs for transplantation.
Second, these alternatives promise greater health benefits and survival rates for
patients. Nonetheless, many of these alternatives are experimental and may never
be realized. During the interval, some mediating alternative is required to fill the
gap left by the abandonment of brain death as a means for organ procurement. In
the next section, some tentative considerations for organ procurement during the
latter stages of the dying process will be presented. It is necessary that such
considerations remain consistent with the ethical consensus governing the practice
of health care as discussed in the previous chapter.

7.4 Tentative Considerations for a New Standard
The implication of the discussion to this point suggests that there is no
immediate alternative to brain death as means for procuring unpaired viable
organs for transplantation. Indeed, some may worry that returning to a single
criterion of death would be to turn back time and thus undermine the progress that
has been made during the last thirty-five years in transplantation efforts. 585
However, as previous chapters have demonstrated, this “progress” has been at a
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cost. Nothing less than the public trust and the integrity of the medical profession
are at stake. Modesty in the claims of medical experts is required, particularly in
the light of the history of medical practice in which ethical violations were
justified for the purported benefits that would be reaped by society as a whole (see
Chapter 1). Any proposal, therefore, must be in accord with the ethical and legal
principles outlined in Chapter 6. Otherwise, the proposal will be no better than
what it purports to replace.
At first blush, the suggestion may sound overly ambitious. To begin with,
the idea of returning to a qualified form of the cardiopulmonary single standard of
death suggests that society might well find itself back in a 1960’s era of medical
practice, once again plagued by the attendant problems that were overcome
through the introduction of brain death. Moreover, to suggest that organ
donation, in particular heart donation, can proceed apart from brain death seems
to push the ethical boundaries beyond acceptable limits. This rationale does not
promise to solve all difficulties surrounding death and donation. No policy
proposal is without its problems. Rather, this rationale paves the way for the
implementation of social policy with the aim of accomplishing that for which the
brain-death criterion was created, apart from the vast majority of ethical problems
with which it is associated.
There are several reasons why the cardiopulmonary single standard
criterion is preferred. First, the cardiopulmonary criterion provides an ethically
safer environment for determining death. As previous chapters indicate,
neurological criteria for determining death rest on uncertain and unproven
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grounds. Commenting on the Italian legislation on brain death and capturing the
essence of the problem in general, Massimo Bondi writes,
It is well-known that our knowledge of the brain functions only
cover a bare 10% of their spectrum; therefore art.1 of law 578/93
(of the Italian legislation) stating that "death is the irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain" is scientifically an
absurdity, because it is not possible to declare an unknown
function to be "ceased.” 586
The uncertainty surrounding the moment of death lingers in the minds of many,
despite technological advances. Because of this, Hans Jonas’ suggestion that,
“Since we do not know the exact borderline between life and death, nothing less
than the maximal definition of death will do,” 587 remains relevant. The criteria
for death primarily should be based on patient care, and secondarily on the
economic and pragmatic interests of others. As Barry Bostrom observes,
…law, medicine and health care should be designed to err, if at all,
on the side of the preservation of life and the establishment of
rational principles for the protection of the most vulnerable persons
in society—those who are medically dependent and disabled. 588
Second, it is easier to satisfy informed consent under the cardiopulmonary
criterion. As previous chapters indicate, satisfying the demands of the doctrine of
informed consent under the brain-death criterion is, for all practical purposes,
impossible. David Price, commenting on the Danish Council on Ethics’ Report

586

Massimo Bondi, J'accuse: Against the Heart-Beating Brain Death
(Canonici Lateranensi: Universita' di Roma, 2006), Press Release, 8:1.
587

Hans Jonas, Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to
Technological Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 130.
588

Barry A. Bostrom. "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Model for the
United States?" Issues in Law and Medicine 4 (1989).

256

on Death notes the importance of the establishment of a concept of death that
relates to the common person’s every day experience:
In 1988, the Danish Council on Ethics, in a Report on Death, drew
attention to a perceived divide on ‘scientific’ (unseen) and
‘ordinary’ (seen) views of death. It stated that ‘The concept of
death must relate to the everyday experience’, according to which
‘the identity of the person relates no less to the body than to the
mind’, and recommended that the standard of death should be
cessation of respiration and cardiac activity. 589
Commenting on her personal experiences with family members of brain dead
patients, researcher Michi Nakajima observes:
During my five-month visit to the ICU, I felt one thing as most
peculiar in the beginning. None of the family members would take
the hand of the patient, nor shed a single tear at the news that their
husband, wife, or a beloved child was brain death. At first, I
thought I accidentally came across people who were cold-hearted
or logical-minded. However, I soon understood that no one really
felt that the brain dead person was truly dead.
Later, the same researcher notes:
But the same people, without exception, burst into tears or wiped
their eyes when the brain dead person’s heart ceased beating and
the respirator was removed. At this point, they truly realized their
relative’s death. 590
As noted in Chapter Three, it is unlikely that informed consent for organ donation
under the brain-death criterion is obtainable. The central problem emanates from
the complexity of the condition and the uncertainty of the diagnosis. However,
most people would have little difficulty accepting death as occurring at the
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permanent cessation of heart and respiratory functions. 591 What remains at this
point is some qualification on the particulars.
Finally, cardiopulmonary death, which is the most consistent criterion
under the current definition, enjoys an already established consensus. As Josef
Seifert contends, “Everyone will agree that after the end of the biological life of
the human organism as a whole there is no human life present in the body.” He
continues noting that, “A complete consensus is possible with regard to the thesis
that no human life is present before the beginning or after the end of the
biological life of the human organism.” Since no consensus can be established
regarding any other limit, he concludes that the “most natural, unambiguous
definition and criterion of human death…is preferable to any other criterion or
definition of death.” 592
Taken as a whole, the cardiopulmonary criterion can provide an ethically
safer environment for determining death, can more readily satisfy the demands of
informed consent, and has an already established consensus. Exactly how organ
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donation may proceed that respects the principles and distinctions embedded in
American law and ethics will be discussed next.
Based on discussions in previous chapters, at least three alternatives
emerge, each of which has major problems. In Section 5.3 of Chapter Five, a
proposal, with varying rationales, was offered by Koppelman, Truog, and
Robinson. Recognizing that brain death is not death, they suggest that while
cardiopulmonary death should be the default criterion of death, excepting the dead
donor rule for organ donation in cases where the patient is dying is acceptable
provided prior consent is obtained. However, as the critique in Chapter Five
demonstrates, this proposal would necessarily involve the collapse of the
traditional distinction between killing and allowing to die, thereby inviting a new
direction in how the practice of medicine is conceived. Not only would it involve
a dangerous use of medical power, it also would provide no basis against the use
of the practice of organ donation as a means of suicide by individuals with
decision-making capacity. In short, this proposal, while recognizing the problems
of organ donation under brain death, fails to maintain consistency with the ethical
consensus governing the practice of medicine today.
Another possibility is the suggestion made by D. Alan Shewmon which
was briefly alluded to in Chapter One. 593 Shewmon proposes a form of controlled
Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation (NHBD), with a short asystole time, as a
means for procuring organs for transplantation. Further elucidation of this
593
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proposal shows promise in satisfying the ethical demands as discussed in Chapter
Six. As Shewmon reminds, successful heart transplants in the 1960s were carried
out without the need for the brain-death criterion. Similar to the procedure used
by Christiaan Barnard, the process of removing hearts and lungs can be carried
out after discontinuation of ventilator support and circulatory standstill. After a
latency of sufficient time to ensure moral certainty that spontaneous resuscitation
will not occur, the removal process may begin. During the interval, preserving
medications can be delivered to select organs to ensure their viability. As
Margaret Lock notes, “If a patient is perfused with specially prepared cold fluids
immediately prior to or after cardiac arrest, then the organs remain in reasonably
good condition even after cardiopulmonary death and can be removed for
transplant.” 594 This elaborate procedure is needed, writes Shewmon, due to the
fact that “transplant surgeons never developed a technique for heart-lung retrieval,
primarily because the ‘brain-death’ fiction convinced them that there was no need
to do so.” For the sake of everyone’s consciences, he writes, “I believe that a
historically honest and physiologically enlightened appraisal of ‘brain death’
makes it an ethical requisite.” 595
There are a number of favorable characteristics in this proposed
procedure. First, it satisfies the ethical distinctions addressed in Chapter Six. The
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distinction between killing and allowing-to-die, upheld in both law and ethics,
permits patients or their surrogates to choose to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining measures that they deem extraordinary. This policy closely adheres to
this moral distinction by recognizing a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment.
Since organ procurement does not proceed until cardiopulmonary death is
determined, then there is no reason to extend donation beyond the dead donor
rule. Moreover, even if successful cardiopulmonary resuscitation is technically
possible, the decision to forego the ventilator “all the more so would be the
foregoing of resuscitation immediately thereafter.” 596 Second, informed consent
can be respected in a more meaningful way. Under the current paradigm,
informed consent is not achievable. The complexity of the issues surrounding
brain death and its diagnosis renders it practically impossible for patients to
understand. However, these problems are greatly lessened in light of the fact that
a consensus regarding cardiopulmonary death already exists. Most people accept
that when cardiopulmonary functions permanently cease, death has occurred.
Third, it could potentially increase the number of organ donors. Many more
patients who request to withdraw life-support are potential donors. This includes
neurologically devastated patients on life-support. By relieving the decades-old
596
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suspicion surrounding brain death that some suggest has been counterproductive
to organ procurement, many individuals may be more inclined to become organ
donors. 597
Despite these favorable characteristics, some important problems remain.
First, critics of NHBD note that while an asystolic heart can be used as a means
for determining death, it is unclear whether heart stoppage is actually reversible if
it could be restarted but is not due to a decision to forego resuscitation measures.
Robert Veatch explains:
Death requires irreversible stoppage, yet it is unclear whether that
means the heart could not be started again or merely will not be.
Even more perplexing is whether an individual should be
considered dead during the period when a heart could be restarted
by people with expert skills and sophisticated equipment if those
people and equipment are not available. The concept of
irreversibility has become much more complex. 598
In the analysis of some, ensuring that spontaneous resuscitation will not occur is
unsatisfactory. 599 Given the possibility that if a patient is removed from lifesupport, and resuscitation efforts are successful in restoring circulation, the patient
cannot be said to have been dead when life support was removed. Simply
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deciding not to resuscitate does not constitute “irreversibility” but rather conflates
a prognosis of death with a diagnosis of death. 600
A second problem concerning the meaning of irreversibility involves
whether brain tissue is dead at the point when heart stoppage is determined to be
irreversible. NHBD protocols that employ a short asystole time 601 run the risk of
designating a patient dead when a patient’s brain continues to be living. 602 Under
the current paradigm, a patient in this state is not yet dead. Protocols that do not
allow for sufficient time for determining irreversibility may allow for greater
viable organ procurement, but run the risk of violating the Dead Donor Rule.
A third possibility remains. One could employ the cardiopulmonary death
criterion, minus the short asystole time to ensure that irreversibility is met to the
satisfaction of the concerns expressed above. This would allow the employment
of Shewmon’s controlled method, though modified with a longer wait period to
ensure that the patient is really dead. A consequence of this would be a reduction
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of viable organs due to the greater length of time necessary prior to procurement
to ensure irreversibility is satisfied. 603
While no alternative is without its problems, the third suggestion seems to
be the least troubling. Although a thorough investigation of these alternatives is
beyond the scope of this dissertation, this preliminary suggestion is offered as a
means to expand discussion in terms of how society might proceed to further
organ donation in light of the major problems that call into question the ethical
sustainability of brain death as a means for organ procurement. In attempt to
further such discussion, the following policy recommendations are presented.

7.5 Policy Recommendations
The following policy recommendations are an attempt to balance
autonomy, death, and organ donation in a more meaningful way. First, as
suggested in the previous section, social policy should recognize a standard of
death that is consistent with current medical science and is generally
understandable to the average person. A form of the cardiopulmonary criterion,
which focuses on the permanent cessation of the circulatory and respiratory
functions, is best suited to accomplish these goals. Second, in an effort to satisfy
the ethical and legal requirements of informed consent, social policy should
respect personal autonomy by requiring transparency through disclosure of the
diagnosis of death and the procedure used to procure organs and tissues. This
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requires that the individual be informed as to the definition and diagnosis of
death, the procedures employed in procuring organs and tissues for donation, and
be given the opportunity to specify the extent of his or her anatomical gift.
Finally, consideration should be given to the means for satisfying the informed
consent process. This could be accomplished through the use of a form (advanced
directive), containing signatures from the potential organ donor and a physician,
indicating the potential donor’s informed consent and directive of extent for
donation. These policy considerations are offered as a means of furthering
discussion specific to safeguarding patient choice and the integrity of the medical
profession in general.
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